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ABSTRACT: Research for the developing world can generate evidence on the effectiveness of foreign aid, 
invent new technologies that serve poor people, and strengthen research capabilities in poor countries. 
How do countries determine which of these policy goals to pursue? Examining the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia reveals how each country established a unique approach to research funding. 
Programs and grantmaking evolved in response to various expectations across governments, tempered 
by the need to remain credible in the scientific community. This book explores the histories of the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), Canada’s International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR). Looking back, 
changes in research governance encouraged a shift towards whole-of-government priorities, shorter 
timeframes for realizing results, and performance predicated on academic productivity and research 
impact. Whereas funders used to encourage “small is beautiful” with local experiments in development, 
today the emphasis is on “getting to scale” delivering innovation through self-financing models. Looking 
forward, research for the developing world is fading as part of development assistance, yet rising as 
collaboration on common global challenges. Funders are adopting new definitions of performance and 
actively shaping policy to connect science and international development. Leaders are brokering 
partnerships that connect research governance at home and abroad, bridging the incentives toward 
academic productivity and research impact. In short, the future of research for the developing world is 
moving from foreign aid to science diplomacy. 
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This book is the result of seven years of study, reflection, and practice of supporting research for the 
developing world. This journey combined formal scholarship with participant observation, as both an 
outsider and insider to the subject.  
As a scholar, I am indebted to the wise counsel of Robert Shepherd, Lisa Mills, and Marc-Andre Gagnon. 
Together they forced me to ground my intellectual curiosity into a framework that draws on the 
literature in public management, international development, and science policy. I am particularly 
thankful for Robert’s advice to prepare a document guide, specifying what information I needed and 
how it linked to the theoretical framework. This turned out to be a brilliant tactic I recommend to 
anyone who wishes to stay focused and avoid getting lost in the archives. Robert also challenged me to 
go further, pushing beyond the obvious, to identify deeper lessons and insights. Luc Juillet and Michael 
Brklacich provided sage advice that sharpened the conclusions and understanding of leadership, 
performance, and governance.  
As a practitioner, I was privileged to work with numerous colleagues at Canada’s International 
Development Research Centre. Lauchlan Munro, Maureen O’Neil, and Tim Dottridge deserve special 
praise for sharing their deep knowledge of the organization’s history, encouraging colleagues to 
question received wisdom, and providing opportunities for young people to take on new responsibility. 
Bruce Muirhead and Ron Harpelle provided insights on how to conduct historical research and 
generously share their source materials and insights. This proved to be a point of departure for tracing a 
story across three countries. I am grateful for openness of numerous people in Australia, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom who willingly shared their experience in, dedication to, and passion for this subject. 
It takes a special kind of person to set aside their professional aspirations for the benefit of others. I am 
humbled and privileged to have met men and women who have dedicated their professional lives to 
furthering science and improving lives in the developing world.  
Finally, as a spouse and parent, I am indebted to Nora, Miranda and David for their patience during the 
research and writing of this book. This meant tolerating far too many shortened weekends and absences 
from home. You accompanied every step of this journey, occasionally in person and always in spirit.  
 
Expecting more: changing governance of public research 
The inspiration for this book came from a 2008 meeting described as a gathering of “like-minded” 
funders with a commitment to supporting research for the developing world. On the surface, all agreed 
on intent and thematic priorities: everyone wanted to improve health, resolve conflict, make 
governments accountable, and help poor people adapt to climate change. Yet there was no consensus 
on how to address these priorities. One participant urged for providing developing country governments 
with budget support, another called for core funding to southern universities, and another argued for 
funding independent policy think tanks. Each was invested in a distinct set of programs which embodied 
different assumptions about how change occurs and how their organization’s work contributed to it. 
These programs were incommensurable, departing from different first principles regarding the purpose 
of research, its role in development, and how the world worked. These unstated philosophies are more 
than an academic curiosity, as they carry real consequences for the research community, in terms of 
which ideas were more attractive to the funder, and who receives their support. 
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From this meeting emerged a question: how do funders decide on their approach to “research for the 
developing world”, and why do these approaches vary over time and between funders? The answer lies 
in the policy environment surrounding each funder. Sitting at the nexus between foreign policy and 
science policy, funders must be sensitive to both. Funders adopt particular program theories in part due 
to the performance regime in which they find themselves. This book explores how three different 
funders survived, and occasionally thrived over three decades when hard questions were asked of public 
research. Many countries became less tolerant of curiosity-driven work with vague promises of eventual 
spin-offs, and began to favor more applied work predicated on more demonstrable economic and social 
benefits. The following chapters delve into the parallel worlds of London, Canberra, and Ottawa, where 
alternate narratives of research evolved along divergent paths despite the similarities of a Westminster-
style parliamentary system. The story that unfolds is one of changes in the policy environment which 
affect how well each funder “fits” with what government wants, and how each funders not only adapted 
to the changing governance but demonstrated leadership in advocating for its own ideas.  
This chapter introduces the ideas of research for the developing world, and the changing governance of 
public research in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The next chapter introduces the 
framework used to study the governance around, and the routines inside, organizations that fund 
research for the developing world. The subsequent chapters present three case studies, a funder from 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, identifying when and how each altered their programs and 
grantmaking practice. The latter part of the book looks across these experiences to discuss why funders 
made these decisions, and looks forward to the future prospects of research for the developing world. 
The book concludes with critical insights on the nature of leadership with public organizations, the 
implementation of performance management, and the evolving definitions of research impact.  
 
Research for the developing world  
Before delving into the research for the developing world, it is useful to review the meaning of science, 
research, and innovation. Science is a set of procedures used to certify a claim to knowledge, or to 
skeptically subject ideas to argument, criticism, and empirical evidence (Merton 1942). The methods of 
science include observing phenomenon, formulating potential explanations, and testing hypotheses. 
Science is also communal as scientists share their own findings, and test and extend the findings made 
by others. Approaches to conducting science vary from the experimental to the speculative depending 
on the use of evidence and causal explanation. Science embraces a wider range of disciplines and ways 
of knowing, ranging from the study and manipulation of the natural world (e.g. biology and medicine) to 
understanding human society (e.g. history and sociology). Scientific works are expected to be plausible, 
valuable, and original: attributes that contribute to the notions of scientific excellence and research 
quality.  
Research is creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, 
and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications (OECD 2002). The Frascati manual 
describes surveys of research expenditures and outputs, and distinguishes activities for generating new 
knowledge (“research and development”, or R&D) from related-scientific activities for sharing 
knowledge, such as workshops and conferences (which together with R&D sums “science and 
technology”, or S&T). Innovation, in contrast, is the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product, process, or method (OECD-Eurostat 2005). The Oslo manual describes surveys of the activities 
intended to lead to innovations, including design, engineering, and management. While research is 
about of new knowledge, innovation is converting knowledge into value, by making or doing things in 
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new ways. Innovations can be entirely original (new-to-world) or novel for given place or use (new-to-
context).  
Science and innovation have improved the material condition of human societies. Looking back, the 
development of modern Western societies stemmed from an unintentional process of adopting and 
refining technologies that enhanced the productive capability of the economy and improved the 
wellbeing of citizens. Whether measured as income, life expectancy, or education, human development 
over the past two centuries was profoundly influenced by the spread of electricity, vaccines, and 
telecommunications. Yet for much of that time, such advances were largely unintentional and 
accidental, the spontaneous diffusion of innovations that people recognized and valued. This diffusion 
occurred across national boundaries, as different countries learned from each other, adapted available 
technologies to their local conditions, and elaborated new ones to address local needs.  
Following the Second World War, policy increasingly sought to intentionally direct science and 
innovation towards continued enhancement of life at home and addressing needs abroad. Technological 
advances in radar, radio, aviation, and nuclear physics had contributed to the war effort and Western 
societies seized upon the promise of technology to provide freedom from want during times of peace. 
At home, these countries had entered an age of government science with expanded funding and 
institutional arrangements for public research. Abroad, the leaders of newly independent developing 
countries eagerly sought to establish domestic capability in key areas of science, such as agricultural, 
water, public health, and energy. Science and innovation had former part of the relationship between 
European powers and their colonies overseas, and would become among the less controversial 
elements of the emerging era of foreign aid. In the United States, President Truman outlined a vision 
“for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas”. The next three decades, up to the early 1970s, witnessed a 
period of economic growth, expanding budgets, and unbridled enthusiasm that science was improving 
the human condition.  
The glow surrounding science and innovation lost part of its sheen between the late 1970s and 1990s. 
Economic crises required western governments to cut back on public research funding, while changing 
ideas on the role of the state inspired divesture of government-owned laboratories in favor of 
stimulating science in universities and the private sector. Science entered a new period of “steady state” 
funding, marked by a contracting space for government science. The increased crop yields of the first 
green revolution in agriculture reached a point of diminishing returns, and new missions—such as the 
“war of cancer” or polio eradication—proved more difficult and complex than initially thought. A new 
awareness set in concerning the constraints of scientific progress, and its potential consequences of in 
terms of income distribution, poverty, and environmental degradation. Yet science and innovation 
continued to enjoy a positive reputation and witnessed a renaissance following the Cold War, with a 
renewed understanding of interdependencies in a globalizing world.  
These shifting perspectives on science and innovation matter because they shaped the context for 
public organizations that fund research for the developing world. Some of these organizations were 
born out of a colonial legacy of scientific cooperation with the developing world, while others were 
established as their countries embraced a new role in international affairs. This book traces the histories 
of three such organizations, one each from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and how they 
adapted to evolving ideas on—and government support for—science, innovation, and international 
development. These organizations shared the common imperative of keeping up with the times: 
cultivating the support of their home governments, securing the funding required to continue their 
work, while also maintain their credibility within the research communities at home and abroad. They 
5 
 
also needed to define—and redefine—their position relative to other funding organizations involved in 
this space, including countries with different traditions—such as the Swedish Agency for Research 
Cooperation1 or France’s Institut de recherché pour le developpement (IRD)—and philanthropic 
foundations—such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Bill & Melinda Gates—that are autonomous from 
government expectations.  
Over time, such organizations adopted diverse approaches to research for the developing world. Key 
among these were to provide evidence informing donors of the effects of different interventions to 
reduce poverty, to mobilize existing talent to design technology that serves poor people, and to build 
the capability of poorer countries to conduct science for their own benefit.2 In deciding how to support 
research, funders must decide what knowledge to advance, what types of support to offer, and how 
research might be used (table 1.1). Some act like think tanks and fund intramural research performed by 
staff or consultants, others act like granting councils and fund work performed by the research 
community. Collectively, such organizations pursue multiple approaches including funding researchers 
at home, abroad in developing countries, or collaboration between these two groups.  
Habermann and Langthale (2010) distinguish among research “on” development as a social 
phenomenon done mainly by social sciences, humanities, and economics; “for” development supporting 
innovation in developing countries and oriented towards natural science and engineering; and policy-
related work on strategy and practice of development co-operation.  Their first category includes the 
long-standing tradition of “development studies”, scholarship that seeks to understand the developing 
world, drawing on the traditions of sociology and anthropology. In contrast, their second category is 
more open the researchers who do not necessarily specialize in the problems of the developing world, 
yet also is more restrictive as expects research will affect the material conditions abroad. Their third 
category is yet more restrictive and casts the purpose of research as cause-effect relation between 
donor interventions and outcomes (Rousseau 2006 and Nutley et al 2007). According to Khagram et al. 
(2009) “successful” research outputs are accessible, credible, and actionable. In other words, research 
for the developing world should be easily communicated, accepted as valid, and inform decision-making. 
This latter approach casts research as an input into official development assistance, akin to labour or 
capital. To the extent that the research agenda increasingly embraced a narrow focus on providing 
evidence on “what works”, it excluded understanding of how the wider process of development unfolds. 
It also ignored the politics of knowledge: the potential for research to contest and reframe how societies 
understand themselves, the problems they face, and their potential solutions. Funders are encouraged 
to favor politically-safe questions of technological innovation, limiting the opportunities got more 
contentious questions regarding social norms or how power is distributed and used in society. Improving 
crops or vaccines hold the potential to provide more food or lessen the burden of disease, yet no 
amount of technological innovation can solve poverty if its conditions are rooted in larger social 
inequalities and deprivation (Edwards 2010). When research is devoid of politics, it ignores the 
constraints poor people face and their potential to affect change in their lives. 
These diverse approaches and notions of research quality reflect the rise of empiricism and 
experimentation in the social sciences in the latter twentieth century. Bastow, Dunleavy and Tinkler 
 
1 Once an independent organization, the early 21st century saw SAREC merged into the Swedish International 
Development Agency (see King and McGarth 2004) 
2 For a fuller review of diverse approaches are contained in Singer et al. 1970, UN Millennium Project 2005, 
Scoones and Leach 2006, Wagner 2008, Molenaar et al. 2009, Khagram et al. 2009; Conway and Waage 2010, 
Edwards 2010, and Ely and Leach 2010. 
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(2014) note that social science thinking and methods have evolved towards mathematicization, 
quantification, formalization and theorization. These authors suggest this shift started with “physics 
envy” in the 20th century, as economics and psychology sought to advance more rapidly by embracing 
consensual research priorities and codified knowledge in mathematics. The social sciences also 
experienced waves of rational choice and game theory in the 1990s and of behavioural psychology more 
recently covering cognitive limits, the effects of problem framing and nudge effects where how 
information is presented influences how it is perceived and acted on. 
Organizations vary with respect to the intended purpose and audience for the research they fund. 
Following Habermann and Langthale’s (2010) typology, the purpose can range from understanding the 
natural world or society, to trying out new approaches or technologies, to assessing the outcomes of 
particular interventions. Audience can range from peers in academia, donor or partner governments 
promoting top-down development, or local people, civil society, social movements or private 
enterprises engaged in bottom-up development. As funders choose among their goals, purpose, and 
audience, they set the cornerstones for the program theory that guides their grantmaking.  
In practice, there are a limited number of funding instruments available. The tool of choice has become 
the project grant, although funders can and do offer a variety of awards, including scholarships or 
fellowships for talented individuals, block grants or core funding to particular research-performing 
organizations, or ex-post prizes for research in particular areas or that answers a priority problem. The 
choice among these options relies on assumptions regarding the importance of the research process 
being connected to local conditions (Wagner 2008): whether to study local phenomenon and reach local 
audiences (e.g. field-level agricultural production among farmers), or if the research can take place 
anywhere and reach global audiences (e.g. vaccine development, design of low-cost products). 
Funding organizations often embrace a combination of goals and approaches, seeking to simultaneously 
advance knowledge and build research capabilities required for future advances. The ability to pursue 
such requires a long-term vision that considers not just a few years and the immediate outputs of a 
particular project or program, but several years and the career advancement of young researchers and 
how research contributes to development outcomes for poor and disadvantaged members of society. 
This book reveals how the space to consider and pursue such longer-term goals was squeezed over time, 
as government expectations of public research turned towards more clearly defined and shorter-term 
results. At the same time, the idea of research for the developing world is increasingly intermingled with 
a rising demand for research on global challenges that affect both developing countries and advanced 
economies, such as infectious disease, food security, and climate adaptation (cf Reid et al. 2010, Varmus 
et al 2003). 
Guston (2000) argues that "[t]he asymmetry of information between those who would conduct research 
and those who would govern it presents the central problem of science policy". The classic solution to 
such asymmetry is the principal-agent model. This model considers two rational actors: the principal 
who provides an incentive to the agent to conduct some work or provide a service on their behalf. In 
this simple situation, the principal does not have full information of what the agent is doing at all times. 
As a rational actor, the agent is expected to also pursue his or her own goals and interests in addition to 
doing the principal’s bidding. The extent to which the agent acts on behalf of the principal, rather than 
for themselves, is a function of the incentives provided (e.g. payments) and the efforts invested to 




Table 1.1: Variety in defining and funding research for the developing world. The first three rows 
denote unique program logics, the last two columns spread across these as there is limited number of 
grantmaking practices and multiple ways each of them can connect with development outcomes. 
 
 
This model has been expanded to cast research funders in the middle between what government wants 
done and what researchers actually do (Braun 1993, Rip 1994, van der Meulen 1998, 2003). The 
research funder is a boundary organization that both responds to direction from government and 
provides incentives to researchers who compete for the resources offered (figure 1). The funder is 
simultaneously an agent of the government and a principal to the research community. As Rip (1994) 
argues, funders “must legitimate next year's budget in terms of an attractive portfolio of projects to be 
funded, while the money must be disbursed in a way that is acceptable to the scientists.” Braun (2003) 
describes the problem of governance as how to attract the curiosity of researchers to problems of 
research users. This includes the means by which policymakers get researchers to respond to policy 
demand, ensure they recruit qualified recipients (avoid adverse selection), and that these recipients 
apply themselves to task (avoid moral hazard). 
Research funders are thus an intermediary organization. Meyer and Kearnes (2013) define such as 
entities that “structure expertise and policy imperatives…[and] selectively mobilise and reframe 
contemporary policy discourse and ideas of usability, applicability and impact so as to influence the 
conduct of researchers and research institutions”. These authors identify three approaches to the study 
of such intermediaries: documentary (describing a shift towards distributed forms of governance), 
contractual (underpinned by principal-agent theory), and performance (behaviour of intermediaries 
"getting things done"). These authors describe the contractual approach as drawing on the concept of 
rational choice, focused on “the delegation of political authority… and the particular mandates that 
enable intermediary organisations to operate simultaneously as principals and agents when acting as an 
interface between national governments and research communities”. 
Yet qualified researchers also choose among different funders when seeking support for their work. 
Shove (2003) and Grimpe (2011) consider the point of view of the researcher (agent) who manages 
different opportunities through sequential participation with different funders. Scientists can be 
assumed to select those grants for which they anticipate the highest “return”. Over time, researchers 
string together separately funded projects to pursue their longer-term interests and professional career. 
Projects pull individual researchers into temporary, for-purpose networks with specific objectives. 
Individual researchers are akin to free agents that move between projects. When one project ends, they 
enter into another and may be part of multiple projects at any given time.  










































Researchers can be expected to ignore funding opportunities that stray too far from their interests or 
that do not further their careers. Funders thus compete for the limited time researchers have to prepare 
grant applications and project proposals. Qualified researchers can be expected to prefer opportunities 
that offer greater return on the effort invested in applying for funding. In other words, publicly-funded 
research is not exclusively a “buyer’s market” in which researchers compete for scarce funding; it can 
also be a “seller’s market” in which funders compete for scarce talent and ideas. Consequently, the 
funder must maintain some credibility within the research community to attract a pool of sufficiently 
qualified grant seekers. This is especially so in contexts where researchers have options to pursue 
funding from other organizations, such as domestic granting councils, philanthropic foundations, or 
international organizations. Any particular funder may be just one among a number of potential 
principals to the research community. 
 
Figure 1.1: Principal-Agent Relations Organizations that support publicly-funded research are 
simultaneous an agent of home governments and principal to researchers. 
 
Between states and markets  
Despite its elegance, the principal-agent model ignores the wider governance of public research as well 
as the organizational routines within each funder. Polster (2003) describes such governance as “the 
courses of action in and through which research is conceived, produced, and transmitted to society.” 
The OECD (2003) describes it as the decision-making processes that govern priority setting, funding 
allocation, and the management of research institutes, including how their performance is assessed. The 
OECD innovation strategy (2010) describes it as the institutional arrangements and incentive structures 
that determine how actors “interact in allocating and managing resources… to steer and give direction” 
to research and innovation. While these descriptions are somewhat abstract, the next chapter 
introduces the framework used to study the governance around, and routines inside, three 
organizations that funding research for the developing world. The remainder of this chapter discusses 
what research governance is, and how it is changing.  
Any particular funder is itself an agent to multiple principals and exposed to a diverse range of 
expectations. Public funders in particularly are embedded in a nested set of relationships. At one level, 
one can describe research governance in Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom and how it contrasts 
to research governance in continental Europe or the United States. Yet there are also distinct 
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three levels: the macro goals for public research and its role in relation to the political and economic 
systems; the meso-level of selecting, monitoring, and evaluation of research grants; and the micro-level 
of negotiated practice within academic and research organizations. Edgerton (2009) similarly 
acknowledges the existence of multiple levels, stating there “is no stable entity called science which is 
governed, worried about, applauded, condemned, invested in, much less understood. Each small part of 
'science' is governed by many institutions, and many policies.”  
Research governance is also a coordination problem, to ensure sufficient investment to produce a public 
good. Markets are expected to underinvest in research due to the indivisibility, uncertainty, and 
externalities associated with the creation of new knowledge (Arrow 1962). Some benefits accrue to 
those that copy or use such knowledge, rather than those who undertake and underwrite the research 
(Helpman 2004). Private firms in particular tend to invest in near-market research for novel products 
and services that can create new demand and enjoy temporary rents. There is little incentive to invest in 
basic or fundamental research that cannot be easily captured or utilized by its creator or sponsor. Public 
funding is necessary to correct this market failure, encouraging work that is valuable to society, but 
underprovided by the market.  
Research governance traditionally centered on the academic community, with interaction among peers 
to determine membership in the scientific community, to identify priority problems, and to consolidate 
accepted knowledge. Polanyi’s (1962) “republic of science” describes scientists as working in isolation 
from markets and society, a self-organizing community in which members optimize their time and effort 
based on the results published by others. Science is coordinated through perceived merit—including 
considerations of plausibility, accuracy, importance, and originality—rather than through the market 
principles of price, consumer surplus, and efficiency. This self-organizing research governance offers 
only an indirect promise of public benefit, focusing instead on how a given work is valued among peers.  
State interests also form part of research governance, with public funding tied to the expectation of 
outcomes valued by government. Stretching back to before the 18th century, royal patronage of 
scientists formed part of the competition among nations for international prestige, such as the UK prizes 
for new military or navigational technologies. In the twentieth-century, Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) 
describe the United States as funding “Cold War science” under a Keynesian state, justified by a 
narrative of winning battles against communism, polio, and cancer. The country subsequently shifted 
towards a “competitiveness agenda” under the neoliberal state, justified by a narrative of increasing the 
number of jobs and growing the country’s share of global markets. Although the country does fund 
curiosity-driven research, the majority of public research funds are directed through mission-oriented 
agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Institutes of Health, and 
Departments of Defense and of Energy.  
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom all experienced greater pressure to rationalize public 
spending after the 1970s. Before this time, a vibrant research community was a sine qua non for social 
progress, valued for generating fundamental discoveries and for contributing to the national missions, 
such as exploration, public health, and national defense. After the 1970s, policy increasingly embraced 
the rhetoric of market principles for organizing public research, justifying investments based on their 
expected return. Granting councils began to consider user involvement, policy relevance, and potential 
for commercialization, alongside the traditional criteria of peer review and academic credentials. There 
was greater attention to “demand pull” based on the societal relevance of research, over “science push” 
based on researchers’ autonomy in setting their agenda. 
10 
 
Inspired by the new public management, governments moved away from direct bureaucratic control 
towards more indirect "steering" through setting research priorities and evaluating outcomes. 
Governments became more proactive in guiding their investments and demanding to know more about 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the research they fund. Policymakers questioned whether the 
research they supported was relevant to current public issues, and demanded new forms of evidence to 
inform their decisions (UNESCO 2010). Researchers—and the organizations that support them—were 
pressed to identify how their work benefited others (Boden et al 2006, Jansen 2007, Schubert 2009, 
Stephan 2012). Whitley (2011) describes changes in the relative authority of different groups including 
government, funding agencies, research administrators, individual researchers and teams, national and 
international scientific elites, and commercial and other external interests. Wagner (2008) argues that 
the research process became more networked as individuals increasingly collaborate to share funding, 
data, tasks, and infrastructure. Policy goals and the allocation of funding became increasingly negotiated 
among policymakers, researchers, and potential ‘consumers’. Control over the research agenda moved 
away from the scientific community and expert opinion (endogenous) towards the realm of public policy 
and government decision (exogenous).  
Public research funders responded in various ways, adopting targeted programs aligned to government 
priorities and competitive allocation of funds, as well as additional selection criteria for research 
proposals and more evaluation of project results. Targeted programs earmark funding to priority areas 
of perceived public interest, including explicit objectives to develop new technology and contribute to 
economic growth. Such programs tend to use time-limited project grants for work on specific problems. 
Consequently funders scaled back on core funding, or institutional block grants, available for research-
performing organizations to allocate internally among their own departments and projects.  
Competition for project grants requires research-performing organizations to be at arm’s-length from 
government, opening opportunities for new entrants into the research funding “market” and avoiding 
capture by established actors. Meanwhile a move to concentrate funding encouraged more intense 
research, in fewer areas, by smaller number of increasingly specialized units (Polster 2003, Benner 
2011). A rise in competitive bidding reduced the researcher’s time horizon and heightened the 
importance of performance assessment (Whitley and Glaser 2007). The time within research is expected 
to lead to interesting results has shortened, and the opportunities for financial support for idiosyncratic 
projects has declined. 
Funders expanded their use of ex ante evaluation of research proposals and the ex post evaluation of 
project results. Traditionally peer review of academic quality was the sole selection criteria for deciding 
which proposals receive funding. Yet increasingly the notions of relevance and usefulness became more 
prominent in such decisions. In other words, the criteria of external validity rose in importance. Funders 
focused on policy questions driving the research agenda, rather than the researcher’s disciplinary 
background or preferred method (Ravallion and Gelb 2010). Funders also moved to limit the portion of 
overall costs they were willing to support, requiring recipients to secure additional funding from other 
sources. This condition of co-funding was a market test, demonstrating that others valued the proposed 
work and are willing to invest in it.  
In terms of evaluation, funders adopted increasingly elaborate systems for performance assessment, 
subjecting their grants to greater scrutiny. Productivity is assessed by in terms of the quantity of 
publications and patents produced, as well as their quality in terms of citations or licenses. There is also 
interest in measuring impact or outcomes whether in terms of the monetary value created by patents, 
licenses and start-up enterprises, or detailed assessments of how research findings are adopted by 
practitioners and inform the thinking and actions of policymakers. 
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This new governance is not without its critics, who fear research funding veered towards seeking profit 
instead of truth. Demeritt (2000) laments the shift “from a metaphorical market of ideas… to an actual 
market system” while Shove and Redclift (2001) argue that “academics now have to 'sell' research ideas 
to policy communities and respond to non-academic competition, whilst maintaining conventional 
academic credentials”.  
Recent calls to demonstrate value-for-money gloss over potentially incommensurable ways of 
understanding research and its utility to society. Research is not only a production process, assessed 
according to the quantity of publication or selling price of patents. It is also a process of discovery, 
assessed according to the evidence of progress on problems. Ultimately, society is more concerned 
about finding a cure for cancer, rather than the number of articles written about it. Rip (2003) suggests 
that the literature is already moving away from a narrow focus on static efficiency and effectiveness, 
towards a more dynamic interest in the appropriateness of past actions and improving performance 
over time.  
Meyer and Kearnes (2013) observe an increased attention in academia to the policy instruments 
employed by science intermediaries, such as funding formulae, which these authors see as affecting the 
“institutional contexts of scientific practice" including the incentives that shape the behavior of 
researchers. Extending the arguments put forward by these authors, these incentives even shape the 
career decisions of young professionals, for example choosing to specialize in lab-based genomic 
research focused on developing new crops versus field-based extension work focused on the practices 
of farmers in rural areas. States have used competitive resource allocation among universities and public 
research organizations to push them towards research related to public policy goals and 
commercializing their findings. Such "steering" of research purpose implies a move away from 
disciplinary goals and core problems towards research that contributes towards "solving" societal 
problems.   
Key points 
There is no one accepted definition of research for the developing world. Instead different funding 
organizations adopted distinct approach and modified them over time. To understand why this is so, it is 
important to move beyond principal-agent model and assess what was happening in the wider research 
governance which influenced these decisions and the organizational routines within each funder. 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom witnessed a shift in research funding towards a narrower 
agenda predicated on “solving” problems, raising revenues, and reducing costs. Researchers no longer 
have unquestioned authority to allocate public funds and govern their own affairs. The governance of 
publicly-funded research moved from a self-organized “republic of science”, to market-inspired goals 
negotiated among policymakers, stakeholders, and research “consumers”. Researchers—and the 
funding organizations that support them—must demonstrate the value of their work, not only in terms 
of scientific excellence in the eyes of peers, but in terms of its cost-effectiveness and its impact in areas 
relevant to others beyond academia. 
This raises a fundamental question regarding the value of publicly-funded research. How is research 
valued? By whom? And what is it expected to achieve? The answers to such questions form the first 
principles underlying why science is considered useful to society. Often unstated and implicit, the extent 
to which research policy and practice endorse one form of value over another has profound 
consequences. At the level of research funders, it affects how their performance is assessed: what 
constitutes “success” for a funding program, which lines of inquiry and which recipients are funded. At 
the level of individual researchers, teams, and centers, it exercises a powerful influence on research 
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careers, determining which actions are rewarded, and shaping how researchers invest their time and 
effort. The idea of “research for the developing world” is to apply science and innovation to benefit 
disadvantaged people and resource-constrained places. Yet between this lofty aspiration and the 
mundane details of grantmaking, diverse funding programs embrace different first principles. The 
history of funders in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom is marked by a tension among 
supporting the interests of research communities at home or abroad, the interest of home governments 
in pursuing their foreign policy and trade relations, and the interests of host countries abroad in 
furthering their national development plans. Leadership requires designing programs that secure the 
support of multiple stakeholders by at least partially satisfying the different values each associates with 
public research.   
Given the shifts in research governance at home, funders can be expected to have strengthened their 
upwards accountability to home governments, weakening somewhat their downwards accountability 
towards host countries and research communities. The criteria by which funders are judged—and on 
which they base their decisions—is expected to turn towards the utility of research for influential 
stakeholders at home, and away from its relevance and contribution to the host societies abroad. 
Research for the developing world originated with a vision of empowering host societies: building their 
capability to create and adapt knowledge in order to address the needs of their citizens and shape their 
own future. Yet as home governments came to expect to more direct benefit from public research 
spending, they favored research that informs decision making on how to invest foreign aid dollars or 
how to address shared global challenges.  
This chapter introduced the ideas of research for the developing world, and the changing governance of 
public research in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The next chapter introduces the 
framework used to study the governance around, and the routines inside, three organizations that fund 
research for the developing world. The subsequent chapters examine each of these organizations, 
identifying distinct periods of time when the funder pursued a particular approach to its work. 
Understanding how and why these approaches evolved when they did provides insight into the extent 
to which such work was subjected to the changing governance noted above.   
 
 
Research funders: adapting to government expectations 
This chapter introduces the framework used to examine the governance context for public research, and 
the response by three organizations that fund research for the developing world. The previous chapter 
described how the context of research governance evolved in recent decades, exposing funders to new 
expectations on what research is meant to achieve, coming from a changing set of stakeholders. Yet 
research funding organizations are not passive. Leadership within these funders select which 
expectations to respond to, and which to ignore. These choices influence how the funders craft various 
program offerings which aim to maintain credibility with both their government sponsors and potential 
grant seekers in the research community.   
Research governance is examined as a performance regime which includes expectations emanating from 
multiple sources, such as Parliament, ministers, line departments, central agencies, beneficiaries, and 
public opinion (Talbot 2010). At any given moment, the viability of a public organization depends on 
achieving a connection between what the organization does and what such entities consider to be good 
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performance. In essence, there is not a single government voice telling public organizations what to do, 
instead they have to contend with multiple principals shaping various dimensions of the policy space 
within which the organization operates. Yet performance regimes are not static, and the notions of what 
constitutes good performance do change over time.  
Funders are adaptive organizations build upon past experience and selectively decide how to respond to 
changing expectations. Research funders periodically renew their priorities and programs, and evolve 
certain patterns in how they engage with the research community and support research activities. In 
this way, R4D funders learn: testing and refining different program theories (how they understand their 
actions contribute to international development). Successful experiences are codified into the 
grantmaking practices the funder uses to support research: who is eligible for funding, how to support 
them, and how research is used.  
Performance Regimes 
Dismayed at the diversity of approaches to performance management, Talbot (2010) argues for a 
coming together of theories. He posits that such a unified framework could involve three parts: models 
that identify both results and the factors that enable them, attention to regimes of power holders and 
the tools they utilize to shape performance of public organizations, and the public values that guide 
these power holders and public servants. His concept of “performance regime” is the ensemble of such 
formal and informal influences that direct public sector service delivery, through formal and informal 
cooperation and competition (Talbot 2008). This concept can be tailored to the context of the public 
entity under study, whether a research funder or a health ministry. These two entities are subject both 
common and unique expectations. In the same country they are both subject to performance tools 
emanating from central agencies, yet are also accountable to distinct ministers and different sets of 
stakeholders. Such a regime is akin to the institutional setting (cf Ostrom 2005), but emphasizes the 
model of performance held by influential actors and how their understanding is grounded in public 
values.  
Talbot draws attention to the first principles underpinning a study of performance, the often unstated 
assumptions regarding the nature of reality (ontology), how one can know this reality (epistemology), 
and the techniques for knowing (methodology). He argues that many studies of performance start from 
weak or distorted theoretical assumptions about the behavior and motivations of individuals and 
organizations. He identifies four key problems including defining the unit of analysis and its boundaries, 
determining what is included (and excluded) from the concept of performance, choosing techniques to 
measure it (qualitatively, quantitatively, client satisfaction), and identifying the political implications of 
pursuing multiple values simultaneously. As noted in the previous chapter, certain areas of public policy 
are subject to multiple competing goals, including research for the developing world. 
Talbot’s performance regime thus combines the institutional context of actors and the powers they 
possess to steer public organizations, with performance interventions or the actions these actors 
undertake to influence the performance of public organizations. Talbot (2010, 83) identifies this as a 
realist approach, based in historical institutionalism that can be used to analyze changing governance of 
performance over time. He sees performance as both "brute facts" and socially-constructed meanings 
attached to such facts. The dimensions of performance are epistemologically real, as are the positions, 
attitudes, and beliefs held by real groups and individuals. Talbot cites Moore’s triad of public value 
(1995) as delivering public services, achieving social outcomes, and maintaining trust and legitimacy; as 
well as Fried’s triad of ethics (1976) including responsiveness to public demand (democratic ethic), 
compliance with rules (legal ethic), and economy in the use of resources (work ethic). His argument is 
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that the sum of such varied influences shapes or steers performance for specific organizations.  
Talbot draws on resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salanick 1978) which sees organizations as 
successful if they can gather resources from their external environment, meeting competing demands 
from external stakeholders in exchange for the supply of resources. He also cites resource-based 
theories of the firm that concentrate on the internal capabilities, capacities, and resources of the 
organization (Barney and Clark 2007). With its emphasis on position relative to diverse power holders 
and stakeholders, the concept of a performance regime embodies insights from organizational studies. 
For example, Baum (1996) argues for understanding an organization’s niche, benchmarking it against 
comparator firms, identifying how its services differ from what is offered by others. Poister et al (2010) 
argue that organizational performance is a matter of fit with the surrounding context and operating 
environment, and requires periodic repositioning to maintain such a fit. 
Performance regime thus acknowledges the institutional landscape within which a public organization 
finds itself. At its simplest, this means identifying where an organization fits within the bureaucracy, 
including its reliance on other entities for information, resources, and legitimacy. A map of the 
performance regime begins with the principal-agent model, tracing the formal lines of authority from 
the funder upwards into their home government and downwards into the research community. Next the 
map identifies power holders and stakeholders—in the public and private sector, at home and abroad—
that might influence performance, yet stops short of uncovering their behavior, motivations, and 
expectations. In practice, public organizations are more responsive to actors such as the Cabinet office 
and Treasury, and less so to line departments outside their portfolio or distant from their mandate. As 
research for the developing world bridges the domains of public research, development cooperation, 
and foreign policy, it is useful to understand the structure, rationale, and performance within each of 
these policy domains.  
The top part of table 2.1 lists the indicators used to analyze performance regime. Structure refers to the 
legal entities that occupy the policy domains and how they are organized, such as research granting 
councils, the foreign office, and aid agency. Rationale refers to the narrative used to justify spending in 
these areas, including each entity’s goals and scope of action, such as national research priorities or the 
thematic and geographic focus within foreign aid. This is the context for defining performance, including 
the mechanisms used to allocate funding, the intended outcomes, and the tools used to assess such. 
Performance criteria will differ between public research and foreign policy, yet research for the 
developing world must satisfy both.       
Beyond these policy domains, other stakeholders also hold expectations and possess mechanisms to 
enforce them, such as the governing party and the central agencies, including the Cabinet office or 
Treasury. These bodies shape the broader policy agenda, issues directives, and ultimately control the 
public purse strings. At the same time, the research community in each country has a more or less 
organized “science lobby” that actively courts government to influence research policy. Public entities 
must maintain their credibility with various actors who hold their own perspectives on performance. 
Funders can be expected to adopt programs that resonate with the multiple expectations of influential 
actors—within and beyond the domains of public research and foreign policy—including statements 
regarding the perceived research strengths of the home country.  
Mapping power holders and stakeholders and their expectations permit a more detailed description of 
the governance context. This information provides insights into what drives changes in governance and 
whether this is due to shifts in resource availability, public management, or research management. 
These drivers are introduced below and will be revisited in the three comparative case studies that 
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follow. These case studies find explore the links between changes in the governance context for 
strategic planning and organizational response for performance improvements (Poister, Pitts and 
Edwards 2010). 
The importance of resources available is self-evident: funders cease to exist without public money for 
their programs. The rise and fall of budgets influences the scale of such programs. Waves of budget 
growth permit funders the opportunity to expand their work, while waves of austerity require them to 
be more focused. Less evident are the conditions placed upon access to such funding, both the 
expectations placed on the funder when it receives additional money and the scrutiny it receives during 
periods of austerity. Such conditions can cascade down to potential grantees and force the funder to 
alter its selection and evaluation criteria. For example, programs can limit grants to a certain percentage 
of overall project costs or require grantees interact with particular stakeholders, such as local 
communities, policymakers, or the private sector.   
Public management is understood here as the ideas on the purpose, role, and operation of government. 
Public research funders are embedded within government and respond to waves of ideas on how they 
should organize themselves, including the functions of planning, evaluation, and performance 
management. At times, funders were left to simply pursue their own mandate, while at other times they 
were expected to make a contribution within a “whole-of-government” agenda. Such ideas shape the 
opportunities to support research for the developing world, and how funders relate to other parts of 
government, including Cabinet, the foreign ministry, and central agencies.  
Research policy encompasses the decision-making processes over priority setting, the allocation of 
funds, and the management of research institutes and the assessment of their performance (OECD 
2003). As described in the previous chapter, the pressure to rationalize public expenditures has 
prompted governments to become more proactive in directing their investments to areas expected to 
generate higher returns. Governments want to know more about the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
research they fund. These pressures led to changes in the policy and programs for publicly-funded 






Table 2.1: Framework used in case studies: Talbot’s performance regime (2010) is applied to describe 
the context governing public funding to research for the developing world, and how research funders 
























Structure Legal & organizational structure of public research funding and of 
foreign aid 
Rationale Narrative used to justify funding, including national research 
priorities and the thematic & geographic aid priorities  
Performance Mechanisms for allocating research grants & aid projects (intended 
outcomes & tools to assess each) 
Stakeholders Additional expectations of funder's performance and the 




















Position Changes in the funder’s organizational structure, staffing, budget, 
leadership, or reporting relations 
Theory of Change What the funder sought to achieve, including the focus of its grant-
making programs 


















Selection Criteria & process for choosing recipients and funding proposals 
(e.g. location, nationality, excellence, relevance) 
Role  Daily tasks of staff, their interaction with recipient, and contribution 
to the research process 
Portfolio Description of the grants made by the funder, including the 
recipients and types of support offered 
Implications Incentives provided to the scientific community, and what the funder 
expected of its recipients 
 
 
Adaptive Organizations  
The performance regime provides the governance context within which research funders continually 
renegotiate how to pursue their mandate. Yet outside influences do not automatically translate into 
new directions. To gain traction and affect the organization’s behavior, these influences must be taken 
up inside and inform internal decisions. Only then do influences begin to affect which problems warrant 
investment and the types of support offered to recipients. This section draws ideas from strategic 
planning and program evaluation to reveal how funders adapt their program theory and reorient their 
grantmaking practices over time.  
Organizations exercise their agency—the ability to act or intervene—when mediating the various 
expectations placed upon them. They do not passively responding to the whims of others. Whereas a 
legislative mandate forms a point of departure, management elaborates and over time modifies its 
approach towards implementing this mandate. Corporate strategies, strategic plans, and annual reports 
provide an initial articulation of this thinking. Strategic planning is a “disciplined effort to produce 
fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) is, what 
it does, and why it does it” (Bryson 2004, 26). The concept of corporate strategy has evolved over time 
through a sequence of ideas, including: managing by objectives, creating synergies among 
17 
 
complementary lines of business, maximizing shareholder value, and identifying core competencies 
(Faulker and Campbell 2003). A recent definition describes strategic planning “as a process for clarifying 
mandates and goals, scanning the environment for threats and opportunities, identifying strategic issues 
and ways of dealing with them, developing outcome measures and how to track progress” (KPMG 2008).  
Mintzberg (2007) differentiates among four ways of understanding strategy: as a plan to guide an 
organization’s future action, its position compared to others, its perspective on its role and purpose, and 
the pattern of organizational routines that emerged from past experience. Strategy as position reflects 
concerns of “niche” and “fitness”, finding and maintaining a viable space in the operating environment, 
remaining competitive within the industry, and supported by public policy (Poister, Pitts, and Edwards 
2010). By examining the governance context, the first part of the framework addresses this position. The 
second part of the framework employed here builds on Mintzberg’s concepts of strategy as perspective 
and pattern.  
Within the field of evaluation, program theory is the proposed casual explanation of how change occurs, 
and how the organization‘s actions are understood to contribute to that change (Rogers 2000). It 
involves assumptions regarding how the organization’s activities contribute to real world results. Funnel 
and Rogers (2011) define program theory as “an explicit theory or model of how an intervention… 
contributes to a chain of intermediate results and finally to the intended or observed outcomes”. These 
authors identify four general theories about how change occurs—reasoned action, empowerment, 
diffusion, and socio-ecological networks—each of which addresses different causal mechanisms. 
Reasoned action focuses on how human behavior is shaped by beliefs and attitudes regarding the 
consequences of that same behavior (e.g. health & safety training). Empowerment focuses on how the 
people affected by a particular problem can organize and act to address that problem (e.g. community 
development projects). Diffusion focuses on how ideas and innovations are invented, shared, adopted, 
or rejected among people (e.g. the spread of agricultural techniques). Networks focus how relationships 
among actors can enhance or constrain their actions (e.g. promoting policy change through political 
coalitions). Each of these theories can address different levels where change is expected to occur 
whether within an individual, organization, policy, or community. Each theory of change embodies 
particular assumptions, values, and ideologies.  
Based on these four general theories of change, Funnel and Rogers (2011) identify five general 
categories of interventions, each with a distinct underlining logic. Information programs seek outcomes 
by educating a client through advice and understanding that encourages her or him to adopt the desired 
change. Carrot-and-stick programs seek outcomes by providing various incentives and sanctions 
intended to facilitate the desired change. Case management programs are tailor-made and “work with 
each case in a way that recognizes that… there are likely to be many and varied factors, many 
individualized intermediate outcomes, and many different processes for getting there". Capacity-
building programs seek outcomes by empowering clients to enhance their skills and ability over time so 
they are able to exercise greater control over their lives, while the direct delivery programs seek 
outcomes by providing a product or service. Overall, research for the developing world is rooted in 
information program theory, the belief that new knowledge and technology will change the 
opportunities for international development (Arrow 1962, World Bank 1998, Helpman 2004, Molenaar 
et al. 2009). Yet, as shown in subsequent chapters, organizations can simultaneous embody multiple 
program theories and grantmaking practices, as well as shift between different ones over time.  
Program evaluation accepts and examines the distinction between what an organization intends to do—
its explicit strategy or program theory—and what it actually does, or the implementation of that theory. 
Where Funnel and Rogers refer to theory of change and interventions, Chen (2005) distinguishes 
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between a change model and an action model. The former includes the goals and outcomes, the 
determinants understood to cause the problem the organization seeks to address, and identifies the 
interventions employed by the organization to change those determinants. In contrast, Chen’s action 
model is the delivery protocols and plans for arranging the organization and ensuring a supportive 
environment.  
In program evaluation, the absence of an expected outcome may be due to failure of strategy or 
implementation. The former is related to how one expects the world to work, while the latter is related 
to how one organizes to bring about that change. Thus it is possible to correctly implement a program 
theory that fails due to incorrect assumptions in how interventions actually work, and it is possible to 
have appropriate interventions that are incorrectly implemented. Chen (2005, 247) describes this 
distinction as the sound implementation of faulty causality (conceptual model failure) versus the faulty 
implementation of sound causality (action theory failure).   
The following chapters are not concerned with the validity of the program theory per se, but identify 
when and why funders changed their understanding of research for the developing world. Indeed 
corporate strategies seldom describe program theory in sufficient detail to serve as a basis for program 
evaluation. For this book, it is sufficient to identify notional program theories that guided grantmaking at 
different times, including when and why these shifts occurred. These are moments when the 
organization changed its “strategy as perspective”, one means by which organizations respond to new 
pressures in the surrounding governance context. In contrast, an organization’s “strategy as pattern” is 
embodied within the grantmaking practices, the everyday operations and routines that stem in part 
from past experience.  
In the following case studies, program theory is analyzed using the indicators of position, theory of 
change, and evidence used in assessing performance (table 2.1). Position describes how the funder 
organized itself, noting when there were significant changes in staffing, budget, leadership, 
organizational structure, or reporting relationships. The sum of these attributes speak to where the 
funder fitted into the performance regime, and suggests the relative influence of external actors in 
prompting such changes. This serves to identify when there was continuity or when the funder was 
undergoing a period of transformation, highlighting moments of disjuncture that warrant further 
attention.  
Theory of change is revealed through statements of what the funder sought to achieve and its choice of 
programs, which in turn showed how the funder opted to address certain problems over others. If 
available, data gathered for this indicator captures the criteria the organization used to select, 
elaborate, and approve different funding envelopes or programs. On occasion, this is stated explicitly in 
written documents, but is more often uncovered through interviews or deduced from program choice. 
Finally, evidence refers to the information cited by the funder to demonstrate its performance. This 
indicator notes the arguments employed at a corporate level to justify public spending, as well as the 
type of information the funder collects in determining the extent to which its programs are successful.  
Attention to grantmaking practice is warranted for two reasons. First, while a research funder might 
pursue multiple program theories simultaneously—using different funding envelopes—the range of 
grantmaking practices is more limited. Second, organizational pattern can be more persistent than 
strategic perspective, as the grantmaking practices that guide staff may endure despite changes in 
corporate strategy and its embedded program theory. Public research funders are not exactly analogous 
to competitive firms, and research strategy is distinct from corporate strategy. The two overlap to the 
extent that research strategy involves the high-level choice regarding which problems to work on and an 
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explicit or implied calculation of expected return from investing in each. Yet research strategy is 
embedded in the organizational routines as a heuristic search process, “the procedures used to identify 
and screen research projects” (Nelson and Winter 1977).  
Grantmaking practices are “strategy as pattern”. They serve as informal heuristics stemming as much 
from operational experience as from the formal program theory crafted by management. Paarlberg and 
Bielfeld (2009) argue that staff rely on simple heuristics that provide guidance in identifying priority, 
boundaries, timing, and exit—in other words rules of thumb regarding what is important, what is within 
and beyond program limits, when to act, and when to stop. Such rules-in-practice (cf Ostrom 2005) are 
given life through the norms created by staff in carrying out their daily work of selecting proposals, 
setting funding procedures, monitoring current grants, and evaluating their results.  
Grantmaking practice emerges from organizational learning and can circulate back into program theory. 
Subsequent generations of corporate strategy also formalize what was learned, rather than merely 
responding to stakeholder expectations. In other words, organizations do not necessarily reinvent 
themselves to match what the performance regime judges to be politically feasible. They also 
incorporate learned experience into future efforts to improve operations. This understanding of 
grantmaking practice echoes Nelson and Winter’s (1977, 1982) description of how markets select among 
competing innovations and reinforce the position of certain standards over time. The result is that 
practices, routines, and innovations are influenced in part by past success and failure: some are ignored 
while other are picked up and “locked-in” over time. Building on this insight, the literature on the 
economics of innovation (cf Lundvall 1988) argues that past learning is embodied in the daily routines of 
staff.3 Grantmaking practice is thus evolutionary, as a research funder’s past experience shapes its 
approach to research for the developing world. 
Research funding programs also evolve through interaction with the scientific community. Each program 
creates a funding envelope, articulating a thematic focus and desired outcomes, yet the substantive 
content comes from the proposals submitted. Programs are co-created as the funders’ ambitions are 
mediated by the response from grantseekers who apply for support (Shove 2003). Research funding 
programs can thus grow and unfold in unpredictable ways, as each project carries with it the recipient’s 
interests and history of prior research. This opens opportunities for program implementation to differ 
from program theory, as some intended actions are unrealized and some realized actions are 
unintended (Mintzberg 2007). 
In the following case studies, grantmaking practice is analyzed using the indicators of selection, role, 
portfolio, and implications (table 2.1). The overall purpose is to look beyond program theory and 
examine how the funder implemented such and how it used the resources available. In this sense, 
grantmaking practice is tailored to the work performed by research funders, and could easily be 
relabeled “organizational routines” in keeping with the literature on the economics of innovation. 
Selection refers to the criteria and process used to choose recipients and funding proposals. This 
indicator collects information on whether access to funding is restricted to particular countries 
(eligibility) and the criteria by which funding proposals are judged, such as: the qualifications and 
expertise of the proponent; the feasibility, originality and relevance of the proposed work; engagement 
 
3 One such innovation is the use of a ‘milestone’ approach which ties grant payments to different deliverables or 
progress markers during the project. Milestones provide evidence on how the research is progressing and, if 
necessary, offer an opportunity to redesign or reschedule future milestones to respond to any difficulties 




with stakeholders in the research process; and the work’s potential contribution to knowledge or 
development outcomes. This indicator also notes how a funder gathers project proposals, whether 
through competitive calls, unsolicited submissions, or encouraging talented researchers to apply.  
Role focuses on the real-life tasks of staff, rather than what the funding organization perceives as its 
contribution to the research process. This indicator draws on job descriptions and hearing former staff 
recount their personal experiences. A researcher’s impression depends more on their specific 
experience interaction with an individual program officer or coordinator than on their impression of a 
funding organization in general. The dynamic balance between government and the scientific 
community is reflected in how staff allocate their time. Beyond monitoring the project progress, staff 
make an intellectual contribution through such tasks as engaging recipients on research design and 
methods, connecting them to peers working on similar problems elsewhere, and ensuring that the 
funder’s programs built upon the state-of-the-art in different fields of knowledge. Thus rather than 
starting with corporate strategy and looking how it was enacted by staff, it is valuable to examine what 
staff do and identify what guides these efforts.  
Portfolio refers to the actual grants made by the funder, including the types of support offered and the 
profile of recipients. Grant databases and annual reports provide information on the location and type 
of institutions that received funding (e.g. universities, government, for-profits, and not-for-profits 
whether located in the home country, in an advanced economy, or in a developing country). Finally, 
implications describe what the funder expected of its recipients, and consequently provides incentives 
for certain types of work, and to certain segments of the research community. As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, funders can fail to attract the attention of prospective recipients if there is a 
mismatch between its programs, and the career aspirations or other incentives shaping the research 
community. 
This chapter introduced the framework used to analyze three research funding organization, one each 
from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. All three support research for the developing world, 
but evolved different program theories and grantmaking practices over time, in part due to changes in 
the governance context. Talbot’s performance regime builds upon the principal-agent model to describe 
the ensemble of expectations emanating from power holders and stakeholders, and their tools and 
mechanisms for shaping public performance. Yet a look inside is necessary to identify which of these 
influences gained traction within each organization.  
 
 
United Kingdom: between Haldane and Rothschild 
 
Among the three case studies, the United Kingdom has the longest history of supporting research in the 
developing world. Early milestones include the founding of the Asiatic Society in 1784 and the Imperial 
Institute in 1887. Long before the modern era of foreign aid began after the World War II, support for 
research was a well-established part of colonial administration, fragmented among different 
government departments. The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) thus inherited a tradition 
of funding research, which it divided into different thematic divisions. In this century, the new 
Department for International Development (DFID) consolidated this funding into a single unit within its 
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policy division. Throughout these organizational changes, research had to compete for space and budget 
within an agency that was also responsible for bilateral, multilateral, and humanitarian assistance. 
  
This chapter identifies distinct periods when research for the developing world was subjected to 
different expectations and adopted different goals. Initially, the performance regime was characterized 
by self-governance of research funding, under which scientific communities allocated funding among 
peers. The program theory guiding research funding was focused on maintaining a base of UK science 
specialized in the problems of tropical climates. This inspired grantmaking around core support to highly 
qualified people and established centers within the scientific community at home, part of which resided 
within government laboratories. In the next period, starting in the 1970s, the governance context 
encouraged a division between those who performed research and those who commissioned it. This 
period saw government exit service delivery, spinning-off its scientific units to the academic or private 
sector. Program theory focused on purchasing knowledge and outcomes of interest to the aid agency. 
This gave rise to a quasi-market pattern of project funding under which researchers would bid for the 
opportunity to contribute to the aid agency’s work programmes. 
  
During the subsequent period, beginning in the 2000s, the aid agency received an increasing level of 
resources and a legislated mandate to contribute to global poverty reduction. Program theory saw 
research as a form of public good, placed at the service of furthering a global development agenda 
negotiated with other donors. Grantmaking practice evolved to include greater support to recipients 
located abroad and a move to larger projects, networks, and consortia of grantees. During the following 
period, the governance context reemphasized ties with UK science, including notions of scientific 
excellence, rising scrutiny of foreign aid, and downward pressure on operating costs. Program theory 
embraced the potential for technology to change the lives of poor women and men, as well as the 
potential for research to inform an evidence-based approach to policy. Corresponding, grantmaking 
expanded to include partnerships with the UK research councils, continued rise in average project size, 











Research for the developing world emerged out of the political reality of the British Empire. UK science 
expanded in the 18th and 19th centuries as the industrial revolution reshaped the economy at home, 
and Britain coordinated a loose network of colonies abroad. Researchers roamed around the empire to 
study local phenomenon different than what was found at home. Colonial and overseas 
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surveys, medicine, and agriculture to better understand and exploit the holdings they were responsible 
for. In short, research helped Britain understand and run the world, supported by an array of scientific 
institutions at home and abroad. 
  
The Haldane reports in 1905 and 1918 mark a key point in UK science policy. As Secretary of State for 
War, and later Lord Chancellor, Richard Haldane chaired parliamentary committees that shaped the 
research funding landscape. The first report led to the creation of the University Grants Committee, 
providing block grants to institutions of higher education. The second report led to the UK research 
councils, providing scholarships and project funding for individual researchers. This second report (Cd 
9230) established a distinction between funding allocated by scientists (to further the frontiers of 
knowledge) and funding allocated by government (for work that responded to the needs of each 
department).  
 
Haldane was thus responsible for introducing a distinction between basic and applied research, and 
providing different funding streams for each. In this way, Haldane hoped to address a lag in UK military 
technology revealed by in World War I. Inspired by the then-new science of aviation—which integrated 
both basic and applied science—he sought to prepare the country for future challenges. Over time, the 
first part of this idea was reinterpreted as a “Haldane principle” that the research community should 
collectively determine its own priorities and allocate public funding. To this day, the Haldane Principle is 
seen as a right to self-governance in the sciences, invoked to defend against the threat of government 
interference. This interpretation is not entirely accurate of Haldane’s recommendations (Edgerton 
2009). Indeed research for the developing world was influenced more by the second part of Haldane’s 
idea which led to government departments obtaining a budget line for applied research.   
  
Between 1919 and 1930, the Colonial Office funded “poorer Colonies and Protectorates in conducting 
the necessary researches”. Overseen by a Colonial Research Committee, the primary focus was the 
study and exploitation of local minerals, agriculture, animal health, forestry, and fisheries. Colonial 
science policy first coalesced in the early 1920s as the British government pondered the fate of scientific 
institutes in former German colonies in Africa (Worboys 1996). The Colonial Development Act 1929 
provided grants and loans for the promotion of scientific research, complementing the Rockefeller 
Foundation funding in the 1920s to expand the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In 
1938, Lord Hailey’s “African Survey” called for investing in research, drawing on British institutions 
which were seen as having better-qualified personnel and “the conditions, facilities and atmosphere 
necessary for good research work” (Jefferies 1964). The Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) 
included a call for £50 million over ten years for development, and a separate amount of £5 million for 
research. By establishing this dedicated budget line, the Act recognized research as a distinct activity 
from building roads or infrastructure. This research fund was subsequently doubled to £1 million per 
year in 1946 and made an ongoing line item in the budget with no expiry. Jefferies (1964) notes the Act 
embodied a conviction that research much be conceived on a long-term basis, noting: “The initiating of 
a project frequently involves a commitment for years ahead, and can only be undertaken if there is 
certainty that the necessary funds will be available and not subject to the hazards of a periodical re-
submission to Parliament.” 
   
Hence the governance context privileged natural science inquiry to optimize the use of natural resources 
abroad, drawing on the scientific community at home. Britain established local institutions abroad to 
provide knowledge needed to plan and exploit local resources, and cultivated world-class research 




After World War II, the governance context sought the independence of former colonies and gained 
new faith in mission-oriented science. Britain and other war-weary economies had utilized their 
overseas colonies to draw in resources and benefit from world trade, yet the colonies were now more of 
a burden than a bounty. It was more cost-effective to let the colonies run their own affairs. At the same 
time, the war had injected optimism in the potential for public research. New technologies, such as 
radar, had emerged from government funding and concentrated effort, a model that would inspire 
research policy for decades. 
  
As Britain negotiated the independence of its former colonies, scientific infrastructure abroad was akin 
to the children of couple filing for divorce. The product of an earlier era, the soon-to-be independent 
countries had an array of local scientific establishments, ranging from departments of agriculture and 
health, to universities and field stations. With the newfound faith in science, there were great 
expectations that these establishments would be a motor for development: informing local government 
with needed knowledge and providing local industries with useful technologies. Britain could not simply 
abandon this infrastructure, as it relied on outside funding and skilled personnel. Thus Britain initially 
accepted an ongoing responsibility for research abroad, until the local economy could take over. 
  
Between 1940 and 1960, Britain allocated £24 million to research at home and abroad intended to 
benefit the developing world. Funds were allocated through six different committees drawing in 
members from across multiple government departments. Together the committees formed a Colonial 
Research Council which provided financial support for local scientific institutions abroad. It also 
supported scientific units at home, including the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and government labs, such as the Transport Research 
Laboratory. These units, specialized in the problems of tropical climates, were seen as a unique, “world-
class” service that was not available abroad. 
  
The next decade saw a number of organizational changes. The council replaced the word “colonial” in its 
name, to become the Overseas Research Council. Its updated mandate was “to advise on… policy in 
respect of scientific research undertaken in or for overseas territories … of methods of making the 
results of research available in these territories; and of assistance to the scientific services of those 
territories” (Jefferies 1964). The council initially provided budget support for the operating costs of local 
institutes abroad, as well as travel grants that enabled visits by expatriate specialists to work and train 
abroad. The former loose, cross-government structure was replaced with a formal Department of 
Technical Cooperation, bringing together expertise on colonial development and incorporating a 
number of previously independent research centers. In 1964, this department became the Ministry of 
Overseas Development, recognizable as Britain’s foreign aid agency. 
  
In summary, the initial period was characterized by self-governance under which scientific communities 
allocated funding among peers. Program theory focused on maintaining a base of UK science specialized 
in the problems of tropical climates. This inspired grantmaking around core support to highly qualified 





In the 1970s, the governance context for public research began to shift towards fostering competition 
among researchers. Edward Heath’s conservative government (1970–74) created a Central Policy 
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Review team in the Cabinet Office as an internal think tank to aid government problem solving. Lord 
Victor Rothschild was appointed to lead this team and introduced the largest shift in UK research policy 
since Haldane. Rothschild’s framework called for customer-contractor relationships between those that 
funded and performed research. Under his vision: “Departments, as customers, define their 
requirements; contractors advise on the feasibility of meeting them and undertake the work; and the 
arrangements between them must be such as to ensure that the objectives remain attainable within 
reasonable cost.” (Cmnd 5046, 1972) 
  
Rothschild’s principle of customer-contractor relations became the new cornerstone of UK research 
policy. Government was now seen as a purchaser of knowledge services within a marketplace, in which 
there were assumed to be a large number of potential service providers. Government was no longer 
expected to be a mere patron of research, but an “intelligent consumer” of it: able to absorb available 
knowledge and independently determine the need for new research. Yet the Rothschild principle faced 
three issues during implementation. First, the research “market” for specialized fields—such as 
trypanosomiasis and locust control—was oligopolistic, with a small number of well-connected 
researchers at one or two institutes. Second, few departments had the technical expertise required to 
review and synthesize existing knowledge, much less design a call for proposals and conduct merit 
review. Third, departments faced the dilemma of what to do with the scientists on staff and research 
centers dependent on government funding. 
  
The first two issues were addressed by establishing teams of advisors within each department on the 
scientific aspects of government policy. These advisors were to act as honest brokers, taking in ideas 
from the outside, to define competitive bids based on departmental objectives. Advisors consulted the 
research community on the feasibility of meeting particular requirements, yet excluded that community 
from government’s priority setting and funding decisions. The third issue provide more difficult. 
Departments faced a practical reality of needing to provide for the short-term survival of their scientific 
units while reducing their medium-term reliance on government funding. In practice, calls for proposals 
need to provide some support to preferred providers. Such was the challenge that research for the 
developing world would soon face. 
  
Yet foreign aid was initially protected as government looked first at defense and health. After merging 
into Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Britain’s foreign aid agency was renamed the Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA). The Administration housed a number of scientific units and 
provided core funding for many more. It even began to prepare an annual report on its research 
activities noting that “British scientists have a long history of achievement in helping to tackle the 
problems of the tropical and semitropical areas”, and describing research as “adaptation of existing 
technologies to the circumstances of countries which are tropical and under-developed” (ODM 1974). 
Research funding grew fourfold over the decade, from under £4 million to almost £14 million per year. 
The bulk of this funding was dedicated to grants for research projects carried out on a contract basis by 
individual researchers or teams and the recurrent costs of centers in Britain which gave scientific and 
technical help to the developing countries. ODA also provided support for international research 
cooperation and research in developing countries. ODA initially provided core funding to maintain 
research institutes abroad, yet soon switched to project funding “to solve specific problems... outside 
the financial or technical capacity of local programmes” (ODA 1980). Local governments were expected 
to assume responsibility for the ongoing operating costs. 
  
By the mid-70s, ODA acknowledged the Rothschild principle, but implemented it half-heartedly. ODA 
argued that it “…interprets to its research 'contractors' the needs of its overseas 'customers' and 
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commissions work on their behalf” (ODM 1975). In other words, ODA saw itself as a proxy customer, 
representing the demands of developing countries, which were limited in their ability to fund research 
or influence the UK research community. Project ideas were assessed according to “scientific 
soundness..., the degree to which they met the Ministry's criteria, and their claims for financial support” 
(ODM 1975). ODA began to emphasize the potential for research to inform practice abroad: “the results 
should filter down to those who really need to know—the farmer in the field, the workers at the bench 
and the doctors and nurses in the bush” (ODM 1977). 
  
Yet the presence of a Labour-majority government (1974–79) temporarily reduced the pressure to 
implement Rothschild. ODA continued to deal incrementally with the array of funding relations it had 
inherited at home and abroad, with a large number of scientists relying on ODA directly as government 
employees or indirectly through research grants. 
  
  
Neoliberal values ascendant 
 
The United Kingdom then entered a period of reforms under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government (1979–87) which revived the Rothschild principle. The House of Commons (1983) noted 
that “scientific research. . . should be subject to ‘customer-contractor’ relationships, whereby work is 
commissioned by a paying customer”. The result was a “marketization of research” with changes in the 
form of public ownership, its organization, and governance (Boden et al. 2004). In the words of one 
respondent, “there was a sword of Damocles hanging over social sciences in Britain”. Thatcher’s 
government felt public research had a “provider mentality” pursuing its own curiosity, oblivious to 
whether or not it had any public impact. Government expected every public institution to be aware of 
its costs and able to demonstrate public benefit. As the reforms curtailed research performed with 
government, a greater portion of public research was performed within universities. 
  
The Conservative government soon called for scrutiny reports on ODA’s scientific units. In 1980, the 
research budget exceeded £15 million per year and the in-house scientific units employed more than 
one thousand scientists and support staff. As a result of the reports, the Directorate of Overseas 
Surveys—which provided mapping services to developing countries—lost two-thirds of its staff and 
began to commission aerial surveys from private companies rather than conducting them in-house. 
Similarly, two of ODA’s units were merged to form the Tropical Development and Research Institute. 
The House of Commons complained that “though purporting to deal with efficiency, [the reports] largely 
ignored benefits and were concerned almost exclusively with costs... the ‘Rothschild principle’ is of only 
limited applicability to the kind of work [these units] do” (House of Commons 1983). Yet the complaint 
fell on deaf ears. Indeed a subsequent wave of reforms starting in 1988 would see government move a 
number of functions out of the bureaucracy into quasi-independent “executive agencies” to be run as 
corporations. This Next Steps initiative essentially split the role of providing advice and implementing 
policy, establishing market-inspired arrangements between ministries and these executive agencies. 
  
ODA needed to demonstrate that it was serious about the government’s concerns, including the 
usefulness of outputs and a commitment to efficiency. It adopted an “emphasis is on research likely to 
be of practical use in a reasonable period of time, and… of direct relevance to the poorer sectors of 
poorer countries” (ODA 1988). More significantly, ODA began to divest itself of its scientific units, 
particularly those related to agriculture and the natural environment. To ease the transition, ODA 
needed a find a way of supporting its former scientific units while also presenting the image of 
consumer-contractor relations with the scientific community. The challenge was to rationalize funding 
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to see these organizations move to new ownership. In the words of one respondent, “the size of 
investment was determined by how much do these institutions required to survive”. 
   
The response was five thematic work programmes which laid out priorities towards which research 
grants was supposed to contribute. In the words of one respondent, these programmes were “based on 
a logframe: we would define purpose and goals, and we would then contract out; the competing bodies 
would come back with objectives, activities and resources”. The largest was the Renewable Natural 
Resources Research Strategy—affectionately known as the “yellow brick”—which lasted for fifteen 
years. In short, whereas ODA had previously been a fairly responsive funder, allowing recipients to 
pursue their own goals, it became more proactive, expecting recipients to contribute to a program of its 
own design.  
 
In essence, ODA altered its relationship with the scientific community. Having already shifted from core 
to project funding abroad, it now similarly revised its offer to scientific community at home, requiring 
them to fit their interests within a larger thematic strategy. Reflecting this shift, ODA stopped describing 
its research portfolio as “support to British scientific establishments” in favor of “R&D programmes… 
managed and carried out by centres in the UK” (ODA 1992). Grantmaking moved to a combination of 
competitively awarded projects and progressive independence of organizations reliant on ODA. 
  
  
The End of an era 
 
Reforms to UK research policy accelerated further under John Major’s Conservative government (1987–
97). The “Realising Our Potential” White Paper called for public research money to be directed towards 
contributing to wealth creation and quality of life. This imperative was even applied to the UK research 
councils, requiring them to reformulate their missions towards these goals and towards responding to 
“users” including “industrial or service sectors, private and public, as well as central and local 
Government” (Cm 2250, 1993). Two of the research councils were merged to create the Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
began to relate part its budget to national priorities in order to satisfy its political masters and retain 
some freedom to hold more open grant competitions.  
 
With respect to ministries, “Realising Our Potential” reaffirmed and strengthened the customer-
contractor principle. Departments were to be intelligent customers: determining their own needs and 
commissioning work from suppliers who competed to meet the government’s specifications. 
Departments were “expected to mount competitive tenders wherever practicable, and to seek value for 
money” in order to achieve “the utility and quality of research needed” (Cm2250, 1993). 
  
The dual impact of the Next Steps Initiative and “Realising Our Potential” was keenly felt within ODA’s 
natural resources programme. In the early 1980s, a rich array of scientific units within and outside ODA 
could trace their legacy back to the colonial period. By 1990, many of them were consolidated under the 
Natural Resources Institute (NRI), an executive agency. NRI was expected to survive selling its research 
and consultancy services, chiefly to Britain's overseas aid, but also to the World Bank and the European 
Commission. NRI was required to charge prices that reflected the full cost of its services, rather than 
relying on ODA for indirect costs. In the words of Anthony Beattie (1994), the director of NRI: “What is 
new in recent years is the involvement of ODA headquarters in setting the agenda and commissioning 
programmes of work—or projects—under quasi-contractual arrangements. We have moved... the 
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service provider's discretion has been considerably curtailed—on the argument that client involvement 
will enhance effectiveness and efficiency.” 
   
The agricultural research community initially believed that “what it does will not fit easily or 
satisfactorily into the world of contractual relations and markets”, and that sooner or later the pressure 
would go away “leaving researchers to go back to a golden age” (Beattie 1994). Yet the government 
continued to see the market for research services as intrinsically similar to the market for other 
professional services. Six years after becoming an executive agency, the remnants of NRI were 
transferred to the University of Greenwich. While the Institute continues to exist today, it is a ghost of 
its former self, with just one-tenth the number of staff it had in the 1980s and little sign of its lineage 
back to the Imperial Institute. 
  
The health research community fared somewhat better. The London and Liverpool Schools of Tropical 
Medicine were less vulnerable given their connection to higher education. Their employees were not 
civil servants and their back office services relied on university administration. ODA entered into a 
“concordats”, or partnerships, with the Medical Research Council, which became an intermediary 
between ODA and the health research at home. 
  
ODA began to encourage its recipients to take on a role in championing the adoption of their findings. 
ODA believed that “effective dissemination of research outputs is essential if research is to have any 
impact... In the past... dissemination to policymakers and practitioners has often been less effective” 
(ODA 1993). The focus on outcomes within work programmes meant the “good” research practice saw 
researchers engaged in the field, as advisors or agents promoting particular policies or techniques, 
rather than the disinterested third parties largely outside of development practice. This also meant 
working through additional intermediaries, such as non-governmental organization, like Oxfam or 
ActionAid. The distinction between a research project and a development project was blurred as both 
were expected to achieve real-life change abroad. Looking back at UK research in development studies 
since 1980, Meier (1994) lamented that basic research was being crowded out, as funding directed the 
research efforts towards shorter-term projects and the “quicker payoff” in which “standards of technical 
rigour have, at times, been ignored… less concerned with high theory, relatively weak in quantitative 
and econometric techniques of analysis.” Changes in the UK approach to research funding were 
beginning to alter what counted as research for the developing world. 
  
In summary, during this period, the governance context encouraged a division between those who 
performed research and those who commissioned it. This period saw government exit service delivery, 
spinning-off its scientific units to the academic or private sector. Program theory purchased knowledge 
and outcomes of interest to the aid agency. This gave rise to a quasi-market pattern of project funding 
under which researchers would bid for the opportunity to contribute to the aid agency’s work 
programmes.  
 
Under the old era, ODA provided core funding to maintain world-class science at home—some of which 
was inside government—and contribute to capacity abroad. Yet the waves of reform under Conservative 
governments shifted ODA towards project funding based on consumer-contractor relations. Work 
programmes embraced government-defined objectives, in which ODA considered itself as a proxy client, 
purchasing services on behalf of developing countries. The roles of research funder and performer were 
divided, with ODA retaining the former and divesting itself of the latter. The work programmes also 
included a covert lifeline to some of ODA’s scientific units, to ease their transition into a new reality in 
which they needed to sell their services to survive. Many of them experienced mergers and 
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privatization, and some simply ceased to exist. Meanwhile ODA needed to show that its research 
funding was applied and practical, and consequently began to press its recipients to play a role in getting 
“research into use”. 
  
  
Research as a Public Good 
 
After seventeen years of Conservative rule under Thatcher and Major, anyone hoping for a return to the 
blind government patronage of the sciences would be disappointed. Market relations had been 
introduced to govern publicly-funded research. Blair’s Labour government (1997–2005) would not turn 
back the clock, but instead saw further changes affecting research for the developing world. The first 
was to create the Department for International Development (DFID), separate from the foreign office 
and represented by a senior-level minister in Cabinet. The second was to introduce new performance 
management tools and an “evidence-based” approach to policy. The third was to critique DFID use of 
science, prompting the department to give research funding more prominence within its hierarchy. This 
section describes each of these changes in more detail. 
  
Since 1979, the foreign aid program had been part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Despite a 
brief period of independence under the Callaghan government (1976–79), the aid program had been 
subservient to foreign policy and commercial relations throughout much of its history. Yet the new 
Labour government quickly redefined the purpose of foreign aid as “the elimination of poverty and 
encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor” (Cm 3789, 1997). The UK was an early 
advocate for, and adopter of, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and entrenched its new aid 
policy into legislation. The International Development Act 2002 required that the Secretary of State be 
satisfied that development assistance was likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty. Such assistance 
was to further sustainable development in poorer countries or improve the welfare of their people. The 
Act also formally untied aid, removing any requirement to prefer UK companies or providers in the 
delivery of development programming.  
 
DFID was also given remit to examine all government policy affecting developing countries, including 
migration, defense, and trade. Thus the aid program went from being a stand-alone portfolio to being a 
key ministry with a sweeping role across government. With its new mandate, DFID was connected to a 
network of actors across Whitehall, including the Department of Trade and Industry, Department for 
Environment, Food and Agriculture (DEFRA), Office of Science and Technology, UK Research Councils, 
British Council, and the Chief Scientific Advisers. 
  
DFID saw research as knowledge management: a means to “know what will work and what will not 
work” and a source of solutions that could be replicated elsewhere. The 1997 White Paper cited various 
examples of research impact, including: conditions necessary for microcredit, effectiveness in treating 
HIV, deploying low-cost water treatment, nutrient analysis of crops, controlling pests in rice and 
aquaculture, new design for wood stoves (Cm 3789). The elimination of poverty and protection of the 
environment was seen to require improved access to knowledge and technologies by poor people. DFID 
would also adapt existing knowledge to the particular circumstances of developing countries and, where 
necessary, invest in developing new technology. Finally research was also expected to “find local 
solutions to local problems” through better understanding of social, economic, political and physical 




Yet DFID senior management also feared research funding had been captured by the research 
community at home. One respondent recounts that Secretary of State Clare Short “was fed up with 
meeting little old men in white coats who thanked her for forty years of research on the hind leg of a 
mosquito”. 
  
Research became prominent within DFID: research was no longer the poorer cousin to bilateral aid. The 
bar was raised again with the release of a second White Paper focused on the impacts of globalization. It 
identified “research that benefits the poor” as a global public good which was underfunded. Most 
research and development capacity was located in developed countries and oriented to their needs. This 
is most clearly illustrated in drug development, where the problems of rich consumers—such as male 
impotence—attracts substantial investment while the problems of poor consumers—such as tropical 
diseases—are largely ignored or “neglected”. To address this market failure, the Blair government 
committed to "help focus more of the UK and global research effort on the needs of the poor” and 
“strengthen the capability of developing countries to produce, adapt and use knowledge, whether 
produced locally or internationally” (Cm 5000, 2000). The International Development Act 2002 untied 
aid, include research funding, allowing DFID to go anywhere to obtain the knowledge it needed without 
preference for UK researchers. Development assistance was expected to be untied, country-owned, and 
demand-led: characteristics that encouraged greater participation of developing countries and 
continued attention to the “uptake” of research into policy and practice. 
  
Research for the developing world had been given a new mandate and heightened expectations. In the 
words of one respondent, “DFID decided it would service the international development agenda… It 
drove the agenda around development objectives rather than making the best use of existing capacity” 
at home. Staff began reimagining DFID’s approach to research funding, inspired in part by the Blair’s 
government introduction of new tools for performance management and “evidence-based” policy. A 
cornerstone of this approach was the “Modernising Government” White Paper. Where the Conservative 
had sought to emulate a market, Labour sought the “use of evidence and research so that we 
understand better the problems we are trying to address... [and] pilot schemes to encourage 
innovations and test whether they work” (Cm 4310, 1999). 
 
UK policymaking experienced a positivist shift, with greater expectations that research would lead to 
improved social policy, particularly in health, education, and policing (Sparrow 2011). To simplify 
somewhat, the previous test for government policy and programs had been: was it affordable and did 
government consider it the right thing to do. Under an evidence-based approach, this test became: what 
is known about the problem, how was the proposed solution supposed to work, and how would 
government know if indeed it worked. Assumptions that were previously accepted as common sense 
were now open to questioning. The importance placed on the experience of public servants diminished, 
as the evidence-based approach demanded support in the form of baseline studies, empirical data, and 
evaluation. In short, there was a new demand for public research. 
  
  
A contract with the Treasury 
 
Blair’s government also vowed to continuously improve value for money in service delivery. Echoing the 
language used by Rothschild, the “Modernising Government” White Paper cautioned that “public 
services can be organized too much around the structure of the providers rather than the users” (Cm 
4310, 1999). To address the perceived bias, Blair’s government brought in new tools for performance 
management. First there were Public Service Agreements (PSA), or four-year contracts between the 
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Treasury and line departments defining the service that the government “purchased” through the 
budget process. Second there were subsequent Comprehensive Spending Reviews through which 
Treasury assessed the extent to which line departments delivered on this contract, in order to set a new 
agreement and budget for the following four years. Thus spending reviews provided a periodic 
opportunity to refine the performance framework against which the line department would report 
against. Where the Conservative government had introduced contractual relations between a line 
department and its executive agencies, the Labour government extended this practice to the relations 
between Treasury and line departments. 
  
DFID quickly adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the basis for its Public Service 
Agreement, committing to reducing poverty and improving health in developing countries. This was a 
courageous move for two reasons. Firstly, there was a mismatch in timetables. While the MDG 
timetable aimed for results by 2015, the Treasury used annual and four-year cycles for budgeting and 
performance reporting. Secondly, the department could not guarantee these outcomes, but merely 
contribute towards them as a member of the international community.  
 
Yet the PSA gave the illusion of certainty, implying that government was purchasing a particular 
outcome, such as longer life expectancy in Tanzania. The subsequent spending reviews inevitably 
revealed a “failure” to achieve some of these targets, as they were disconnected from what the 
department could actually control. The National Audit Office cautioned that DFID staff “may not know 
exactly what impact their efforts are having given the wide range of other agencies and external 
political, economic and social factors involved” (UK 2002). The Comprehensive Spending Reviews also 
allowed the Treasury to introduce cross-government directives to control operating costs: DFID soon 
faced the triple challenge of managing a growing aid budget, while decreasing its staff and internal 
costs, and decentralizing to offices outside of London. 
  
With respect to research funding, the Labour government built upon Rothschild’s idea of the intelligent 
consumer. The UK Comptroller and Auditor General asserted that all government departments were 
expected “to be clear about their strategic research aims and establish coherent systems for procuring 
research—including its commissioning, quality assurance, and use" (UK 2003). In particular, the 
comptroller argued that those responsible for research had to ensure its quality and relevance, and that 
findings were used to improve service delivery and to inform policy. Furthermore, departments were 
expected to have a clear understanding of future demand and supply of research—pertinent questions 
and the capability of potential providers—and to consult research users to identify and prioritize their 
requirements. Meanwhile in academia, the UK Research Assessment Exercise had been established by 
the Thatcher administration in 1986 and was now encouraging researchers to move on rapidly to new 
research projects, effectively discouraging longer-term dissemination of their work (Burawoy 2011, Surr 
et al. 2002). 
  
DFID began to examine its approach in light of these new expectations. A Knowledge Policy Unit was 
established in 1998 to learn from the research being funded, yet the day-to-day management remained 
dispersed across the policy division, including separate teams for economic and social research, health 
and population, education, engineering, renewable natural resources, and social development. Each of 
these teams had evolved their own “strategy, with distinct procedures... including separate guidance to 
applicants, reporting procedures... how to set research priorities... how to disseminate research 
findings; how to assess impact, and so on” (Surr et al. 2002). An evaluation of research funding found 
that when a project failed it was due to inadequate depth and rigor in proposals, insufficient attention 




The Department adopted a Science Innovation Strategy yet it mostly described the status quo, rather 
than laying out a vision for the future. It noted that funding was mostly allocated through competitions 
targeted to meet specific policy needs, yet at times DFID responded to researcher interest through peer 
review involving internal and external assessors (DFID 2000b). The annual research budget reached £147 
million in 2001–02, equivalent to over 4% of the UK budget for official development assistance. At the 
time, the largest beneficiaries were universities (accounting for 70% of all recipients), followed by not-
for-profits (20%) and others (3%), including foreign governments (Surr et al. 2002). While DFID 
expressed a desire to increase private-sector involvement, for-profits represented just 3% of its 
recipients. 
  
DFID decided to improve its research management skills, understood as its ability to define a research 
policy and strategy, identify projects, monitor budgets, and assess research impact (Surr et al 2002). 
Research for the developing world was defined as (1) correcting for market failure by providing 
incentives or otherwise stimulating demand for research that addresses problems of the poor; (2) 
providing evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of donor and host government interventions; and 
(3) empowering poor countries to decide their own path; and modernization via knowledge to boost 
productivity (Surr et al 2002). To rationalize internal costs, DFID also wanted to fund fewer, larger value 
projects—involving networks of organizations—and partner with other research funders, such as the UK 
Research Councils and the European Union (EU). DFID decided to consolidate its existing research 
programmes into a single research group: 
  
…headed by a senior civil servant who would be responsible for the overall strategic 
management of research and for representing DFID in Whitehall and the EU and other 
international fora...  Advisors would be both in research teams and within policy themes (as well 
as linked with country programmes via their advisory networks). This should keep research 
informed by DFID’s priorities and vice versa, and improve the relevance of research and its 
effective dissemination and promotion (Surr et al. 2002). 
  
The Central Research Department (CRD) was established in 2003 within the policy division. It began with 
just seven full-time employees led by Paul Spray who, despite a rich career within the foreign aid 
program, identified himself more as a development generalist than a research specialist. The MDGs also 
imparted new ideas on aid effectiveness: development assistance was expected to be untied, country-
owned, and demand-led. These characteristics encouraged DFID to place increased emphasis on the 
participation of developing countries in its research funding, and continued attention to the “uptake” of 
research into policy and practice. 
  
  
Science strikes back 
 
DFID’s use of science soon became the subject of an inquiry under the House committee on science and 
technology. Parliament, encouraged by the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, was concerned that 
DFID was disconnected from the government departments responsible for science, under-resourced to 
fully participate in research partnerships, and in dire need to scientific staff (Sivadasan et al. 2003). 
  
At one level, the inquiry was concerned about DFID’s ability to act as an intelligent customer. In the 
words of one respondent, “there was really no apparatus for assimilating, dealing with, and 
disseminating results of the research that was done”. This situation had been aggravated by the move 
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towards fewer, larger projects. DFID had begun to fund Research Programme Consortia, or networks 
comprised of four-to-six institutions, some of which were located in developing countries. This type of 
grantmaking moved more funds in each project, but also shifted research management partially to the 
recipients. DFID would interact more with the lead managers within each consortium, who in turn 
coordinated the researchers involved. Staff had limited interaction with individual researchers, which 
was feared to erode DFID’s ability to use the results of the research it funded (House of Commons 2004). 
In the words of one respondent, the relationship with research community had, “moved gradually from 
working-on-top-of-you, to working-with-you, and then let’s-give-you-money to do research”. 
  
At another level, the inquiry sought to reverse a perceived move away from supporting researchers at 
home in the UK. The inquiry report introduced the term development sciences to refer to “the full 
spectrum of social and natural sciences, engineering and technology undertaken with the purpose of 
informing, supporting or promoting international development” (House of Commons 2004). 
Development sciences were seen as distinct from development studies. Witnesses argued that the UK 
had strong experience in agricultural, biotechnology, and medical research. David King, the 
government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, cautioned that “DFID's untying of research may well compromise 
the sustainability of the UK research base operating in areas of particular relevance to the developing 
world”. In its report, the select committee argued that the “erosion of the UK research base in 
development sciences is now endangering the future ability of the UK to sustain this leadership role” 
(House of Commons 2004). Discontent over previous shifts in grantmaking, a strong science lobby 
emerged to argue for the participation of the domestic research community within foreign aid, arguing 
that science: 
  
make[s] an invaluable contribution to development by, reducing disease burdens and food 
insecurity; facilitating communications; enabling monitoring of global and national 
environments to minimise conflicts and give warning of natural disasters, and developing new 
ways of using water, energy and other natural resources... [and] engender a culture of inquiry, 
openness and respect for evidence (House of Commons 2004, 9) 
  
  
Although the bulk of the inquiry focused on research management within DFID, it also made other 
recommendations. First was to give greater prominence to capacity building. The inquiry report argues 
that “the UK has an obligation to support capacity building in science and technology for development” 
in developing countries, including human resources, physical infrastructure, and stronger research and 
education systems. Second was to appoint a Chief Scientific Adviser, following a 2002 recommendation 
in the government’s “Investing in Innovation” strategy called for such a position in all departments that 
used or commissioned significant amounts of research. 
  
DFID responded with an increase in research funding. The aid budget was growing rapidly, particularly in 
the run up to the UK hosting the 2005 G8 meeting in Gleneagles with its focus on aid to Africa. The 
country’s official development assistance had reached £4.1 billion by 2004–05, and was projected to 
reach £6.5 billion within three years. The House committee argued that there should be a 
"commensurate increase in the availability of funding for development sciences R&D in the UK, in order 
to strengthen the evidence base available for international development policy-making, and to 
safeguard the UK's ability to maintain a leadership role in the field" (House of Commons 2004, 82). 
  
As for a Chief Scientific Advisor, the title was initially added to job description of the director of the 
Central Research Department. Now wearing these two hats, Paul Spray prepared the Research Funding 
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Framework 2005–07. By the end of this period, DFID expected to dedicate at least £100 million per year 
to research, and the framework described how to direct this new spending. Two-thirds was dedicated to 
four priority themes: sustainable agriculture, “killer diseases” (HIV, malaria and tuberculosis), state 
fragility and governance, and climate change. These themes mapped closely to the various interests 
within DFID and were intended to ensure that everyone—DFID management and the UK research 
community alike—felt they had a stake them. The remaining one-third of funding was spread across 
other MDG-related research, as well as smaller policy-oriented projects (£100,000 to £300,000 each) 
which provided a window for responding to ideas proposed by the research community (DFID 2004). 
  
Research began to enjoy a rising profile within DFID. Despite the minor portion of DFID spending 
invested, research projects contributed many of the examples highlighted in the department’s annual 
report to Parliament. This was in part because research projects were more directly tied to results, 
compared to budget support in partner countries. Meanwhile Secretary of State Hilary Benn was keen 
that DFID research be seen as credible in the eyes of the UK research community, not least owing to the 
fact that his brother was an active member in the Royal Society of Chemistry. By 2006, the CRD staff 
grew to thirty people, divided between Program Managers responsible for administrative and financial 
aspects of funded project, and Research Advisors responsible for program development, monitoring, 
and evaluation. They would prepare concise descriptions of an under-researched area that served as the 
basis for competitive tenders. Projects were selected using a two-stage process with an internal review 




In summary, during this period, the governance context invested the aid agency with an increasing level 
of resources and a legislated mandate to contribute to global poverty reduction. The program theory 
guiding funding decisions saw research as a form of public good, placed at the service of furthering a 
global development agenda negotiated with other donors. The grantmaking practice that evolved saw 
an increase in support to recipients located outside the UK and a move to larger projects, networks or 
“consortia” of grantees. The Labour government adopted the rhetoric of an evidence-based approach to 
policy, heightening expectations that research would demonstrate and enhance government 
performance. DFID saw research as a global public good, part of the UK contribution towards the 
Millennium Development Goals. Yet subsequent spending reviews required the department control its 
operating costs: to manage a growing budget with fewer staff.  
 
Research funding switched from individual projects with single recipients, towards much larger-value 
research consortia involving multiple recipients. Consequently much of the responsibility for shaping a 
research programme was effectively transferred to recipients. This move attracted new criticism 
regarding DFID’s use of science. Whereas ODA research advisors previously fostered competition among 
potential providers—establishing market-inspired relationships between government and researchers—
DFID was now expected to have a coherent approach to its research funding that contributed to 







Figure 3.2 Performance regime surrounding DFID. Solid lines represent formal lines of authority, dotted 
lines describe the flow of program ideas, and dashed lines show funding relationships. Upper portion 
represents governance context: formal authority came through the minister, yet treasury, other 
departments, and research councils were influential. The scientific community at home also lobbied 
Parliament. Lower portion describes grantmaking, with shaded circles represent recipients abroad. From 
left to right: support to recipients abroad, international initiatives with multiple participants, consortia 
led by UK institutions, and support to UK recipients.  
 
 
The Promise of Technology and Evidence 
 
The year 2005 marked a peak in public support for development. The UK chose to focus the G8 summit 
on development in Africa. Many donor countries were increasing their aid budgets, and civil society 
campaigned to “make poverty history.” The world was seen to have the resources, and now the political 
will, to eliminate absolute poverty and achieve the MDG agenda. This optimism cascaded over into DFID, 
which had established itself as the cutting-edge of the public service. It drew young, career-minded 
professionals away from traditionally more popular departments, including Treasury and the Foreign 
Office. Research enjoyed pride of place within the department, responsible for a portion of the growing 
aid budget. 
  
Research for the developing world was entering a new period. DFID recruited its first full-time Chief 
Scientific Advisor: Gordon Conway, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation and a fellow of the 
Royal Society who had pioneered the science of integrated pest management. Responding to the House 
committee inquiry, his tenure saw DFID take a greater interest in so-called platform technologies and 
~-------......... . .. .. . ... . ..... .... 
--






•••• -•••• UKCDS • \ ~ ••••••••••••••••••;-•;;;•••0 ; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••;, R -;-;~-• ~-~~\:-... • •• / / I \ ' / ..... / 0 ✓ I \ \ I ..... / 00o i i \ IP ..... ®€8)6b°~o 
36 
 
expand its partnerships with the UK research councils. These steps re-established ties with the natural 
sciences in the UK, embracing the promise of technology to make create new opportunities for poor 
people abroad. Yet DFID also expected research to inform the department to become more effective 
and efficient in its bilateral, multilateral and humanitarian aid. Government continued to press 
departments to control their operating costs, limiting the amount of time staff could invest in research 
management and monitoring. 
  
Towards the end of the decade, DFID’s program theory for research would shift away from an approach 
framed by development studies, and towards a way of thinking based more on clinical medicine. David 
Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal coalition government (2010–) arrived in power just as the developed 
world faced its worst financial crisis since the 1930s Great Depression. This marked the beginning of 
austerity budgets and saw the Public Sector Agreements replaced with new tools for performance 
management. Foreign aid was initially “ring fenced” and protected from budget cuts, yet this 
heightened the scrutiny to which DFID spending was subjected. Research would be increasingly seen as 
providing evidence on which forms of spending offered the best “value for money.” 
  
  
Partnering with the councils 
 
The Blair government’s third White Paper on development policy promised to double DFID funding for 
research. Responding to the House committee inquiry, the White Paper argued DFID would “exploit 
science to fight poverty" such as the potential for upstream natural sciences and technological 
advances. Research promised to lead to “a new generation of drugs, vaccines and treatment methods... 
new technologies for water treatment and purification... and adapting to the impact of climate change" 
(Cm 6876, 2006). The White Paper also reiterated an expectation that research would provide 
developing countries access to international expertise and encourage local researchers to address the 
needs of the poorest members of their societies.  
 
Researchers were not expected to work in isolation, but to link with a variety of partners that could help 
ensure the uptake of research into practice, including community groups, the media and private sector. 
Recipients were not only expected to be highly-qualified researchers, but also adept networkers, 
entrepreneurs, and innovators. 
  
The government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, David King, convened a “Development Science Working 
Group” to reflect on how the government might better coordinate UK support to medical, agricultural, 
environmental and other areas of research. At one point, this group considered a new research council 
dedicated to development sciences. Yet this option would have redirected funding from DFID and the 
existing research councils, without necessarily improving coherence among the various offerings of 
these funders.  
 
The government instead opted to create a UK Collaborative on Development Sciences (UKCDS) to 
“maximise the impact of UK research on international development”. Its initial members included DFID, 
Wellcome Trust, the line departments for health and for innovation, and the research councils for the 
natural environment, biosciences, medical research, and economic and social research. The 
Collaborative had a modest staff of roughly five persons, considered employees of the bioscience 
research council (BBSRC) but working out of the offices of Wellcome Trust, a private charity dedicated to 
medical research. UKCDS sought to help its members identify future research needs, improve 
coordination, and share good practice. While it did not have any formal powers, the Collaborative was 
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expected to both enhance DFID’s links with other research funders, and ensure the UK research councils 
supported opportunities for work on international development. 
 
DFID began to issue joint calls for proposals with a greater number of the UK research councils. Such 
partnerships were a win-win for DFID: it was perceived to be commissioning high-quality science, and 
doing so by buying into the existing peer review process, rather than setting up and running such 
competitions itself. Consequently, part of DFID’s portfolio moved towards more upstream research, 
including plant genomics and human vaccines. The pool of potential grantees grew from the former 
development studies community interested in poor countries abroad, to take in a wide community with 
skills in lab-based sciences at home that could be applied abroad. In the words of one respondent, it 
widened the field to “anyone who can slice in a salt-tolerant gene”. Yet a new tension emerged: 
proposals with the best science did not necessarily have the greatest relevance to development. 
  
The councils were already struggling to balance the criteria of research quality and impact. Each of the 
councils had its own program theory for research, but faced a common performance regime. In 2006, all 
the councils were asked “to make funding decisions based on assessments of research excellence and 
the potential economic impact” (Holmes and Harris 2010). Consequently the councils had embarked on 
an “excellence with impact” agenda, which emphasized demonstrating impact, engagement with 
research users, and support for people in knowledge brokering roles. Hence the opportunity to work 
with DFID was attractive: it would provide an example of demand from a government department, and 
DFID funding would match or exceed those offered by the councils. Yet the councils’ program theory 
continued to privilege quality ahead of impact, while DFID expected research to be relevant and have 
practical application. The Secretary of State argued that DFID was not interested in funding research per 
se, but in its benefit for developing countries. 
  
Somehow the peer review process had to reconcile the criteria of quality and impact. Early competitions 
used parallel review committees, one focused on the scientific quality of proposals and the other on 
their relevance to development. The project ideas that were ranked highly by both committees were 
invited to submit full proposals. Yet the result was perceived as somewhat disappointing to both sides, 
projects midway between the comfort zones of basic and applied science preferred by the councils and 
DFID. This move also re-established the prominence of UK researchers in DFID funding. To be eligible for 
council funding, project ideas needed to include a UK researcher. Furthermore, developing country 
colleagues were at a disadvantage, lacking experience in presenting their ideas for consideration in UK 
peer review. 
  
Additional differences between DFID and the councils surfaced after the selection process. The councils 
were accustomed to relying on academic incentives of tenure and university careers to encourage 
recipients to get on with their research, yet DFID was accustomed to playing an active role in monitoring 
progress of the funded work. In some instances, the grantees were asked to revisit their project design 
in order retrofit logical frameworks, milestones, and deliverables. Furthermore, recipients were 
expected to provide regular updates on their work and respond to periodic requests for information 
coming from DFID. 
  
  
Funding global science and informing aid 
 
The promise of upstream science and new technology was also present elsewhere in DFID’s research 
portfolio, with new support to a variety of international alliances and product development 
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partnerships. These partnerships combined funding from the public and private sectors to identify, 
refine, and take to market medicines and other technologies for poor countries. They were intended to 
address the ‘market failure’ created by the low financial demand exercised by poor people, which meant 
that certain technologies were not profitable for the private sector to invest in.  
 
Product development partnerships were seen as a means to coordinate across government, academia, 
companies and civil society to underwrite the R&D costs and facilitate the discovery and diffusion of 
new technologies. Such partnerships operated as virtual non-profit R&D organizations, outsourcing 
activities to academic or private firms and providing technical oversight and research management 
(Grace 2010). Product development partnerships also sought in-kind contributions from private firms in 
the form of staff time, use of laboratories and production facilities, and access to proprietary 
information, such as candidate molecules for new drugs. Examples included the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) and Global Alliance for 
Livestock Veterinary Medicines (GALVmed). 
  
Two factors encouraged DFID to adopt this approach to grantmaking. The first was the beliefs and 
convictions of DFID’s Chief Scientific Advisor. Gordon Conway championed these initiatives based on his 
experience with the Rockefeller Foundation, which had been an early supporter of product development 
partnerships inspired in part by delays in public research through the United Nations. The second factor 
was the opportunity to minimize operating costs by moving large amounts of funding in single grants. 
Thus the DFID research portfolio now included a greater diversity of approaches, with research 
programme consortia, collaboration with the research councils, and product development partnerships 
adding to the more traditional research projects with single recipients or contributions to multilateral 
programs, such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) or World 
Health Organization (WHO). 
  
Meanwhile, under the Blair and Brown governments, Whitehall expected that public research funding 
would provide an input into an evidence-based approach to policy making. The Cabinet Office defined 
evidence as “expert knowledge, published research, existing statistics, stakeholder consultations, 
previous policy evaluations, the Internet, outcomes from consultations, costings of policy options, 
output from economic and statistical modelling” (Davies and Nutley 2002). Much of the public sector 
adopted a new concern for gathering evidence to substantiate policy objectives, instruments, and 
monitoring. 
  
Clinical medicine was held up as an ideal for this approach. Clinical medicine starts with a clear outcome 
which allows practitioners to establish a hierarchy among different methods. For example, if the desired 
outcome is reduced mortality or disease, the mechanism is a drug or vaccine candidate. Randomized 
experimentation is a means of establishing validity, or ‘truth’, followed by observational studies and 
professional consensus. Within government, this clinical medicine philosophy was increasingly applied 
more widely within health policy, as well as other areas of social policy, including justice and education. 
Yet, similar to international development, these sectors simultaneously seek multiple outcomes, often 
negating the possibility of establishing a clear hierarchy among methods and types of knowledge that 
counts as “evidence” (Davies and Nutley 2002). 
  
Yet the performance regime in the UK required evidence to underpin all decisions. For example, the 
policy process required some form of evidence as to the extent of a particular problem or the 
effectiveness of some form of intervention. There had to be some proof before the problem was 
accepted as deserving to be on the government agenda, or before an intervention was accepted as 
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deserving of public funding. In other words, policy goal X was important, or policy instrument Y worked, 
because of evidence Z. Consequentially, experience-based knowledge or expert opinion counted for 
much less than they had in the past. The emphasis was very much on the instrumental use of empirical 
evidence to inform practice, rather than the conceptual use of theoretical knowledge to frame policy 
(Nutley et al 2007). 
  
The twin promises of technology and evidence were integrated into the DFID Research Strategy 2008–
13. DFID expected to spend up to £1 billion on research within this five-year period, thus the stakes 
were high and there was opportunity to move beyond the department’s previous directions. The 
Director General of Research and Policy, Andrew Steer, described DFID priorities as a product of “where 
would research have the greatest potential impact on changing the way one tackles poverty, new 
priorities set by the Minister, what other research funders do, what is the opportunity cost of research 
in one area versus another” (House of Lords 2010) 
  
Following a substantial consultation with research communities at home and abroad, the strategy 
included some substantial continuity. It defined research for the developing world as a means to “make 
faster progress in fighting poverty and achieving the MDGs” and called for continued support to health 
and agriculture. These two themes continued to account for the largest shares of the portfolio, at £50 
million and £40 million in 2007–08. Next in size was research on economic growth and on fragile 
states—which accounted for £10 million and £12 million respectively—which could trace their lineage 
back to the old work programmes. The strategy also laid out new investment in the areas of research 
communications, climate change, and future post-2015 challenges. Collectively these themes accounted 
for £16 million in 2007–08. 
  
The focus on research communications responded to demand for evidence-informed practice. The 
strategy argued that it was "more likely that people will act on evidence that is built up over many years, 
in different contexts, once this has been communicated effectively”. Thus part of the value of research 
was seen to lie in bridging this last mile, to reach a potential audience that could “use research to bring 
about real change" (DFID 2008). Accordingly, the strategy called for investing up to 30% of the research 
budget into making research “available, accessible, and useable”. Recipients and DFID were both 
responsible for research communication. Funds were earmarked within each grant for recipients to 
share their findings, while DFID increased its own spending on research communication and synthesis. In 
the short term, DFID’s approach was framed by the experience of development practitioners—based on 
a belief that each country’s development experience was unique—yet it increasing adopted the 
philosophy of clinical medicine—based on a belief in universal facts about what worked and what did 
not. 
  
DFID’s new strategy outlined four intended results: policy knowledge for developing countries, the 
international community and DFID; evidence to inform decision-making about international 
development; technologies developed and used in developing countries; and capabilities to do and use 
research. DFID sought a proactive role in shaping the research agenda, asserting that its staff would 
“take the lead intellectually in delivering high-quality research that shapes ideas, policy, and practice” 
(DFID 2008). Research would focus on DFID partner countries in Africa and South Asia, responding to 
local demand and improving the capability of these countries to carry out research. Yet in practice, it 
would be difficult for the London-based research staff to feed into spending by local country programs 




Gordon Brown’s Labour government (2007–10) released yet another white paper on international 
development, establishing the DFID priorities as economic growth, climate change, and conflict. Foreign 
aid was to be directed “based on the principles of country income, population size and confidence that 
resources will be used effectively." (Cm 7656, 2009). DFID continued to be squeezed on operating costs, 
with a promise to "deliver an additional £155 million of value for money savings by 2010–11”. These 
savings were to be found in part by “improving value for money in the research budget”. Echoing the 
optimism over the promised of technology and evidence, the white paper argued for focusing research 
on “best bets… innovations with the greatest potential to lift poor people out of poverty". The examples 
cited included drought-resistant maize and vitamin-enriched crops. Meanwhile DFID research was also 
expected “to ensure that decision makers have the best evidence of what works” (Cm 7656, 2009). 
  
In 2009, Chris Whitty was recruited to DFID to occupy the now recombined post of Chief Scientific 
Advisor and Head of Research. This included both a corporate role to facilitate the use of science 
throughout DFID, as well as direct oversight of the staff responsible for the research funding decisions. 
This post was just two levels from the top of DFID management, reporting to the Director General of 
Policy and Research, which in turn reported to the Permanent Secretary. Whereas the past directors of 
DFID research were career public servants, Whitty was trained as a medical doctor and would continue 
to keep a foot in academia, teaching part-time at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. He 
had the gravitas of coming from the other side of the fence, being part of the medical research 
community and seeing research management from that point of view. To meet the expectation of 
informing DFID policy and operations, the Central Research Department was soon renamed the 
Research and Evidence Division (RED). Under the new division, research was not only for reducing 
poverty, but for “doing more with available funds, [to] avoid developing expensive ideas that do not 
work” (DFID 2009).  
 
The division began to fund systematic reviews on questions facing DFID operation across the 
department. The method of systematic review compiles a synthesis of past research findings by: asking a 
precise question, establishing an explicit protocol for how to identify and include previous studies, and 
conducting a meta-analysis of the data from these studies. A systematic review assesses the rigor of 
previous studies, and excludes from the meta-analysis those studies that are considered to have poor-
quality designs. Systematic reviews originated in clinical medicine, as a means to look at effectiveness of 
a particular drug or intervention, with the aim of informing practice and better targeting future research 
effort. The Research and Evidence Division collected a series of questions from across DFID, which were 
then tendered to the research community to apply for. It also worked with donor agencies in Australia, 
the United States, and Canada on additional calls. 
  
The use of systematic reviews was controversial. Drug effectiveness could be established by a controlled 
context and causation rooted in biochemistry and human physiology. Yet changes in poverty happen in 
an uncontrolled context due to multiple causal mechanisms stemming from the interaction of 
economics, politics, and the actions of donors, partner governments, and poor people themselves. Some 
of the questions identified for a systematic review were fairly general in nature, such as “what factors 
limit the use of cleaner cookstoves”. This made it difficult to identify which past studies were 
appropriate to include in the meta-analysis. Conversely, the focus on high-quality studies led to reviews 
that included a very small number of findings or that excluded studies that were seen as pertinent by 
development practitioners considered and (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2012). As the reviews were conducted 
by outsiders, they tended to lack the nuance needed to tailor their presentation the practical needs of 
DFID staff. Furthermore, adapting Sparrow’s argument on evidence-based policing (2011), a systematic 
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review selects a tiny fraction of scientific methods applicable to international development and narrows 
the range of solutions available. 
  
DFID continued to move towards targeted research, becoming less responsive to researcher interest. 
Prior to the 1990s, ODA projects had been primarily determined by the research community, while 
under RED the research themes—and increasing the research questions—were determined primarily by 
government. Yet a more nuanced balance of Rothschild and Haldane visions was emerging in UK 
research policy. A House of Lords inquiry into public research (2010) argued that “plurality and 
diversity... allows multiple opportunities for the best research to be funded”. Those responsible for 
research funding were to exercise careful judgment about how to deploy “limited funds between 
competing priorities so that the pursuit of knowledge and its translation into practical applications meet 
the needs of society”.  
 
Echoing earlier concerns, witnesses to the inquiry expressed doubts over whether government 
departments knew “who to ask or what to ask”, and argued that targeted funding risked producing 
poorer quality or even mediocre research (para 44 and 52). Applying this concern to DFID, one 
respondent lamented, “the way [researchers] are being funded is turning everyone into a short-term 
consultant and analyst”. Having worked hard to establish its scientific credibility, this was not a desirable 
image for DFID. Despite continued pressure to control operating costs, research management required 
skilled people. The Research and Evidence Division soon grew to over a hundred employees and began 
to give evidence to Parliamentary inquiries in the areas of health and food security. 
  
DFID was well positioned to respond to an emerging concern with global challenges, common to UK and 
developing countries. In 2009, the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, now Sir John Bebbington, 
argued that the twin forces of climate and demographic change would provoke a “perfect storm” of 
food, water, and energy scarcity within twenty years. The scale and urgency of these problems was seen 
to require greater collaboration across government and with other countries. The House of Lords argued 
that highly competitive funding systems discouraged such collaboration, instead rewarding individual 
pursuits and providing an incentive to keep research progress private until peer-reviewed publication. 
The inquiry further lamented that “research councils do not reward or facilitate interdisciplinary or 
ground-breaking work [and] departmental priorities outweighed cross-Government priorities” (House of 
Lords 2010, para 38). 
  
  
Research under austerity 
 
David Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal government (2010–) inherited the consequences of the 2008 
financial crisis that had rocked North America and Europe. The G20 response had seen the UK and other 
countries introduce two years of stimulus spending. By 2010, reduced revenue from a slowed economy 
had forced government finances into deficit with national debt increasing by 50%, to over £760 billion. 
The new government crafted an austerity budget, introducing tax hikes and cutting departmental 
spending by up to 25%. It also replaced the Public Service Agreements with a new requirement for 
departments to prepare “business plans.” Spending proposals were subjected to a new set of tools 
developed by HM Treasury, framed around a “five case model” of concise arguments outlining how the 
proposals contributed to government strategy, optimized value-for-money, and were commercially 




The international development budget was protected, or ring fenced, and further increased as the new 
government maintained a commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income towards official 
development assistance by 2013. Yet this continued growth in foreign aid meant that DFID would be 
subjected to intense scrutiny. Transparency and value-for-money were the priorities for DFID under its 
new Secretary of State, Andrew Mitchell, with an Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) 
reporting directly to Parliament on the effectiveness of various aid programmes. The government also 
quickly launched “root and branch” reviews of bilateral and multilateral aid. The bilateral review saw 
DFID end its aid to sixteen countries, including China and Russia, and refocus on twenty seven other 
countries, primarily in South Asia and eastern Africa. The multilateral review identified agencies DFID 
would stop funding or place under special measures. It prioritized support for the World Bank, regional 
development banks, UNICEF, the GAVI alliance, and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria (DFID 2011). 
  
Value-for-money became the prominent watch word within the department. In releasing the reviews, 
the Secretary of State argued they represented a “determination to deliver the greatest possible return 
on investment, both for the world’s poorest people and for the British taxpayer” (DFID 2011). The DFID 
Business Plan 2011–15 asserts that it “will no longer support projects that are failing to perform... spend 
as much money on marketing and communications... [or] provide substantial aid to countries that do 
not need it”. DFID re-emphasized the use of results-based management and quantitative commitments, 
including numbers of children to be enrolled in school and women to receive access to family planning. 
In such cases, value-for-money meant achieving these targets at a minimal cost. Yet DFID also wanted to 
help protect livelihoods from the effects of climate change and make countries safer from violent 
conflict. Such goals were not so easily measured or verified. They lacked a counterfactual of how 
conditions might otherwise evolve without UK intervention and it was difficult to distinguish DFID’s 
contribution from the efforts of others.   
  
The purpose of Research and Evidence Division was to commission research on key questions in 
development. It was expected to develop new technologies (such as new drugs, vaccines, or drought-
tolerant crops), find better and more cost-effective ways of delivering aid, and help DFID and partner 
countries make the best policy choices. The latter goals assumed an internal demand for research. Every 
DFID project was expected to be justified through statements summarizing evidence on the need for the 
intervention, as well as evidence on its potential or real impact (House of Lords 2012). By 2012, 
Research and Evidence Division had an annual budget of £235 million, up from £130 million in 2008, and 
expected to reach £320 million by 2014 (House of Commons 2012). Up to one-third of this budget was 
to be directed to ensuring that “research evidence from any source gets to the policy makers and end 
users who need it” (DFID 2009). 
  
Research and Evidence Division staff had a role in synthesizing evidence from a variety of sources, 
assessing its quality, and communicating the findings. The division’s work now involved producing four 
types of “evidence products”, including systematic reviews contracted out to universities, in-house 
evidence papers providing DFID’s own perspective of the state of the science, classical literature 
reviews, and rapid reviews intended to respond to urgent policy needs (House of Commons 2012). Chris 
Whitty described himself as having three roles: ensuring that the evidence base was strong and reached 
users across DFID, contributing to the professional development of staff, and strengthening DFID’s peer 
review and “proper mechanisms for commissioning research rather than a slightly ad hoc process” 
(House of Lords 2012). Yet Whitty also cautioned that uncertainty continued to exist. It was often 
impossible to answer a Minister’s question or provide a definitive recommendation “either because the 
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studies are not there or because they have not been done to a high enough quality” (House of Commons 
2012). 
  
DFID had strengthened its engagement with academics, despite some clear challenges. The incentives 
for academics were to compete for Haldane-style funding from the research councils, and to publish to 
enhance their university’s standing in the Research Assessment Exercise. Despite the rise in demand for 
academic input from evidence-based agenda, government departments continued with Rothschild-style 
contracts focused on their own needs. The potential to participate in, and contribute to, policymaking 
held some attraction, but many academics were reluctant to chase after government contracts at the 
cost of progressing in their own careers. 
  
DFID sought to break this impasse in three ways. First was through senior research fellowships offering 
established academics an opportunity to work within the department for limited time (DFID 2009). 
Second, some DFID posts were modified to permit staff to hold both academic and public service 
responsibilities. Chris Whitty and his deputy continued to hold their university jobs, albeit with reduced 
teaching and research responsibilities. This meant that staff would not have to forego their standing in 
the world of academia while contributing to DFID. Third, Whitty convened an informal Research 
Advisory Group (iRAG) of outside academics, chaired by the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University, to 
provide ongoing independent advice on the current and future relevance of DFID’s research agenda. 
  
In summary, during this period, the performance regime reemphasized ties with UK science, including 
notions of scientific excellence, and witnessed rising scrutiny of foreign aid, including downward 
pressure on operating costs. The program theory guiding funding decisions embraced the potential for 
generating technologies to change the lives of poor women and men, as well as the potential for 
research to inform an evidence-based approach to policy. Corresponding, grantmaking expanded to 
include partnerships with the UK research councils, continued rise in average project size, and renewed 




 Figure 3.3: United Kingdom's R4D spending since 1980. ODA/DFID grants to research in dark (left axis) 
compared to UK's official development assistance (right axis). All amounts are expressed as million GBP 
adjusted to 2011. Gaps represent times when research spending was not reported separately. The 
shaded years represent time when Conservative party was in power. (Sources: ODA Report on Research, 


















UK research policy was subject to a tug-of-war within between the Haldane principle—under which the 
research community is essentially self-governed— and the Rothschild principle—under which research is 
for hire. Haldane divided research commissioned by departments for a specific purpose from research 
funded by councils for more general use. Lord Rothschild saw applied research as having “a practical 
application as its objective”, best governed by the principle of “the customer says what he wants; the 
contractor does it (if he can) and the customer pays”. After 1979, Conservative governments pursued an 
agenda to make the public service more economical, efficient, and effective. Reforms saw the 
government’s scientific units spun off into quasi-independent entities. These agencies were expected to 
fend for themselves, with their access to public funds governed by a customer-contractor relationship. 
Pressure mounted for competitive tendering of public funding, and for the measurement and audit of 
outcomes utilizing performance indicators. 
  
Research for the developing world has deep historical roots in the United Kingdom. The current 
arrangements with DFID trace their lineage back to the early twentieth century, predating the era of 
foreign aid. Upon its creation, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) inherited a legacy of 
funding relations from the previous Colonial Research Council, including scientific units within 
government, world-class centers at home, and a host of institutes abroad. The initial focus was on 
maintaining the UK science base and reducing the dependency of institutes abroad by switching its offer 
from core funding to project funding. With the advent of the Rothschild principle, ODA established an 
arm’s-length relationship with the scientific units previously part of government. ODA kept its research 
funding fragmented among policy divisions responsible for agriculture, health, economics, etc. The 
adoption of work programmes after 1993 saw a more deliberate attempt to set the research agenda and 
foster competition within the research community. 
  
Following the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997, research was 
subject to mounting critique from inside and outside the department. In response, a Central Research 
Department was established to strengthen DFID's ability to manage its research funding. Research 
benefited from an increasing foreign aid budget, yet struggled with the Treasury’s efforts to control 
operating costs. Funding moved from “retail to wholesale”, away from small grants with individual 
research teams, and towards larger grants with either consortia of recipients or international alliances. 
The International Development Act in 2002 untied foreign aid, and saw an increase in research funding 
to recipients abroad. Later in the decade, DFID sought to reestablish its scientific credibility, working 
more closely with the research councils to promote the promise of new technology, and positioning 
itself as the provider of evidence upon which to base foreign aid investments. This latter role became 
particularly pronounced in the follow-up to the Labour push for evidence-based policy and the 
Conservative focus on value for money during times of austerity. 
  
The periods describe above closely match Bastow, Dunleavy and Tinkler (2014) identification of three 
eras of UK governance. These periods include a pre-1980 government science characterized by 
Weberian bureaucracy with in-house scientific expertise; pre-2000 new public management with 
creation of quasi-markets by outsourcing government science and emphasizing evidence-based policy; 
and the current digital-era governance privileging quantitative approaches and focusing on real-time 
impacts. The second era included dividing “purchasers” from “providers”, making providers compete 




The governance context can be described in terms of resource availability, public management, and 
research governance.  
 
In terms of the resources available, the UK initially supported the costs of local research facilities abroad 
and world-class centers of excellence at home. By mid-century, the UK government sought to reduce 
overall costs by encouraging the governments of the newly-independent countries to fund local 
research. Meanwhile, the move from core funding to competitive work programmes was a means of 
rationalizing government expenditure on UK recipients. The rise of official development assistance this 
century saw a disproportionate increase in research funding. Yet the New Labour discipline of spending 
reviews saw strict controls on the resources available for staffing and internal costs, encouraging a move 
from “retail to wholesale” funding: supporting larger projects, networks or “consortia” of grantees, and 
co-funding with the UK research granting councils. Recent austerity budgets saw research as providing 
evidence that informed the design of aid investments. 
  
In terms of public management, Haldane established that line departments should have a budget line 
for research, which ODA initially used to maintain the UK research centers specialized in the problems of 
tropical climates. The market-inspired thinking of Rothschild and Thatcher eventually led to a split 
between those who performed research and those who commissioned it. ODA exited service delivery 
entirely, spinning-off its scientific units to the academic or private sector. Following the creation of DFID, 
research was seen as a public good contributing the international agenda beyond the UK. Research for 
the developing world benefited from an outside “science lobby” as domestic researchers were primary 
beneficiaries of ODA grantmaking until the untying of aid. The shift away from domestic research 
providers provoked an attack on DFID’s use of science, leading to the creation of a Chief Scientific 
Advisor, the first of whom brought in a focus on platform technologies, such as ICTs and genomics. His 
successor imparted a model inspired by clinical medicine, resonating with an evidence-based approach 
to policy championed by Blair. The result was a shift to seeing research as an internal service to 
demonstrate the value for money of foreign aid. 
  
In terms of research policy, the research community invented a “Haldane principle” of self-governance 
under which government was merely a benign benefactor. Later Rothschild’s ideal of “customer-
contractor” expected government to be an intelligent consumer, specifying exactly what it needed from 
the research community. Research shifted from responding to the interests of the research community 
to instead encouraging work on the interests of government. The UK research community was initially 
seen as a close ally worthy of support, but later re-cast as a consultant to be managed through 
contractual relations. These two forms of governance coexist in a dynamic tension between what 
government wants done, and what researchers are interested in doing. Even when ODA adopted 
competitive funding mechanisms, the relationship with the research community was not entirely arm’s 
length. Government officials would turn to the research community in crafting the terms of references. 
Meanwhile researchers are judged more on their publication record, than on their participation in 
government funding opportunities. 
 
The agency of ODA and DFID is seen in how these organizations responded to a changing context 
through the evolution of the program theory used guiding funding decisions and grantmaking practices. 
  
In terms of program theory, ODA initially focused on the science base at home, maintaining highly-
qualified people and established centres within the UK research community. Later the work 
programmes offered competitive funding for projects to further outcomes of interest to the aid agency. 
DFID initially shifted away from the domestic research community in favour of the global development 
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agenda negotiated with other donors. More recently, DFID embraced perspectives based on the 
promise of technology and a clinical approach which sees research as providing evidence as to what is 
needed and what works. Both of these perspectives opened up funding to recipients beyond those that 
self-identified as working on international development. Yet new perspectives did not completely 
displace older ones, instead there has been a layering of grantmaking logics over time. For example, 
DFID continued to provide core funding to the Overseas Development Institution despite long 
abandoning a perspective of maintaining the UK science base. A growing research budget provided 
space for multiple program theories to coexist and thrive. 
  
Drawing Funnel and Rogers’ (2011) concepts of program theory, the UK approach to research was often 
based on a diffusion theory of change, initially underpinned by a direct delivery archetype. ODA 
inherited a set of scientific units at home that saw government responsible for conducting research. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the importance of this archetype eroded with the slow move to competitively-
awarded work programmes and the eventual phasing out of direct delivery during Next Steps agenda. 
With the establishment of DFID and substantial budget growth, research funding oscillated between 
diffusion and reasoned-action theories of change, which interpreted research as technical innovation 
and evidenced-based policy. In both cases, Research funding was underpinned by carrot-and-stick 
archetype, correcting a market failure by providing researchers with a financial incentive to do work that 
benefitted developing countries. 
  
In terms of grantmaking practices, ODA’s initially provided core support to highly-specialized senior 
researchers and research centers, based on historic relationships with institutes at home and abroad. 
Slowly ODA sought to rationalize these relationships, initially shifting from core funding to project 
funding for institutes abroad, which were increasingly expected to provide their own operating costs. A 
similar shift occurred in the relationship with domestic research community, with the work programmes 
moving UK institutes from core funding to project funding based on competitive calls for proposals. The 
work programmes saw the overall pool of recipients contract as some entities merged and others 
ceased to exist. The staff role of a “research advisor” evolved from a subject matter expert engaging 
with the external research community, towards an internal role providing technical support within DFID. 
Meanwhile the recipients of UK funding needed to satisfy an increasing number of expectations, 
including scientific quality, relevance to developing countries, and getting “research into use”. Beyond 
generating new knowledge and technologies, projects were expected to actually deliver development, 
demonstrating their contribution to outcomes such as raised incomes and improved well-being. 
 
 
Canada: Hopper’s vision of empowerment 
Even as Canada established its donor agency in 1968, prominent individuals envisioned a separate 
organization specialized in research. Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) would 
come to adopt the grantmaking practices of a philanthropic foundation, with a substantial role for its 
program officers to interact with recipients. As IDRC staff focused their gaze on the developing world, 
management cultivated a network of allies within Ottawa, periodically reposition or restructure the 
Centre to adjust to a changing performance regime.  
Such research was subjected to three distinct periods of performance expectations and goals. At first, 
IDRC was afforded a substantial degree of autonomy. Program theory was based on capacity building: 
strengthening research communities in developing countries to address their own problems. 
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Grantmaking provided direct project funding to southern recipients, loosely linked to the themes of 
information, health, agricultural or social science. A second period, starting in 1991, witnessed waves of 
budget cuts in the federal government that heightened demands to control operating costs and to 
demonstrate the utility of research. Program theory emphasized policy influence: research as an input 
into local efforts to address poverty abroad, requiring recipients to connect with audiences able to 
influence such. IDRC restructured itself and adopted a set of Board-approved program strategies which 
influence project selection. A third period, starting in the early 2000s, emphasized alignment with the 
priorities of Canada’s foreign policy. Programming was increasingly tied to government funding 
decisions, or committed to programs partially funded by CIDA and donors outside Canada. Program 
theory valued research for its actual contribution to changed policy and practice in the developing 
world, with an increasing array of expectations placed upon its recipients. Grantmaking embraced 
competitive calls for proposals alongside the older practices of responding to unsolicited proposals and 
proactive project development by IDRC staff.  
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In contrast to the United Kingdom, Canada opted to create a distinct for-purpose organization to fund 
research for the developing world. The idea originated in the 1960s. At home, Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal 
government (1963–68) rewrote the social contract with the introduction of universal health care and 
the Canada Pension Plan. Abroad, Canada established itself as an independent actor in foreign policy, 
championing the concept of peacekeeping following the Suez crisis and avoiding involvement in the 
Vietnam War. Canadian pride hit a peak in 1967, with the centennial celebrations and hosting of the 
World Exposition in Montreal. The time was ripe for bold thinking about the country’s role in the world. 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was established in 1968, building upon the 
External Aid Office within the Department of External Affairs which had coordinated Canada’s 
participation in the Colombo Plan. Maurice Strong was appointed Director General of the External Aid 
Office in 1966. Coming from industry, he questioned the lack of a research branch, which in his 
experience worked to identify new products and improve production. When Strong met Barbara Ward, 
author of the book “Spaceship Earth”, the two began to conceive of a foundation or think tank, a 
Canadian equivalent to the Brookings Institute or the Hudson Institute (Stockdale 1995). Ward enticed 
Pearson to support the idea, who announced the government’s intention to do so in June 1967. With 
the blessing of Cabinet, Strong convened a steering committee of deputy ministers to refine the idea 
further (Seward 1974).4 The committee retained A.F. Wynne Plumptre, a former Executive Director with 
the World Bank, to prepare a feasibility study of an organization “for the promotion of research directed 
towards developing countries.”  
Plumptre (1968) interviewed various officials in Canada and abroad, and found substantial support for 
the idea of applying and adapting new technology to the problems of developing countries. He found 
less enthusiasm for the alternatives of reviewing the results of past programs to improve future aid, or 
acting as a databank to coordinate international research efforts. Plumptre also discouraged gathering 
operations into a single location, cautioning that “useful research… will take place in the developing 
countries themselves… where the results of the research will have to be applied.” He argued that the 
Canadian government should provide a “substantial and reasonably assured” flow of funds that 
simultaneously responded to the needs of developing countries and “had application to Canadian 
experience and Canadian problems”.  
Following the transition to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, a new Secretary of State, Mitchell Sharp, 
proposed that Cabinet approve an independent corporation, focused on the problems of 
underdeveloped countries, drawing on Canadian expertise and experience (Canada 1968). The Cabinet 
memo described an “action… [and] solution-oriented” organization leading to “policy options and their 
presentation in usable form to the decision-makers”. Reflecting the tenor of the times, the organization 
was expected to make a uniquely Canadian contribution to the world, reflecting the “country’s 
experience of bilingualism, biculturalism, multi-racialism and federalism.”  
Simultaneously in 1968 World Bank President Robert McNamara invited Pearson to chair a commission 
reviewing the effectiveness of the previous twenty years of development assistance. The resulting 
report—“Partners in Development”—noted a sense of aid fatigue: “international support for 
 
4 Strong also drew on the UK experience by including Geoffrey Oldham (University of Sussex) in this work. 
Oldham would continue to contribute to Centre’s work throughout its first decade.  
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development is… flagging… its feasibility, even its very purpose is in question. The climate surrounding 
foreign aid is heavy with disillusion and distrust” (Pearson et al. 1969: 4). Among the many concerns 
raised5, the Commission called for greater assistance to research, arguing that “a large effort is needed 
to absorb, adapt, and develop scientific and technical knowledge in developing countries” (Pearson et al. 
1969: 21, 202–7).  
As the Pearson Commission report was going to press, back home the Trudeau’s Liberal government 
(1968–79) introduced legislation into the House of Commons for debate. Based on frustrated attempts 
to fund research through CIDA, Strong ensured the bill granted a degree of political independence, as a 
Crown corporation with its own Board of Governors. While the Board would be appointed by federal 
government, ten of its twenty-one members could be non-Canadians, ensuring the voice of developing 
countries in its governance. In January 1970, Sharp moved the bill to second reading, describing its role 
to "assist the developing countries to build their own scientific and technological capabilities so that 
they will [be]… contributors in their own right to the solution of their own problems" (Seward 1974). The 
bill was passed unanimously and, with Royal Assent in May 1970, the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) was born. 
Under the Act, IDRC was “to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the 
developing regions of the world”. It was granted a four-part mandate to: a) enlist the talents of natural 
and social scientists and technologists in Canada and other countries; b) assist the developing regions to 
build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills, and the institutions required to solve their 
problems; c) encourage generally the coordination of international development research; and d) foster 
cooperation in research on development problems between the developed and developing regions for 
their mutual benefit (Canada 1970, s4.1). The challenge ahead was to put this broad mandate into 
practice.  
That job fell to the Board of Governors, particularly the Chairman and President. Indeed the Act 
describes “IDRC” as the Board, with the power to appoint such employees as they felt necessary 
(Canada 1970, s3 and s14). Pearson became the first Chairman6, providing him with an opportunity to 
pursue his Commission’s recommendations. As a former head of state and Nobel laureate, he provided 
the political gravitas necessary to ensure the new Centre was taken seriously. In contrast, following 
another of Plumptre’s insights, the first IDRC President would command respect within the world of 
research, rather than politics. Strong recruited David Hopper for the job, a Canadian engaged in India’s 
“Green Revolution” to boost agricultural productivity. Hopper had a background in agricultural 
economics from McGill and Cornell Universities, and had worked with both the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations. Strong had been impressed when he met Hopper in 1967 and sought to emulate the 
foundation model in the new Centre.  
The legacy of preparing the IDRC Act gave Pearson and Hopper a “smorgasbord of ideas” (Seward 1974), 
a diverse variety of perspectives on research for the developing world upon which to model the new 
Centre. Yet it would prove to be Hopper’s interpretation that would have a lasting influence on the 
Centre’s philosophy and operations. 
 
5 The report critiqued the use of tied aid, foresaw the problem of external debt among developing countries, and 
called for “structural adjustment” on behalf of industrialized countries to absorb an increase in imports from 
developing countries (Smillie 2011). 
6 The terms used here reflect the language of the IDRC Act, which referred to “chairman” until 2008 when 




Capacity Building  
Behind the scenes, ahead of the first meeting of the Board of Governors, Pearson advocated for the 
Centre to become a think tank that mobilized Canadian expertise. Given the positive reputation of the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the United Kingdom, there were some who thought that IDRC 
should become the “ODI on the Rideau” River. Yet Pearson was quickly eclipsed by an alliance between 
Strong and Hopper. As the IDRC Board of Governors convened for the first time in October 1970, Canada 
was in crisis as the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) had resorted to kidnaping and murder in their 
demands for the people of Quebec to have greater autonomy over their own affairs. Under the 
protection of bodyguards and beginning to experience ill-health, Pearson was less strenuous in 
defending his vision for the Centre. Even as the IDRC Act was being drafted a year earlier, Strong had 
stated his own vision “to help developing countries to acquire their own problem-solving capabilities” 
(Stockdale 1995). Meanwhile Hopper—after years of working alongside Indian scientists and farmers—
had a deep conviction that lasting change depended on supporting the people of developing countries 
to take control of their own development.  
This conviction permeated Hopper’s inaugural speech to the Board, in which he argued for a conscious 
choice: emphasizing the second part of the mandate (building research capabilities abroad) by adopting 
a particular approach to the first part (enlisting the talents of scientists abroad). He saw the Centre’s 
role as “expanding the horizons of indigenous research workers by giving them improved facilities and 
greater opportunities to collaborate closely with associates elsewhere in the world engaged in similar 
problems” (IDRC 1970). His vision was based on the conviction that “they, not we, are the best judges of 
what is relevant to their circumstances” and aspired to grantmaking that would “leave the direct 
management of our support in the hands of our partners”.7 This speech became the cornerstone of the 
IDRC’s program theory, serving as the de facto corporate strategy for the next twenty years. In it, 
Hopper foreshadowed aspects of the organization that would emerge, including a focus on rural people, 
addressing problems common to multiple countries, and locating a significant part of IDRC operations 
outside of Canada.  
The young IDRC enjoyed a legislated mandate and high-level champions in the world of politics and 
research. Given Hopper’s direction, the Centre focused on funding research performed by organizations 
in developing countries, rather than engaging in its own work or funding Canadians. Canadian scientists 
might find their way into IDRC projects, but the tendency was to place a developing country researcher 
as the principal investigator. Under Hopper’s guidance, and that of the management team he 
assembled, emphasis was placed on addressing problems that affected more than one country. Rather 
than bilateral programming, IDRC’s perspective was regional, and the Centre established offices in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.8 
Management organized the Centre into four program divisions corresponding to agriculture, health, 
information, and social sciences. Early projects were rooted in one of these four divisions and tended to 
 
7 Hopper (1979) would later reflect upon his experience at IDRC and concede that at certain times it was necessary 
to simply tap the best minds to matter where they were to quickly address a pressing need, rather than wait years for 
building up new local capability to address development problems. 
8 Within the first five years, IDRC established regional offices in Singapore, Bogota, Dakar, Beirut, and Nairobi. 
Security concerns prompted the Centre to leave Beirut and Bogota, relocating these offices to Cairo (1975) and 
Montevideo (1989) respectively. IDRC also opened an office in New Delhi in 1983.  
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focus on enhancing a single commodity, crop, or economic activity, typically within a single scientific 
discipline. For example, the first decade included projects to develop new crop varieties, hand pumps, 
biogas digesters, cooking stoves, and pit latrines, as well as economic studies of how poor people made 
their living, such as through informal trade or as rickshaw drivers (IDRC 2000). The result was a balance 
of being proactive in the pursuit of thematic priorities, yet responsive to the particular circumstances in 
developing countries and the ideas of particular researchers.  
Under the Act, IDRC was not “an agent of Her Majesty” (Canada 1970, s18.1) and its employees were 
not public servants. A significant portion was not even Canadian, as management actively recruited 
program officers based on their experience and expertise, regardless of nationality. Today it is difficult 
to imagine how program officers plied their trade in an age before fax machines, computers, and 
Internet. The role of a program officer was very much to seek out project ideas, scouting developing 
countries to identify their needs, and spotting talented people and organizations that could address 
them. Staff would regularly work with prospective recipients on their project proposals, elaborating 
ideas to the stage where they could be taken to the Board of Governors for approval.  
As Hopper had directed, most projects looked beyond the national level, to foster collaboration among 
researchers located in different countries; helping to overcome the isolation from peers, resources, and 
literature that then plagued scientists working in developing countries. In the words of one employee, 
program officers acted as “wandering minstrels”, painstakingly building networks by sharing what they 
had seen, and who they had met as they travelled from one location to another (Muirhead and Harpelle 
2010, 96). During the course of a project, program officers would regularly travel to visit recipients in the 
field, to monitor how the project was progressing, offer mentoring in research techniques, access to 
academic literature not available locally, and brokering contact with peers abroad.  
Relations with Ottawa 
Financial and administrative autonomy from the rest of the federal government allowed IDRC 
management the freedom to design the Centre as they saw fit. Yet by the late 1970s, central agencies 
challenged this autonomy in an attempt to reassert control. The Centre’s annual budget had grown 
rapidly, from $2.5 million to $36.9 million during the seven years between 1971 and 1978. As IDRC’s 
budget grew and the initial euphoria of its creation wore off, Ministers began to ask what Canada was 
getting in return for its investment. In considering the allocation of external aid in 1977, Cabinet made 
two requests: calling on the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) to conduct an evaluation of IDRC activities, 
and calling on the Privy Council Office to clarify IDRC’s relationship with CIDA and the Minister of State 
for Science and Technology (IDRC 1977).  
The Treasury Board evaluation was largely positive in its assessment of IDRC programming. Nonetheless, 
it was critical of the somewhat ad-hoc manner in which the Centre had evolved. In response, IDRC 
established an Office of Planning and Evaluation, which soon began an annual process of “Program and 
Policy Reviews” to satisfy the TBS requirement for three-year operational plans. Meanwhile the Privy 
Council Office began a process to reschedule Crown corporations, and include them under provisions of 
the Financial Administration Act. Close contact between IDRC management and Privy Council officials 
allowed the Centre to successfully argue for preserving its autonomy in order to receive funds from non-
Canadian sources and to engage developing countries independently of the federal government. The 
Centre would be covered by the Financial Administration Act, but given certain exemptions, comparable 
to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Bank of Canada. 
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The challenge to its status revealed a need for IDRC to pay as much attention to concerns within official 
Ottawa as it did to the needs of developing countries. At home, the optimism over Canada’s role in the 
world had been replaced by concern over the price of oil and the emerging phenomenon of economic 
stagflation. One of IDRC’s original champions, Pearson, had passed away and Hopper left in 1978 to 
accept a senior position within the World Bank. IDRC management, particularly Strong who was now the 
Chairman, realized it was not enough to be well-regarded outside of Canada; IDRC needed a domestic 
constituency within Canada and allies within the government.  
This task formed part of the mandate for Ivan Head, who arrived as IDRC’s new President in 1978. 
Trained as a lawyer and having previously served as Trudeau’s foreign policy advisor, Head was the 
mirror opposite of Hopper: someone from the world of politics rather than the world of science. 
Nonetheless Head was experienced in navigating official Ottawa and knew the importance of positioning 
IDRC not as wholly independent, but as useful to government. He would publicly speak of IDRC as an 
expression of Canadian foreign policy, rather than an instrument of it. While the program officer might 
be focused on IDRC’s relationship with researchers in developing countries, management and the Board 
needed to be attentive to the Centre’s relationship with the Canadian government.   
IDRC was under the portfolio of the Minister of State for External Affairs, and formally the Centre 
connected to the machinery of government at two levels: the Chairman was accountable to the 
Minister; and IDRC officials interacted with their counterparts in the department responsible for 
development assistance. In practice, IDRC maintained a wider range of ties with CIDA, the Department 
of Finance, and central agencies, at the levels of deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, and 
director generals with geographic responsibility for parts of the developing world. Management 
invested time in a deliberate attempt to cultivate “friends of IDRC,” an influential network that knew of 
and appreciated the Centre’s work. It was also a practical means of gathering insights into the 
government’s decision making and policy processes, purposefully fact-checking what came through 
official channels. Much of this lobbying on behalf of the Centre was invisible to IDRC staff: it tended to 
ebb in good years, but increase to a fever pitch on occasions when the Centre felt threatened.  
In the late 1970s, IDRC repositioned itself as Canada’s response to an international agenda. In 1979, the 
United Nations convened a Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD). These 
were heady times as the rise of oil wealth in parts of the developing world fueled the rise of the Non-
Aligned Movement and talk of a New International Economic Order. For the Canadian government, IDRC 
was a ready-made platform for Canada going into the conference and was more palatable than the 
alternative of establishing a new multilateral agency or fund under the UN system. IDRC jumped at the 
chance to assert itself as such, convening a preparatory meeting in Toronto (Gordon 1979) and working 
closely with External Affairs to prepare positions and briefings, acting as the Department’s brain trust on 
such issues.  
A new pattern had emerged. IDRC could not take its existence for granted merely because of its 
founding legislation. It needed to constantly renew its ties to official Ottawa and reposition itself as 
contributing to the priorities of the day. The government provided funding that allowed IDRC to support 
researchers abroad, and in return, the Centre was attentive to the exigencies of foreign policy.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, IDRC proved its usefulness to the Department of External Affairs in 
sustaining critical social science inside countries experiencing dictatorship. In Chile, Argentina, and 
Uruguay, IDRC supported organizations that allowed economists and political scientists to continue 
doing their work at home. Alternatively, in Uganda, the Centre provided an “underground railway for 
intellectuals” to escape persecution and work in other countries (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010, 76). 
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IDRC’s arm-length status was useful for government, allowing it the means to engage in situations 
where it did not or could not take an official position. The most prominent instance would occur on 
South Africa in the late 1980s when, with the blessing of the Prime Minister, IDRC assisted the African 
National Congress and Mass Democratic Movement to prepare the policies needed for a post-Apartheid 
era.   
With its own position in Canada’s foreign policy family, IDRC was somewhat insulated from the periodic 
shift in CIDA’s priorities. It was even more isolated from Canada’s science policy. The Centre would 
occasionally reach out to the Minister of State for Science and Technology, and later Industry Canada, 
but these were relationships were of little consequence in determining the Centre’s fortunes.  
Canadian universities resented that the Centre did not dedicate more of its resources to Canadian 
researchers. In response, Ivan Head’s tenure saw IDRC’s agricultural division station five program 
officers within Canadian universities, and the Centre adopted a “cooperative program” in 1981 
specifically aimed at encouraging collaboration between Canadian researchers and peers in developing 
countries (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010, 113 and 119). Whereas IDRC in the 1970s had spent under two 
percent of its funding at Canadian universities, in later years Canadian institutions were involved in as 
much as one-fifth of IDRC projects. Nonetheless, IDRC management and Board continued sending the 
bulk of the Centre’s resources abroad, encouraging Canadian scientists to seek support for their work 
through the tri-councils for natural, social, and medical research.  
 
Serving a new master  
The arrival of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government (1984–93) 
presented IDRC with a new challenge. While the passage of the IDRC Act had enjoyed unanimous 
support in Parliament in 1970, the Centre was closely associated with Liberal leadership, particularly 
Pearson and Trudeau. Indeed the Centre’s budget had doubled under Trudeau’s second government 
(1980–1984) from forty million dollars to over eighty million. The challenge was to position the Centre as 
an organization the new government would identify with and support.  
That opportunity came with a review of Canada’s foreign aid, chaired by William Winegard. A former 
President of Guelph University, Winegard had been an IDRC governor in the late 1970s, prior to 
becoming a conservative Member of Parliament in 1984. Unsurprisingly the committee report endorsed 
the IDRC’s raison d’être. Titled “for whose benefit”, the report noted IDRC helped developing countries 
overcome dependency on “technology conceived and produced outside their borders and without 
reference to their needs" (Canada 1987). While critical of a number of aspects of foreign aid program, 
the report simply encouraged IDRC to do more “to ensure the practical application of its research," 
suggesting staff exchanges with CIDA and greater use IDRC research in CIDA projects.9  
A more ringing endorsement came the following year as the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) 
included IDRC in a special report focused on well-performing organizations:  
 
 
9 The desire for greater synergy between IDRC and CIDA arose in later reviews, up to the 2007 OECD-DAC Peer 
Review of Canada.  
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IDRC is considered worldwide to be one of the best organizations of its kind. Its high 
performance is based on a number of elements: people who are competent, committed and 
value-driven; continuity of leadership; a clear and strong sense of mission and purpose; a strong 
client focus; autonomy and flexibility at all levels; risk-taking and innovation; freedom from 
political and central agency interference; tailor-made internal regulations and reporting 
requirements; and continual self-scrutiny of strategies and activities. (Canada 1988) 
 
Thus IDRC thrived in the first years of the Conservative government, and by 1988 reached a budget that 
exceeded $110 million per year. Continued growth nonetheless strained the organization, which had 
retained the same structure and strategy for almost two decades, despite tripling the size of budget and 
staff. Each of the four divisions operated more or less independently of each other, seeking out and 
proposing projects based on their individual merit, with little sense of how they might complement each 
other or contribute to corporate goals.  
In 1985, IDRC management and the Board endorsed a mission and set of objectives through the seventh 
Policy and Program Review: "to support research of direct relevance to and demonstrable potential for 
Third World development, with relative emphasis on poverty problems; and… to assist developing 
countries to build and maintain indigenous research… capacity… mainly in terms of human resources." 
On the surface, these objectives were quite broad, describing the status quo rather than suggesting a 
change in the direction. Nonetheless, a careful read of this document shows that Centre was struggling 
with some fundamental questions:  
In the early years of IDRC, strategic planning was characterised by a commonly shared 
philosophy based on a generous mandate allowing considerable freedom to explore, innovate 
and create... it is now timely to evolve further and to develop clearer strategic policy guidelines, 
beginning with more formal statements of broad Centre objectives. 
In particular, the Policy and Program Review reveals greater emphasis on demonstrating how projects 
were expected to contribute to development outcomes. The document states bluntly, that the "‘burden 
of proof’ for all proposals lies with the proponents, who should explain the socio-economic context and 
implication of each activity, including how the potential outputs could contribute to the Centre's 
mission". IDRC began to layer new expectations on its recipients. Beyond conducting sound science that 
respected disciplinary norms, recipients needed to show alignment with the Centre’s programs, as well 
as define and reach an audience for their work. In 1986, Head convened management to further re-
examine the mandate and function, highlighting new concerns for interdisciplinarity in research design 
and the utilization of research results. IDRC divisions were encouraged to identify the results of their 
work and to consider research as a means to achieve development, rather than an ends in its own right. 
Management also struggled with the question of geographic balance in IDRC programming. Lower-
income countries with higher levels of poverty were arguably in greater need of support, but had a 
relatively meager base of local researchers and organizations with which to engage. So-called emerging 
economies, such as India and Brazil, had rising incomes, rising inequality, and an increasingly rich array 
of research talent. Given the Centre’s tendency to be attentive to local researchers, the voices from the 
latter threatened to drown out the former and, given IDRC’s limited budget, it was tempting to work 
where such talent already existed rather than build it from scratch. As had become the Centre’s 
practice, the policy decision was not cast as a choice between two extremes, but a question of 
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balance.10 At the time, management and the Board decided that in principle IDRC could fund work any 
developing country, yet proposals from more advanced economies would receive proportionately 
greater scrutiny and be eligible for less comprehensive support.  
 
In summary, during this first period, the performance regime afforded IDRC a substantial degree of 
autonomy. Central agencies occasionally sought to reassert control over the Crown Corporation, but the 
Centre defended its niche within foreign aid by cultivating a network of allies in the bureaucracy. 
Program theory emphasized capacity building: strengthening research communities in developing 
countries to address their own problems. Grantmaking provided direct project funding to southern 
recipients, loosely linked to the themes of information, health, agricultural or social science. 
 
Budget Cuts  
Keith Bezanson was appointed as the IDRC President in 1991, inheriting a Centre that had changed little 
over time. Over two decades, the Parliamentary appropriation for IDRC had grown from $5 million to 
$114 million per year, while the number of staff had expanded to over six hundred (IDRC 1991; Beemans 
1999). Yet the Centre retained thematic divisions that would have been easily recognizable to Hopper or 
any of the original IDRC governors. In contrast, the coming decade would be a turbulent period that 
would see IDRC’s status threatened once again and its budget slashed on two occasions. The 
combination of these shocks, along with changing ideas on how to organize science, provoked a 
substantial restructuring of the Centre.  
Whereas Head had come from the world of politics, Bezanson came from the public service. Having 
worked for CIDA for most his career, he served as Canada’s ambassador to Bolivia and Peru in the mid-
1980s, before joining the Inter-American Development Bank. He knew about development and foreign 
policy, and came to IDRC with definitive views that the Centre had grown too complacent: confident in 
its own inherent value, but with little sense of how it connected to the rest of government (Muirhead 
and Harpelle 2010, 208).  
With the approach of the Centre’s twentieth anniversary, Bezanson led the drafting of a new strategy 
for IDRC, finally replacing Hopper’s inaugural speech. Bezanson recast the IDRC mandate as 
“empowerment through knowledge”: encouraging “the creation, adaptation, and ownership of the 
knowledge that people of developing countries judge to be of the greatest relevance to their own 
prosperity, security and equity.” While the strategy retained the essence of Hopper’s vision, Bezanson 
was convinced that the idea of development had fundamentally changed with the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of globalization.  
In particular, Bezanson was determined to sharpen IDRC’s programs and reduce operational expenses. 
He was shocked that the Centre was spending close to 40% of its budget on operating expenses and 
staffing, and immediately set a target ratio of 70:30 between programming and operational expenses. 
First, each program officer was to boost the value of programming they handled, encouraging southern 
institutions to manage the day-to-day technical and financial management of projects. Second, 
 
10 Hopper (1973) had set this pattern with an essay identifying ‘Eleven policy issues’ on which IDRC needed to 
choose a path incorporating competing goals, such as: support research at home and abroad, on topics identified by 
proponents and those selected by IDRC staff.  
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Bezanson convinced the Board of Governors to reduce the staff by twenty percent. He even sent the 
new strategy to the Paul Tellier, Clerk of the Privy Council, along with a hand-written note promising this 
reduction (Stockdale 1995). 
Such steps made Bezanson unpopular among staff, yet he proved was adapting the Centre to a changing 
performance regime. Canada’s foreign aid budget had grown at seven percent per year throughout 
much of the 1980s, much above the rate of growth of the national economy. By the 1990s, the national 
debt was a rising concern and the decade ahead saw reductions in government spending in order to 
balance the books. The government also faced new pressures with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
1991 federal budget scaled back the growth of aid to three percent and embedded aid within an 
“International Assistance Envelope” which allowed for non-ODA spending in Eastern Europe. Facing 
slower growth and new pressures, it was only a matter of time before there were implications for IDRC. 
The first impact came in April 1991 when the government decided to take away $7 million of IDRC’s 
budget to help Canada address famine in Africa. In nominal terms, this returned the parliamentary 
funding for IDRC back to 1988 level, making a reduction in spending inevitable.  
By the end of the fiscal year, the number of IDRC staff went from 592 to 486 persons. Bezanson 
encouraged the Centre seek out opportunities to do contract research on behalf of other organizations, 
as well as co-funding from other donors in IDRC projects. Referred to in-house as “resource expansion,” 
the intent was to diversify IDRC’s sources of revenue: to compensate for the reduction of parliamentary 
funding by hosting big ideas that would leverage funding from outside sources. Pierre Beemans, then an 
IDRC vice-president, (1999) would later note “rather than cut our programs to fit our budget cloth, we 
decided to try to attract other funding agencies to invest in our activities or to join with us in jointly-
managed ones.” Within a few years, Bezanson would boost that "about a fifth of all IDRC projects now 
involve at least one other funding agency. In addition, most Centre projects provide for contributions in 
cash or kind from recipient institutions" (IDRC 1994). IDRC would argue that its status as a Crown 
corporation was justified in order to receive such funds.  
A key example was IDRC hosting a “Micronutrient Initiative”, started in 1992, to address deficiencies in 
vitamin A, iron, and iodine in the diets of people in developing countries. The initiative attracted support 
from the World Bank and would be the first time that the government provided a special purpose 
appropriation to the Centre, essentially earmarking funding to this specific initiative rather than 
providing core support to the IDRC Board. The Micronutrient Initiative would eventually leave IDRC in 
2002 as a stand-alone legal entity. Another example was the “essential health interventions” project 
under which IDRC, World Bank, and CIDA set out to test the assertion in the 1993 World Development 
Report that a small increment of funding could dramatically reduce mortality through better targeting of 
health care to the local burden of disease. Over the decade, pilot results in two districts of Tanzania, 
including a 40% decline in child deaths, provided the proof of concept that attracted support from the 
UK charity Comic Relief to scale up the efforts across the country.  
 
Embracing Rio 
No sooner had IDRC begun to adjust to a smaller budget, than its status as a Crown corporation was 
once again threatened. Since the late 1980s, the Mulroney government had been reviewing Crown 
corporations, in an effort to reduce government spending and “letting market forces take the initiative 
to enhance Canada’s competitiveness” (Canada 1991, 76). The effect was to eliminate many Crown 
corporations altogether through privatization, merging their operations into line departments, or simply 
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reducing government funding to them. The federal budget in 1992 announced the elimination of forty-
six government entities. Small and less visible to Canadian citizens, IDRC was originally considered for 
inclusion in this list (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010, 209). 
Last minute efforts by Hugh Segal, then Mulroney’s Chief of Staff, modified the budget’s reference to 
IDRC (Stockdale 1995). Instead of eliminating the Centre, the government now intended to “introduce 
legislation to change the IDRC's legal status to that of a departmental corporation… [to] bring its 
administrative regime into conformity with that of the rest of the public service, while maintaining the 
Centre's distinctive research function and its international board” (Canada 1992, 128). Pierre Beemans 
would subsequently recall the lack of domestic outcry "gave us a vivid idea of how alienated IDRC had 
become from its Canadian roots,” and management once again learned the need to “cultivate senior 
decision-makers in DFAIT, CIDA, PMO/PCO, [and] Finance” (Beemans 1999). 
The threat to IDRC’s status was short-lived and the promised legislation was never introduced. Instead 
IDRC was granted a new lease on life in June 1992, just months after the February budget.  
As world leaders convened in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations’ Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), the relationship between developing countries and industrialized ones was once 
again in the forefront of international relations. The model of IDRC, investing in local researchers to 
address their problems, was a good fit with the emerging discourse of North-South cooperation. More 
importantly, one of IDRC’s original champions, Maurice Strong, chaired the conference and had 
numerous opportunities to engage the Canadian delegation and Mulroney himself (Muirhead and 
Harpelle 2010, 228).  
Whether through policy fit or personal lobbying, the Prime Minister announced that IDRC’s mandate 
would be broadened “to emphasize sustainable development issues... [and] help to ensure a quick start 
on implementation of the UNCED Agenda 21 program”. Furthermore, the Prime Minister committed to 
provide $115 million annually in core support to the organization, noting that this would total more than 
$1 billion over the next ten years. Bezanson grabbed hold of the Prime Minister’s endorsement, and 
within a month IDRC released a volume describing how it current and future work contributed to this 
“expanded” mandate.  
As Agenda 21 was an unwieldy 600-page document, it was easy to link existing IDRC projects to its 
various entry points. Nor was such a match accidental. IDRC had hosted the Brundtland commission’s 
consultations in the mid-1980s, and became the repository of the commission’s archives following the 
publication of “Our Common Future.” The year 1992 would nonetheless be the turning point in which 
the Centre embraced “sustainable and equitable development” as the principle underpinning all its 
work. IDRC continued its disciplinary divisions, yet a new three-year corporate program framework 
emphasized how projects contributed to sustainable development, under the themes of biodiversity, 
food, technology, policies, and information. The long-standing focus on agriculture and rural 
development began to evolve towards environmental and natural resource management. Meanwhile, 
the Centre began to offer training and support in environmental economics in Southeast Asia, and 
championed to the new field of environmental health by tracing the cause of mercury contamination 
through the food chain in the Amazon.  
Yet within two years, Mulroney’s promise of sustained funding for IDRC disappeared. The election of 
Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government (1993–2003) saw the federal government conduct a sweeping 
“program review” to reduce spending across the public service. Between 1995 and 1997, the 
International Assistance Envelope was scheduled to reduce from $2.6 billion to $2.1 billion per year, 
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equivalent to a 21% cut (Canada 1995). In nominal terms, the Parliamentary appropriation for IDRC 
shrank from $112 million to $96 million per year. In real terms, the combination of cuts during the 1990s 
reduced the appropriation by 35% (IDRC 1995a). As much of IDRC’s funding in any given year went to 
pay expenses on existing projects, the Centre cut its 1995 allocation budget for new projects by 30%.  
By the summer of 1995, Bezanson led management through an exercise that John Hardie (director of 
planning) would later describe as simultaneously downsizing, restructuring, and reorienting thinking to 
new philosophy (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010, 259). A smaller budget meant a further need to reduce 
expenses: the number of IDRC staff would shrink to 427 by the end of the fiscal year, and to 347 by 
1998. The health sciences division disappeared almost entirely: reduced to the single project on health 
care in Tanzania and the modest set of projects on human-environmental health. After twenty-five 
years, the old disciplinary divisions were collapsed into a single “programs branch.”  
Program officers were assigned to time-limited teams, or “program initiatives”. The Board of Governors 
would no longer approve individual projects. Instead the Board approved program-level strategy for 
each initiatives and delegated authority to IDRC management to approve projects in line with those 
strategies. Programs were challenged to “define a research problematique and… address it over a given 
time period (3-5 years); establish networks among recipient institutions… [and] bring in external 
funding” (IDRC 1995b). In return, each program would undergo an external evaluation at the end of this 
lifespan, the results of which would inform the Board’s decision whether to renew, modify, or close the 
program.  
This structure of program initiatives responded to changing ideas about research management, 
particularly ‘mode 2’ science. IDRC’s original structure was perceived as what Gibbons et al (1994) refer 
to as ‘mode 1’: researchers working in isolation producing disciplinary knowledge on problems defined 
in academia. In contrast, the new program initiatives were expected to support participation of poor 
people and policymakers in jointly solving interdisciplinary problems identified in society (Slaymaker et 
al. 1998). The program initiatives also responded to a changing performance regime. Staff noted that 
“[t]he competition for funds is rising” requiring managers to “ensure utilization of research results and 
use evidence of impact to convince the public and decision-makers of the value of research efforts” 
(Daniels and Dottridge 1993). Management subsequently cautioned that “[i]n a period of scarcer 
resources, science has had to become more accountable. Inputs and outputs [a]re to be measured and 
science supply was to be integrated with market demand" (Slaymaker et al. 1998).  
The program initiatives were IDRC’s new way of doing business. While IDRC continued to fund research 
projects, the ambition for what these projects were expected to achieved had grown. Referred to as 
“capacity building”, IDRC described the results of its work as assisting developing country researchers in 
“designing and monitoring projects, interdisciplinarity and research utilization, linkages with peers and 
scientific networks to access new ideas and methods, [to gain] greater confidence and experience, [and] 
enhanced profile and credibility” (IDRC 1996). Yet when IDRC adopted a second corporate program 
framework in 1996, research capacity placed second to a new emphasis on “policies and technologies 
that enhance the lives of people in the developing regions”. Research for the developing world was 
expected to lead “directly to sustainable improvement in the quality of human existence, or… improved 
understanding of factors that affect development" (Slaymaker et al. 1998).  
 
New leadership, new ambition  
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In 1996, Bezanson’s term as IDRC President was renewed for a single year, fuelling rumors that the 
government intended to close the Centre. Sensing an opportunity, the University of British Columbia 
(UBC) proposed to host a ‘virtual centre’ not unlike Pearson’s vision, it would essentially replace IDRC by 
refocusing on mobilizing existing expertise within Canada. Led by UBC President David Strangway, the 
proposal was supported by former IDRC President Ivan Head who by then was based at the university. 
Maurice Strong once again emerged to neutralize this threat to IDRC, this time from his position leading 
a task force was examining how Canada connected to the world. The task force report argued that 
intellectual capacity, rather than size of the economy, increasingly determined a country’s stature on 
the international stage. The report described IDRC as strategic asset for Canada, acting as a knowledge 
broker with emerging economies. In receiving the report, the new foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy 
rejected the UBC proposal and offered Bezanson an additional mandate (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010, 
263–64). Yet the turbulence at IDRC had taken its toll, and Bezanson soon moved to the University of 
Sussex as director of its Institute of Development Studies. 
Maureen O’Neil was appointed as IDRC President in April 1997. With a list of accomplishments that 
included President of the North-South Institute and Deputy Minister for Citizenship in the Ontario 
government, O’Neil combined an understanding of international development and knowledge of how to 
navigate the machinery of government. In June, she was joined Gordon Smith, who was appointed 
chairman of the IDRC Board. A former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Smith once again provided 
IDRC with the high-level gravitas that would convince government that a steady hand was in charge 
overseeing IDRC management.  
Following the trauma of the program review years, the end of the decade a period of renewed calm. The 
federal government started realizing surplus budgets once more. Over the next twelve years, the 
government would invest an additional $13 billion in Canadian research (Doern and Stoney 2009, 10–
11). The expanding resources benefited the granting councils and funded new mechanisms including the 
Canadian Foundation for Innovation (for science infrastructure at universities), Genome Canada (for the 
genetic sciences), and Canadian Research Chairs (to attract Canadian talent to stay or return home). The 
new funding also enhanced the importance of university-based research in Canada, as the boom in 
spending largely bypassed government labs and science-based departments.  
As the parliamentary appropriation for IDRC came from the foreign aid budget, the Centre did not 
directly benefit from increased science spending. Yet it indirectly enhanced the legitimacy of the 
Centre’s work. Research was recognized as important for Canada’s own development, therefore it 
followed that it should be important to the development of other countries as well. This message as 
soon reinforced by the World Bank, as President James Wolfensohn outlined a vision for changing the 
organization into a “knowledge bank”. This echoed one of competing perspectives for IDRC at its origins, 
became the theme of the 1998 edition of the flagship World Development Report under the title 
“knowledge for development.”   
This more favorable performance regime enabled O’Neil a new degree of freedom in preparing a five-
year corporate strategy (2000–05). The program initiatives were regrouped under three areas: 
environmental and natural resource management, social and economic equity, and information and 
communication technologies for development (ICT4D). O’Neil also continued to shift IDRC towards 
influencing policy, rather than merely building capacity. The phrase “closing the loop” entered the 
corporate vocabulary representing a conscious push to ensure that findings reached policymakers and 
other audiences able to act on such findings. This goal was subsequently described rather bluntly as 
"IDRC wants to be able to demonstrate to those who influence or control our funding that we support 
research that produces useful development results" (IDRC 2002).  
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In summary, the second period witnessed waves of budget cuts in the federal government, heightening 
demands to control operating costs and to demonstrate the utility of research. Program theory began to 
emphasize policy influence, seeing research as an input into local efforts to address poverty abroad and 
expecting recipients to connect with an audience that would act on their findings. Following 
restructuring, IDRC continued to offer project funding, but required that these contributed to Board-
approved program strategies.  
 
Figure 4.2: Performance regime surrounding IDRC. Solid lines represent formal lines of authority, 
dotted lines describe the flow of program ideas, and dashed lines show funding relationships. Upper 
portion represents governance context: formal authority came through the minister, yet access to 
government money negotiated through finance ministry, foreign ministry, and aid agency. This process 
was also open to outside ideas that influenced grantmaking. Aid agency merged into foreign ministry in 
2013. Programs respond to opportunities for co-funding with other donors and granting councils. Lower 
portion describes grantmaking, with shaded circles represent recipients abroad. From left to right: 
support to recipients abroad, networks with multiple participants, and twinning Canada-south 
recipients. 
 
Eroding Core  
The new century would once again transform the performance regime surrounding IDRC. After the 
turbulence of the 1990s, the arrival of Maureen O’Neil and launch of a five-year strategy was a new 
beginning. Coming out of the 2002 Monterrey conference on financing development, Canada committed 
to doubling its official development assistance, and soon established a timetable for doing so via annual 
eight percent increments to its aid budget. The next federal budget committed that IDRC would receive 
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a proportional eight percent increase in its funding during each of the next two years (Canada 2003, 
169), thus cutting through the old haggling with CIDA over what share of a growing aid budget would go 
to research. IDRC and central agencies had advocated for greater transparency in how funding decisions 
were made. Behind the scenes Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAIT) and CIDA began work 
on a new management framework for the International Assistance Envelope. 
IDRC’s second five-year strategy began in 2005 with tidying the structure inherited from the previous 
ten years. The Centre retained the three program areas—ICTs, environment, and socio-economic—each 
of which housed a small number of programs, now firmly entrenched as the Centre’s preferred way of 
organizing its work. Despite the increasing budget, the overall number of programs reduced, in order to 
have larger teams with a global remit. A diverse array of corporate projects, explorations, and 
secretariats had evolved in the late 1990s and early 2000s as part of the Centre’s push to diversify 
revenue. These were now converted into stand-alone legal entities, merged into regular programs, or 
transferred to institutions outside of IDRC. For example, a Model Forests’ Secretariat moved to Natural 
Resources Canada, and an Institute for Connectivity in the Americas was integrated into the ICT4D 
program area.  
Beyond such changes in organization, O’Neil continued to press a change in purpose, reinforcing the 
mantra of “research for policy influence.” This goal was enshrined in the new strategy (IDRC 2004, para 
62) and the work funded by IDRC programs was expected to inform policies that benefited poor women 
and men (Carden 2009). The Centre continued to view the world in terms of geographic regions, rather 
than focusing on particular countries. The earlier 2000–05 strategy had committed the Centre to 
spending half of its budget in Africa, and a quarter in each of Asia and the Americas. These notional 
targets continued to guide management as a rule-of-thumb, but the Centre stopped formal tracking and 
reporting on such. This was partially due to the difficulty of parsing project spending that involved 
multiple regions or that did not have an obvious geographic footprint, for example the benefits of new 
seeds could touch multiple regions regardless of where the research was conducted.  
Budget 2005 introduced the new management framework for the International Assistance Envelope 
(IAE). The framework distinguished five categories, or “pools,” of activities eligible for funding: 
development assistance to poorer countries, initiatives to enhance global peace and security, 
contributions to the international financial institutions, responses to humanitarian crises, and support 
for development research (Canada 2005, 217). At one level, the framework simply affirmed the status 
quo, recognizing the distinct interests of CIDA, DFAIT, the Department of Finance, and IDRC. Yet, at 
another level, beyond what was contained in the Budget, the framework laid out a process for allocating 
the promised increases of funding in future years. No one minister would control the IAE, instead senior 
officials would facilitate a “competition of ideas,” collecting and assessing proposals for how the 
incremental funds could be used. Government officials would then prepare options, or packages of 
proposals, for deputy ministers who would prepare a recommendation for Cabinet supported jointly by 
the three minsters responsible for international cooperation, foreign affairs, and finance.  
De jure, IDRC held a weak position within this competition of ideas. Budget 2005 assigned a lead 
manager for each of the “pools,” making DFAIT responsible for development research. IDRC was 
expected to submit its ideas through DFAIT, placing that department in the dual roles of both 
representing IDRC interests while also presenting arguments in favor of its own initiatives. On occasion, 
IDRC might be invited to attend part of a meeting to describe its proposals, but these engagement 
occurred at among officials or assistant deputy ministers. The Centre was excluded from the final 
negotiation among deputy ministers.  
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Yet IDRC found ways to enhance its de facto position away from the negotiating table, by engaging 
with—and gaining support from—CIDA, DFAIT, and Finance. The Centre had constructive relations with 
all three organizations, aided by the fact that each was genuinely interested in different parts of the 
IDRC’s programming, whether health and environment, peace and conflict, or development economics. 
At the same time, the IDRC requests for additional funding were modest and at a scale that did not 
necessarily compete with these organizations’ own funding requests. This was an intentional tactic on 
behalf of IDRC management, which sought to maintain the Centre’s parliamentary grant at roughly four 
percent of the envelope, pitching for incremental funding to expand existing programs. IDRC staff also 
interacted with Privy Council Office and Treasury Board officials. These central agencies did not have a 
vested interest in the allocation of new aid money, and often advocated in favor of including IDRC, up to 
the point of decision-making. They also provided insights on how the allocation process was unfolding, 
clarifying the evolving criteria used to assess proposals. 
The arrival of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government (2006–) did not immediately alter this 
“competition of ideas” process. The new government was quick to dissociate itself from a short-lived 
international policy statement the previous Liberal administration had released in 2005. Yet the IAE 
framework persisted and IDRC was initially able to continue its strategy of modest requests for 
incremental funding. The Centre would trawl through its pipeline of proposed projects and identify 
items that resonated with what government was interested in funding. While the justification for the 
funding request was based on what each IAE partner promised to do in the short-term (one-to-three 
years), the allocation of incremental resources was ongoing. In the words of one official, it was “forever 
money” that was added to the organization’s reference level, which TBS used as a base for departmental 
spending in future years. Thus any funds allocated to IDRC amounted to an ongoing increase in its 
Parliamentary appropriation. In the short term, IDRC obtained new resources for projects the Centre 
largely wanted to fund anyway. Thus the ‘competition of ideas’ freed up existing resources. In the 
medium term, these new resources promised to become core funding available for the IDRC Board to 
allocate as it saw fit. 
 
Aligning with donors and science  
The Centre negotiated a new round of program-level partnerships with other donors, including on 
climate change adaptation in Africa with the UK government, and an initiative to support policy research 
think tanks with the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.11 Such partnerships represented a conscious 
move away from the indiscriminate “resource expansion” of the 1990s which had focused on time-
limited project funding from any organization, toward ongoing program-level collaboration with like-
minded organizations. The new practice focused on a select set of “donor partners,” avoiding those that 
had proven difficult to work with, whether due to conditions placed on their funding or a tendency to 
micro-manage how IDRC used the funds. IDRC’s intention was to enter into true partnerships with other 
funders, investing Centre funds in order to avoid being merely an implementing agency.  
Within official Ottawa, such donor partnerships were a double-edged sword. On occasion, the 
Department of Finance suggested that since IDRC was successful at raising funds abroad, it did not 
require as much support from taxpayers. IDRC management responded that it was the ability to 
leverage Canadian funding that had allowed these partnerships to occur. More often than not, IDRC’s 
 
11 The first example with DFID represented over CAD$ 50 million over five years, while the second example 
eventually grew to CAD$115 million when the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation joined. 
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ability to attract funding from outside Canada was positively received. After all, if UK taxpayers and 
private philanthropists entrusted their resources to IDRC, surely it was a good use of Canadian 
taxpayers’ dollars.   
The Conservative government’s initial priorities for foreign policy emphasized Canada’s NATO mission in 
Afghanistan, asserting Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, and enhancing commercial and security 
relations in the Americas. IDRC management seized upon the imperative to contribute to rebuilding 
Afghanistan, but conditions on the ground presented a challenge to IDRC’s usual “hands-on” approach 
of working directly with local researchers. Security concerns restricted the ability of IDRC staff to visit 
the country, and much of the Afghan research community had already emigrated. The Centre eventually 
funded a handful of projects, including modest support to Kabul University to collaborate with other 
institutions of higher education throughout the Hindu-Kush mountain range. Yet these projects were led 
through the IDRC Regional Office in New Delhi, with no engagement in the cross-government task force, 
whether at DFAIT or the Privy Council Office. IDRC was better placed to contribute to the government’s 
agenda on the Americas. Once again, the IDRC Regional Office in Montevideo played a vital role, keeping 
IDRC programming visible with Canada’s ambassadors in the region and designing an initiative that 
encouraged think tanks in Latin America to critically assess how their countries were contributing to 
Haitian security and development. Yet such efforts were relatively modest, a symbolic nod towards 
government priorities. In the words of one IDRC official, “an investment of two percent of the budget to 
protect the remaining ninety-eight percent” of IDRC programs.  
The change in government did encourage a shift in IDRC programming on science and technology policy. 
After a long absence from the field, IDRC created a new program area in 2005, motivated in part by 
renewed enthusiasm for advances in science to help achieve development goals (UN 2005) echoing the 
discourse of the 1970s. IDRC management sought to seize upon the former Prime Minister Paul Martin’s 
promise to devote five percent of Canada’s R&D to “a knowledge-based approach to develop assistance 
for less fortunate countries” (Canada 2004). Initially, IDRC expected this new program area to enhance 
the positive impact of new technologies, strengthen innovation and science policy in developing 
countries, and foster collaboration with Canada’s research granting councils. Yet under the Conservative 
government, the international tone of Canada’s science policy turned from altruistic assistance to 
poorer countries, toward enhancing Canadian participation in international collaboration. In 2007, a 
new federal science and technology strategy identified four thematic priorities—including environment, 
natural resources, health, and ICTs—which closely matched IDRC’s own priorities. Over the coming 
years, the government would express an expectation that public research funding would enhance the 
competitiveness of Canada’s industry.  
A substantial amount of the work funded under the new program area soon came to focus on 
international collaboration, including an initiative to twin southern researchers with Canadian Research 
Chairs and joint calls with the Canadian Institute for Health Research (CIHR) and the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). In each case, the granting council funded the participation of 
Canadians while IDRC funded the participation by developing country scientists. Whether by coincidence 
or following the shift in government priority, IDRC placed proportionately less emphasis on new 
technologies or S&T policy in other countries.  
While the foreign aid budget increased after 2002, Canada’s science budget had grown since 1997 and 
Canadian universities were increasingly enthusiastic about international collaboration. Joint calls with 
the research granting councils was a mixture of self-interest and altruism. Such partnerships helped 
raise IDRC’s profile within Canada, associating itself with the government’s support for science. Launch 
events became opportunities for ministerial announcements that put IDRC in the spotlight, including 
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one event held within the Parliamentary precinct. IDRC was also motivated to share its experience with 
international research collaboration. The Centre explained its procedures for grant administration, 
including how it dealt with multiple recipients, in multiple countries, using multiple currencies. The 
reaction of one granting council official was “IDRC manages nightmare projects” due the complexity 
involved. The granting councils were used to focusing ex ante project selection and managing peer-
review processes, and were surprised to learn of the amount of attention IDRC invested to ex post 
evaluation and on-going project monitoring.  
An expanding budget for IDRC allowed health programming to thrive once again. The project on 
essential health interventions in the Tanzania slowly expanded to a new program initiative working on 
the governance of health systems and financing health care. This work was initially housed under the 
social-economic program area, but soon grew beyond it as IDRC also began to tackle electronic 
information systems and the use of mobile devices in health care. In 2008, IDRC re-established health as 
a separate program area, no longer subsumed under social and economic policy.  
 
Fitting into government  
Starting in 2007, the Conservative government launched a series of “strategic reviews” under which 
each year a number of departments were asked to assess the entirety of their existing programs. Each 
review was to identify at least five percent of department spending that was performing less well, or 
seen as a relatively lower priority. The initial intention was to identify opportunities to redesign 
programs and better align them with government priorities, yet over the subsequent four years, the 
reviews would come to focus more on simply reducing government spending. In this respect, IDRC was 
fortunate to be included in the first year of the strategic review, when the process still permitted 
departments to propose options for reinvesting the five percent of funding under examination.  
DFAIT and CIDA were included in the first round when it launched in spring 2007. As an afterthought, 
the Privy Council Office added IDRC in early summer in order to look across the entirety of the 
International Assistance Envelope. Each of the three organizations conducted their own review, 
coordinating with others, but ultimately preparing their own individual submissions to Treasury Board. 
IDRC was allowed to retain its funding, reallocating it to programming more closely aligned with 
government priorities. The quality of the IDRC submission no doubt helped, as did the opportunity for 
O’Neil to plead the Centre’s case directly before Treasury Board ministers.12  
The logic of the strategic review worked against the ongoing growth in the international assistance 
budget. Any savings identified among the IAE organizations needed to be replaced if Canada’s was to 
meet its ongoing commitment to double foreign aid. Indeed, the “competition of ideas” process 
continued parallel to, and disconnected from, the strategic review. Yet ministers had begun to see the 
“competition of ideas” as captured by the bureaucracy: a collusion among officials on how to divide 
funding among themselves and their departments’ interests. The strategic review previewed an interest 
at Cabinet to get beyond merely allocating the incremental increases in funding to review instead the 
entirety of international assistance.  
In 2008–09, Cabinet established a new set of five thematic priorities for the envelope: stimulating 
economic growth, increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, ensuring security 
 
12 Originally the IDRC Chairman, Gordon Smith, was to make this presentation. Based in British Columbia, he was 
unable to attend when the Treasury Board meeting when it was rescheduled due to other Parliamentary business.  
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and stability, and advancing democracy. CIDA was the lead agency for the first three priorities: 
responding to the twin crisis in global finance and food prices then rippling across the world. The banner 
of “children and youth” combined the agency’s long-standing work in education and health. In contrast, 
DFAIT was the lead for the latter two priorities, given the department’s interest in global security and 
international relations. Whereas the previous Liberal government had emphasized “good governance,” 
the Conservative government was interested in “democracy promotion”. The 2008 Speech from the 
Throne contained a promise to establish a new agency for this purpose (Canada 2008). In setting these 
five thematic priorities, Cabinet defined new criteria to assess spending proposals, including the extent 
which they: aligned with the government’s thematic and geographic priorities, placed Canada in a 
leadership position, built on proven approaches, were able to demonstrate clear and measurable 
results, and fostered innovation by leveraging funding and efforts from beyond government.  
Despite IDRC’s affinity to innovation and partnership, the Department of Finance drove these criteria in 
two distinct ways. First, as an explicit challenge to CIDA and DFAIT to avoid proposals that simply sought 
more resources to do the same type of programming as in the past. Cabinet was interested in using 
international assistance to do things that were new, different, and transformational. Second, the 
Department of Finance brought forward its own proposals for use foreign aid dollars as an incentive to 
encourage the private sector to develop new technologies and services, rather than grants to developing 
countries or contributions to international organizations.  
An early example of this approach was the 2007 announcement of an advance market commitment in 
which Canada and other donor countries would offer a guaranteed price for a successful pneumococcal 
vaccine (Canada 2007, 265). The idea was to overcome the market failure caused by the high costs of 
research required to develop such a vaccine, which was not easily be recovered from the price required 
should the product remain affordable to those who most needed it. Rather than underwrite the costs of 
research up front, which might or might not be successful, the advance market commitment sought to 
transfer this risk to pharmaceutical firms, guaranteeing a price that would suitably reimburse costs once 
a successful product was developed. The appeal of such an approach was the availability of information 
on the number of potential beneficiaries and estimated R&D costs, which permit the calculation of the 
required price. Using similar logic, the Department of Finance subsequently championed an “pull 
mechanism”—later rebranded as AgResults—to encourage the private sector to develop and distribute 
agricultural technologies to boost harvest quality (such as reducing aflatoxins in groundnuts) or reduce 
post-harvest loss (such as grain storage bags). AgResults contemplated not only a prize for developing 
such products, but also a premium based on the numbers of farmers that adopted it (AusAID 2012a).   
The Department of Finance also played the role of a central agency shaping funding decisions. On more 
than one occasion, the department simply bypassed the seemingly consensual “competition of ideas,” 
to pre-commit IAE funding through the federal budget without consulting CIDA or DFAIT. For example, 
Budget 2008 dedicated an initial $50 million for a new Development Innovation Fund “to create 
breakthrough discoveries with the potential to significantly improve the lives of millions in the 
developing world” (Canada 2008, 182–83). While the budget text mentions that this fund would be 
implemented by “partners in the research community working with” IDRC, the announcement came as a 
surprise to IDRC, CIDA, and DFAIT alike. The idea had originated with Dr. Peter Singer at the University of 
Toronto, a recipient of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Singer proposed to establish a similar 
“grand challenges” initiative in Canada in the form of an independent foundation. The previous Liberal 
government had established a number of for-purpose organizations, including Genome Canada and the 
Canadian Foundation for Innovation. Yet the Conservatives had little appetite for creating new 
organizations, especially as the OAG had recently critiqued the lack of government oversight and the 
accountability of such foundations. 
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The Development Innovation Fund would finally become operational in 2010 as a five-year, $225-million 
initiative. Part of the intervening two years involved haggling among officials to strike a deal which 
transferred responsibility for the fund to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, away from the Minister of 
Finance who had championed the idea and whose riding included the University of Toronto. A new 
entity was established—Grand Challenges Canada—the funding for which was routed through IDRC. The 
Centre would be responsible for evaluation and reporting on the Fund, while the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR) would manage the peer review process towards selecting new projects. Both 
IDRC and CIHR would participate in the board of directors governing Grand Challenges Canada.  
In hindsight, the announcement of the Development Innovation Fund in 2008 marked two distinct 
turning points. First, it confirmed the Centre no longer held a monopoly over “development research.” 
IDRC had to compete not just with other uses of foreign aid budget, but also with others perspectives on 
research for the developing world. Second, the Centre could no longer argue for an increase in its core 
funding. IAE decisions were increasingly bound to discrete, time-limited initiatives. Moving forward, 
once an initiative expired—or “sunset”—its funding would no longer automatically remain in the entity’s 
reference level, but was in principle “free” to be allocated anywhere in the envelope for any purpose. In 
the medium-term, this was expected to increase the amount of the foreign aid budget ministers could 
allocate as they saw fit, rather than tying it up in department budgets.   
 
Adjusting to austerity  
In mid-2008, David Malone took over as the IDRC President. A career diplomat, Malone’s experience 
spanned decades and included postings as Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations and to India. He 
admired IDRC’s legacy of soft diplomacy, how programming had created a network of influential people 
who thought well of Canada. Malone defined himself as a scholar, previously taking leave from 
government to manage the International Peace Academy in New York, and continuously writing books 
and articles on international relations. Fresh from the Strategic Review experience, the IDRC Board of 
Governors expected Malone to cultivate contacts in official Ottawa who appreciated the Centre as 
aligned and useful to the government’s agenda. The Office of the Auditor General completed a Special 
Examination of the Centre in 2008, giving IDRC a clean bill of health, thus the challenge facing the new 
President was more about external relations than internal management.  
In 2009, IDRC management decided to discontinue the program area dedicated to information and 
communication technologies for development (ICT4D). Having justified itself as overcoming the “digital 
divide,” the recent explosion of Internet access and mobile phone use in developing countries had 
partially fulfilled this objective. What ICT4D required now was deeper investment in scaling-up, which 
was beyond IDRC’s niche of incubating new ideas and pilot projects (Canada 1970, s2b). Some 
employees moved to the health or agricultural program to work on ICT applications, and a smaller team 
was retained in the science program to address issues related to open government, science, and 
education. Meanwhile the global crisis in food prices in 2008–09 prompted IDRC to shift back to 
agriculture, via a new partnership with CIDA to establish a competitive food security research fund for 
collaborative projects involving Canadian and developing country scientists.  
Apart from these shifts, the Strategic Framework 2010–15 brought about incremental change in IDRC’s 
structure and programming on the environment, health, and social and economic policy. The Board and 
management chose to persist with its practice of thematic programming, first choosing the problems to 
address, then finding prospective recipients with interesting ideas, which determined the geographic 
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footprint of its programming. CIDA announced a new list of focus countries for Canada’s bilateral aid in 
2009. Yet IDRC did not see itself as bound to this list, as its projects involved and benefited multiple 
countries. In this regard, IDRC enjoyed the passive endorsement of senior government officials—
including the CIDA President—who saw the list as governing CIDA spending and considered IDRC too 
small to warrant much attention.13 At the working level, officials from CIDA and Treasury Board 
Secretariat were often less understanding, and the list played a role in shaping which countries were 
eligible for joint CIDA-IDRC partnerships, such as a new food security research fund. Meanwhile, DFAIT 
officials appreciated IDRC’s presence in countries where CIDA was not present, which gave them 
something concrete to point to in terms of cooperation with Canada.  
With the encouragement of the Board of Governors, IDRC restated its business model as a “grants-plus” 
approach: not only funding new opportunities for research, but engaging with its recipients throughout 
the research process as a mentor, and facilitating their access to both peers and policy audiences (IDRC 
2009, para 42). Rather than a new direction or break with the past, “grants-plus” simply restated how 
IDRC already saw itself.  
In practice, Centre staff pursued multiple expressions of this model. At one extreme, many projects still 
resulted from talent-spotting by program officers seeking out or responding to promising developing 
country researchers, working with them to refine their ideas through multiple iterations on project 
proposals. This approach placed the IDRC program officer as an engaged mentor working directly with 
southern scientists to boost their skills over time. At the other extreme were projects that resulted from 
competitive calls in which written proposals were assessed against explicit eligibility and selection 
criteria. Such competitions were often structured as a two-stage process: an initial call for short concept 
notes—describing the project idea—followed by an invitation for the more promising proponents to 
prepare full proposals.  
Under such competitive mechanisms, engagement with IDRC staff was much more restricted so as 
ensure all proponents were treated equally and received the same information. The application process 
had to be explicitly described in the calls for proposals and any additional information provided in 
frequently asked questions (FAQs) posted on the Internet. Some IDRC staff initially resisted this 
approach, fearing it would give an advantage to more experienced applicants better able to express 
themselves in written English or French. At the same time, IDRC management initially expected 
competitive calls to be less labor-intensive and allow the Centre to optimize the balance between 
research grants and internal costs. The value of competitively-allocated projects was commonly over 
twice that of talent-scouting projects (in excess of $1 million over five years versus $300,000 over three 
years). Assuming the costs of monitoring and administering a project were fixed, boosting the average 
value per project would control internal costs.  
With experience, both staff and management learned that these assumptions were partially false. The 
selection criteria for competitively-allocated projects could include consideration of the potential for 
training younger and developing country scientists; drawing on senior researchers in the project to act 
as mentors, rather than assuming this was a task for IDRC staff. Indeed in the 2000s, IDRC had 
outsourced some competitive grant competitions to trusted organizations in developing countries in 
order to provide opportunities for young researchers and for new grantees beyond IDRC’s regular 
network of contacts (IDRC 2006). Meanwhile competitive calls did not necessarily save on workload in 
the near-term, as there was a substantial workload in setting up the call and coordinating the peer-
 
13 IDRC managers spoke with these officials and obtained verbal commitments, but no public or written statements, 
that the Centre was exempt from the list.  
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review process. Furthermore, a million-dollar project, that involved two or three recipient institutions, 
meant each institution received $300,000 to $500,000. Thus the push for fewer, larger projects did not 
necessarily translate into fewer, larger grants. To some extent, this negated the expected saving on 
administration costs.  
Between 2008 and 2010, the Government of Canada once again moved from surplus to deficit. The 
financial crisis of 2008–09 saw government revenues decrease and stimulus spending as Canada’s part 
of the coordinated response among G20 countries. The 2010 federal budget announced that “future IAE 
spending levels will be capped at 2010–11 levels and will be assessed alongside all other government 
priorities on a year-by-year basis in the budget” (Canada 2010, 142). Having fulfilled the 2002 Monterrey 
commitment to double foreign aid to five billion dollars, the government would stop the yearly practice 
of eight percent increases. The careful wording of the budget also left the door open to future 
reductions in international assistance.   
Management of the International Assistance Envelope was also evolving. Within official Ottawa, there 
was no longer any support for the five purposes—or “pools”—of IAE spending. Funding for crises was 
fixed at $200 million per year, and funding for IFIs was determined by the level of Canada’s 
contributions to World Bank, IMF, and the regional development banks. Despite the historic record of 
IDRC accounting for three-to-four percent of Canada’s foreign aid, there was no support for assigning a 
fixed share of the IAE to development research, and much less that this should go to any single 
organization. More generally, there was a tension between DFAIT and CIDA regarding the appropriate 
balance between spending on each other’s thematic priorities, pitting “food security, economic growth, 
and children & youth” against “peace & security, and promoting democracy.”  
The process of allocating IAE funds was no longer a competition of ideas within government 
departments, but an allocation among “competing pressures” imposed from outside, such as 
commitments at leaders’ summits or to international organizations. Through the 2010 budget, the 
Minister of Finance asserted control over his colleagues. Now part of the regular process of preparing 
the federal budget, IAE funding would no longer be decided between the Ministers of International 
Cooperation and of Foreign Affairs. De facto, CIDA and DFAIT lost their exclusive access to this funding 
and could no longer simply allocate it to proposals they themselves had developed without passing the 
scrutiny of finance officials.  
The final year of the IAE increment was largely dedicated to initiatives related to the G8 and G20 
summits, which Canada would host during the summer. At the World Economic Forum, the Prime 
Minister announced a major push to reduce maternal and child mortality, two of the Millennium 
Development Goals that lagged behind on progress towards the 2015 targets. Despite a long process 
among government departments to identify and shape a variety of proposals for the summit, the push 
on maternal and child health—or “Muskoka Initiative”—swept up much of the available funding for the 
year.  
During preparations for the summit serious attention was given to the theme of “innovation for 
development.” While DFAIT officials consulted IDRC, negotiations among G8 members eventually 
focused on two potential proposals, one to establish a program of research chairs in African universities, 
and another to create a network of African Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS).  
The AIMS proposal was championed by Neil Turok, a South African physicist living in Canada as director 
of the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, an organization established with a donation from 
Mihal Lazaridis, co-founder of Research in Motion (Blackberry). Turok had established the first AIMS-
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Centre in Cape Town in 2003 to provide a training facility that enabled African students to pursue 
graduate-level training in mathematics. Housed within a single building, AIMS-Cape Town included 
classrooms, computer labs, and dormitories. Turok had pulled upon his professional contacts to bring in 
renowned professors to give short courses. Given the success of this first AIMS-Centre, Turok proposed 
to create a pan-African network with similar centres in different parts of the continent. In 2008, Turok’s 
gave a passionate lecture as recipient of the Technology, Entertainment and Design (TED) prize based on 
the idea that the “next Einstein” could be an African who would produce future leaps in scientific 
understanding.  
Through preparations for the G8 summit, DFAIT officials sought to entice financial support from other 
countries. When it became clear that others would not offer new funding pledges, the AIMS proposal 
dropped from the G8 agenda. Yet Turok’s personal diplomacy with the Prime Minister resulted in a 
decision that Canada would make its own $20 million dollar contribution towards establishing the next 
three AIMS centres, initially planned for Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia. One can speculate that Prime 
Minister’s decision resulted from Turok’s ability to raise private funding from foundations and 
companies, the tangible targets in terms of numbers of potential students trained, and Turok’s 
connection to Canada. Beyond living and working in Canada, Turok’s parents had been part of the anti-
Apartheid movement supported by the Mulroney government.  
DFAIT officials turned to IDRC with a “take it or leave it” offer of being responsible for Canada’s 
contribution to AIMS. Similar to the earlier Development Innovation Fund (DIF), the proposal was 
generated outside of government. It also enjoyed the support of a high-level champion who bypassed 
the machinery of government and the customary process of bottom-up policy development and 
budgeting. DIF and AIMS were both outside IDRC’s accustomed grantmaking practice of engaging 
proponents in crafting their proposals. As ready-made initiatives, it was initially difficult to see how the 
Centre would add to it beyond providing a channel for Canada’s funding. Yet, both were now part of 
Canada’s support for development research and refusing a role in them would have made IDRC 
increasingly marginal to the government’s agenda.  
A greater share of IDRC’s budget was now pre-committed to specific initiatives, whether through 
partnerships with foreign donors or those designed outside of IDRC and endorsed by the Government of 
Canada. Consequently, a smaller portion of the Centre’s budget could be considered “core” funding, 
available for the Board of Governors to assign to programming conceived by IDRC staff. In the corridors, 
staff were concerned that the Centre was becoming more attentive to donors and the government, and 
less responsive to the voices of developing-country researchers. Furthermore both AIMS and DIF were 
time-limited initiatives, once they expired there was no guarantee that IDRC would continue to receive 
the funding they represented. After a decade of growing budgets, IDRC faced the prospect of needing to 
contract in future years.       
That future arrived quicker than anticipated. The Conservative government was struggling to reduce the 
deficit and remained critical of departmental program spending, prompting a one-time ‘Strategic and 
Operating Review’ launched in 2011. The review involved all departments and agencies and sought 
proposals for reducing their budgets by five and ten percent. Unlike 2007, this time the Minister of 
International Cooperation led a single, horizontal review of IAE spending. Officials from CIDA, DFAIT, the 
Department of Finance, Treasury Board Secretariat, Privy Council Office and IDRC met throughout the 
summer and into the fall to assess different proposals and negotiate how to share the pain of budget 
cuts. The federal Budget 2012 announced an overall reduction of ten percent in Canada’s international 
assistance, divided more or less proportionally across the IAE partners, slightly more for IDRC and none 
to Canada’s contributions to the international financial institutions (Canada 2012, 213 and 272).  
70 
 
IDRC closed two IDRC regional offices and of one of its research program. The regional office closures 
reflected an ongoing concern to boost the ratio of research grants versus internal costs. IDRC eliminated 
over seventy positions between headquarters and the regional offices. Singapore and Senegal 
represented the two most expensive office locations, thus the greatest amount of potential savings. 
While Singapore was no longer the developing country it was in the 1970s, both closures left IDRC 
struggling to reassess its field presence in Southeast Asia and in West Africa. Given the scale of the cuts, 
management also needed to scale back on programming and concentrated the pain in the “Innovation 
for Inclusive Development” program.14 The program was typical of past IDRC work, something ahead-of-
the-curve, that other funders had not (yet) adopted. Yet the program was a victim of the new 
performance regime that emphasized alignment with government priorities of food security, economic 
growth, and security.  
The model that had served the Centre well in the past was based on the assumption that the 
Parliamentary appropriation was core funding available for the Board to allocate as it saw fit. Yet the IAE 
allocation process had begun to undermine this model, as access to new funding was restricted to 
specific, time-limited initiatives tied to government priorities. Indeed the IDRC Act was modified in 2012 
to reduce the size of the Board to up to fourteen members. As a greater share of IDRC’s budget was 
earmarked to specific government initiatives or donor partnerships, it squeezed the resources available 
to pursue original programming that did not align with the priorities of others. As one respondent 
lamented, “IDRC is mostly ignored, sometimes resented, and seldom appreciated… there is almost a 
conscious policy of eroding the Board's independence in taking decisions.” 
In summary, starting in the early 2000s, the performance regime emphasized alignment with the 
priorities of Canada’s foreign policy. The role of the IDRC Board eroded as programming decisions were 
increasingly tied to government funding decisions or committed to programs partially funded by CIDA 
and donors outside Canada. The program theory that guided R4D funding valued research for its actual 
contribution to changed policy and practice in the developing world, with an increasing array of 
expectations placed upon its recipients. Grantmaking saw competitive calls for proposals join the older 
practices based on proactively project development by IDRC staff and responding to unsolicited 
proposals and partnerships. 
  
 
14 Approved by the Board of Governors in summer 2011, the program proposed to identify and scale-up example of 
grassroots—or frugal—innovation where poor people resorted to inventive means of addressing their needs, such as 





Figure 4.3: Canada's spending since 1980. IDRC expenditures (left axis) compared to Canada's official 
development assistance (right axis). A push to diversify sources of revenue softened the reduction in 
Parliamentary appropriation in the 1990s. The allocation dedicated to the Micronutrient Initiative 
(1997–2002) hides the low point and slow increase in IDRC ‘core’ funding. All amounts are expressed in 
real terms as million CAD adjusted to 2011. The shaded years represent time when Conservative party 
was in power. (Sources: IDRC Annual Reports and OECD statistics)  
 
Key Points 
IDRC largely preserved both Maurice Strong’s vision of an independent research funder, as well as David 
Hopper’s vision of an organization dedicated to supporting the ideas of researchers in the developing 
world. Both these traits became part of the organization’s DNA: staff and management embodied these 
commitments. Yet Strong and Hopper were more than intellectual contributors to the IDRC mission and 
mandate. They proved to be the first in a line of high-level thought and opinion leaders that protected 
and nurtured the Centre over time, rally to IDRC’s defense whenever it was threatened. Individual 
champions played a substantial role in how Canada defined and funded research of the developing 
world over time. IDRC management would cultivate and periodically renew its network of allies among 
the federal bureaucracy, across foreign policy and inside central agencies. Meanwhile contact with the 
Canada’s research policy was less substantial and less critical to IDRC’s fortunes.  
Yet the federal government was never entirely at ease with IDRC’s independence, and periodically 
moved to curtail its freedom. While the IDRC Act established the Centre at arm’s-length from 
government, central agencies imposed the disciplines of planning and evaluation, as well as Ministerial 
responsibility for portfolio management. DFAIT, CIDA, and central agencies might not control IDRC 
governance, but they did influence the process through which the Centre obtained its funding. Over 
time, IDRC appeased these actors by positioning itself as an expression of Canada’s foreign policy and 
contributing to the policy priorities of the day. For the most part, such positioning could be symbolic, a 
veneer of responsiveness covering a deeper program theory and grantmaking practices that proved 
largely persistent in type of recipients and average grant size.  
Budget cuts in the 1990s triggered a substantial restructuring, intended in part to demonstrate that the 
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influence became watchwords as the Centre redesigned and renewed its program framework. This 
century, a growing foreign aid budget initially allowed IDRC to expand those programs that aligned with 
government priorities or that leveraged outside funding through donor partnerships. Yet such 
conditional access to new funding slowly eroded the Centre’s autonomy, as outside actors came to play 
a larger role in designing programs and selecting projects. 
In terms of the resources available, IDRC’s budget rose for two decades, but fell in the 1990s with the 
government’s efforts to reduce the deficit. Bezanson sought to reduce the Centre’s reliance on 
government funding by securing project co-funding from other sources. The subsequent rise of IDRC’s 
budget this century was largely due to the special-purpose allocations and demonstrating the Centre’s 
alignment to IAE priorities, including the joint food security fund with CIDA. Thus while the Centre was 
able to save itself from some of the pain of budget cuts and shared in the benefits of a rising aid budget, 
in both cases new resources came with conditions, rather than core funding for the Centre’s regular 
business model.  
In terms of public management, IDRC aspired to emulate the philanthropic foundations in the United 
States, including their independence from government and political mandates. Yet as a Crown 
corporation largely dependent on an appropriation from Parliament, government periodically 
attempted to reassert control over the Centre. Survival relied on cultivating allies within the bureaucracy 
and demonstrating alignment with government’s priorities, including two rounds of strategic review. 
IDRC was responsive to both Canada’s foreign policy and science priorities: supporting local researchers 
during political and economic transitions in the Southern Cone, South Africa, and Southeast Asia, and 
positioning itself as contributing to the “internationalization” Canadian research. IDRC was both inside 
and outside Canada’s development policy process: it could request additional funding, but was excluded 
from the higher level decision-making. The Centre was also outmaneuvered by the Department of 
Finance and by outside proposals which increasingly defined research for the developing world. The net 
result was an erosion of IDRC’s discretion and autonomy as strategic decisions about program choice 
moved away from its Board of Governors and into Cabinet and senior government officials.  
In terms of research policy, IDRC began to argue for its effectiveness based on a demand and client for 
its projects. The Centre adopted increasingly detailed program strategies which targeted funding to 
particular thematic priorities. Researchers needed to demonstrate how their work contributed to social 
or economic benefit, and the “utilization” of research results. Recipients were expected to identify and 
reach an audience of policymakers and practitioners. IDRC sought to demonstrate that its portfolio 
addressed real-world problems, rather than merely being motived by research interest, and that 
research contributed directly to development outcomes. IDRC also began to adopt competitive calls for 
proposals alongside its original talent-spotting practices modeled on philanthropic foundations. This 
brought about grantmaking that paid greater attention to application deadlines as well as specifying 
eligibility and selection criteria, reducing the space available for the former open-ended practice of 
selectively responding to unsolicited proposals. 
IDRC’s program theory remained close to the Strong-Hopper vision of building the capacity of 
developing country researchers. This initial emphasis meant the Centre expected its projects would 
generate new skills and strengthen local institutions. Research outputs were not necessarily expected to 
be world-class quality, instead IDRC was satisfied if local researchers were gaining experience and their 
work was useful to local audiences. Over time, projects were also expected to: incorporate 
interdisciplinarity into their research design, “close the loop” in terms of influencing policy in developing 
countries, and demonstrate how their research contributed to positive change in the lives of poor 
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women and men. IDRC thus expected its recipients to be good communicators, reaching not only their 
scientific peers, but also an audience of policymakers and practitioners.    
Drawing on Funnel and Rogers’ (2011), IDRC initially pursued an empowerment theory of change, 
underpinned by a capacity building archetype: supporting researchers in poor countries to exercise 
greater control over their own development. Such a perspective was dominant from Hopper’s 1970 
speech at the inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors through to Bezanson’s 1991 strategy. Under 
O’Neil, IDRC supplemented this core philosophy with a network theory of change underpinned by a case 
management archetype: recipients were encouraged to cultivate relationships towards informing policy 
abroad, with IDRC support adapting to the unique circumstance in each project. In contrast, the 
emergence of Grand Challenges Canada in 2010 exploited a gap in Canada’s research landscape, 
embracing a diffusion theory of change.  
IDRC grantmaking consistently favored recipients based in a range of developing countries. The role of a 
program officer evolved from “wandering minstrel” providing access to scientific literature and contacts 
not available locally, to “engaged peer” supporting the research interests of recipients. Projects were 
initially selected solely on their own merits, including its originality, potential contributions to a 
particular discipline, and its perceived relevance to the developing regions of the world. Following 
budget cuts and restructuring in the late 1990s, staff placed greater emphasis on constructing a 
portfolio of projects that contributed towards a Board-approved program strategy. Programs that 
overlapped with donor or Canadian interest grew faster than those where the Centre was the sole 
investor. Yet IDRC resisted the trend among foreign aid agencies to identify a select number of focus 
countries. Instead IDRC consistently selected programs and projects that addressed problems common 
to multiple countries or that spilled across borders entirely. The majority of its projects was coded as 
regional in scope and included recipients working in different countries. 
 
 
Australia: Crawford's legacy of partnership 
The Australian Centre for International Agriculture Research (ACIAR) was created by an Act of 
Parliament in 1982. It is a statutory authority, a public entity entrusted with a particular policy objective 
and established at arm’s-length from government. Statutory authorities are answerable to a Minister for 
their corporate performance, but largely autonomous in terms of its day-to-day operations.  
This chapter identifies three distinct periods when ACIAR was subject to different expectations and 
adopted different goals. During its first decade, the performance regime offered ACIAR a limited lifespan 
to prove its worth in terms of the potential increase in agricultural productivity stemming from the work 
it funded. Program theory was “doing well by doing good,” seeking mutual benefits at home and abroad, 
by mobilizing Australian talent in areas where the country was perceived to have a natural research 
advantage, such as on tropical coastal and dryland climates. Grantmaking focused on a partnership 
model of commissioning projects that matched state-level government scientists with local partners 
abroad, primarily in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, especially in countries where there was an existing 
pool of researchers. 
During the second decade, Australia enshrined poverty reduction as the purpose of foreign aid. This 
policy shift coincided with ACIAR focusing more on how it contributed to real-life adoption of new 
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technologies and techniques. Simultaneously, changes in science policy began to hollow out the capacity 
of state-level government and shifted the center of gravity towards university research. Program theory 
sought to boost rural incomes, linking poor women and men with markets beyond the farm gate and the 
valued added as food moved from “paddock-to-plate”. ACIAR continued its grantmaking practice of 
partnerships for mutual benefits, but increasingly relied on Australian researchers in academic settings. 
The Centre also modified its grantmaking to exit countries that attained middle-income status and enter 
countries that became a foreign policy priority. 
During the third decade, the performance regime adopted whole-of-government strategies towards 
Australia’s engagement within developing countries, particularly in response to the “war on terror” and 
later the global food crisis. Meanwhile, public research needed to justify itself within national priorities 
and program-level outcomes, such as contributing to Australia’s economy and security, rather than 
simply pursuing individual projects based on their own merit. Program theory sought to bridge 
Australia’s innovation system and foreign aid, emphasizing agricultural research-for-development as a 
form of science diplomacy and as promoting stability and food security abroad. While ACIAR largely 
retained its grantmaking practice of commissioned partnerships, the Centre placed a stronger emphasis 
on country strategies, giving its staff a “passport to engage” government colleagues and embassies. 
Responding to foreign policy priorities also led ACIAR to support work in countries with a weak or 





Figure 5.1 Timeline for Australia case study 
 
Origins 
The idea for ACIAR was born as Australia reassessed its role towards the developing world. Australia saw 
itself as both “a Western country... geographically isolated from the Western centres of power” and 
“distinctly Australian… a multicultural society in the southern hemisphere on the very fringe of the Third 
World”. Within international affairs, the importance of the UK was declining just as that of the 
developing world was rising. Growth in nearby Asia offered an opportunity “to benefit from expanding 
trade, to exercise political initiatives, to demonstrate our technical skills and special experience, to 
exercise our idealism and to enrich our culture”. Australia’s nascent foreign aid included calls for 
“applying scientific know-how to the Third World for mutual gain” (Australia 1979, 117).  
The Australian public was acutely aware of the benefits of research for rural people. Each state 
government had established its own network of agricultural labs, research centers, and extension 
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tailored to the local mix of crops, livestock, and climates. Through the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), the national government supported some key efforts to aid 
farmers, including the introduction of myxomatosis virus to control rabbit populations and the 
introduction of dung beetles to remove breeding ground for bushflies (Collis 2002). Since the Wool 
Publicity and Research Act 1936, farmers and rural industries paid levies to finance research intended to 
benefit their industry as a whole, through enhanced productivity and advances in processing. These 
arrangements would subsequently become rural Research and Development Corporations. The money 
raised through levies was matched on a dollar-for-dollar basis with funds from the national government 
(Farrar 2005, Core 2009). Agricultural research already enjoyed strong support from taxpayers and 
industry. 
The idea for ACIAR was championed by Sir John Crawford, an influential economist and civil servant. 
Crawford had served as the Director of Research in the government’s Department of Postwar 
Reconstruction, and as a senior official in the departments of Trade and Agriculture. He then entered 
the Australian National University from where he contributed to the creation of the Australian 
Development Assistance Agency and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR). In 1976, he chaired a committee which proposed that the country establish an international 
research assistance foundation. The committee included participants drawn from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, World Bank, and CSIRO. This committee examined examples such as the UK Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) and France`s Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer 
(ORSTOM).15  
Yet Crawford was clearly inspired by Canada’s IDRC, where he had been a board member from 1970 to 
1979. The committee identified a mandate for the proposed foundation that mirrored the IDRC Act, 
calling for a focus on developing countries, “to build up their research capabilities and innovative skills 
as well as the institutions required to solve their problems”. R4D was expected to enable developing 
countries to “provide food and the basic elements of decent living standards for their peoples”, by 
enabling them to “to select and… import advanced knowledge, adapt it to local conditions as necessary, 
and expand it through indigenous research to meet their needs.” 16 (Crawford Study 1976) 
Yet the moment for establishing an Australian IDRC had already passed. Edward Gough Whitlam’s Labor 
government (1972–75) had lost power after a very active period that saw the introduction of universal 
health care, free university education, and the opening of relations with China. In contrast, Malcolm 
Fraser’s Liberal-led17 government (1975–83) brought in a period of conservative policy that sought to 
control the costs of government. The recently-established aid agency was converted into a bureau 
within the Foreign Affairs portfolio. There was very little political appetite to expand spending, and none 
for such a broad and apparently altruistic mandate. In the midst of this context of restraint and modest 
ambition, James Ingram—head of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB)—established a 
Consultative Committee on Research and Development (CCRD). Once again Crawford chaired the 
committee, this time examining how Australia’s health and agricultural research communities could 
contribute to the aid program.  
 
15 In 1998, ORSTOM was renamed Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD). 
16 IDRC contributed to ACIAR in multiple ways: the first draft of the ACIAR Act was based upon the Canadian 
legislation, and IDRC’s David Spurgeon worked on secondment to establish ACIAR’s communication division. 
17 Australia’s Liberal party is politically right-of-center and akin to the conservatives in UK and Canada. 
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An agricultural mission resonated with Australia’s own history. Having struggled to become self-
sufficient in agriculture, Australia emerged as a major exporter of food and fiber, sustaining the UK 
during two world wars. Australian experience was seen as relevant for developing countries seeking to 
feed their populations and grow their economies. Furthermore the arid Australian landscape was 
comparable to conditions found in parts of the developing world. Thus crops and techniques that 
worked at home might help agriculture thrive abroad.  
Australia already had the National Health and Medical Research Council, but lacked a comparable 
platform for agricultural research. The country’s research community was fragmented among different 
state-level departments of agriculture and various divisions of CSIRO. Arguably there was a need to 
coordinate these actors if Australia was to mobilize its expertise to aid developing countries. CSIRO had 
already established a livestock research center in Indonesia as well as an office to market its research 
services to aid agencies abroad. CCRD visited the Indonesian lab and was concerned that it was isolated 
from both farmers and the wider national agricultural research system. The committee felt that 
Australia needed to mobilize expertise in the CGIAR and existing institutes, rather than building new 
brick-and-mortar institutes. Crawford and Ingram approached universities and state governments to 
gather support for their vision.  
Their opportunity came during preparations for the 1981 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting. Prime Minister Fraser was keen to have an announcement and Crawford presented ACIAR as 
one of the short list of ideas. Fraser was himself a wool rancher who personally identified with 
agriculture, and his coalition government shared power with the National Country Party whose support 
base came from rural areas. ACIAR offered an option that both highlighted Australian leadership abroad 
and played well to voters at home. Shortly after the Commonwealth meeting, the draft legislation 
presented to Parliament focused on mobilizing Australian expertise for mutual benefit. Introducing the 
bill, Foreign Minister Tony Street described a mandate “to fund research by Australian persons and 
institutions… contracting research work to... universities, State departments of agriculture, CSIRO and 
suitably competent private individuals and organisations”. According to the minister, Australians stood 
to gain in various ways including enhanced contact with overseas colleagues, increased information on 
problems abroad, and an expectation that “some of the solutions... the Centre produces will be of direct 
and practical benefit to Australia” (Australia 1981).  
ACIAR was created in 1982 as a statutory authority, in order to attract people who understood the 
problems facing agriculture abroad and who had professional networks at home to address them. In 
introducing the Act, the Minister argued “the Centre will require the capacity to identify needs and 
priorities for agricultural research in developing countries... to monitor critically progress of the 
research... staff of such stature as to command respect among scientists in Australia and in developing 
countries” (Australia 1981). Research program coordinators worked as brokers: conducting field visits 
and consultations abroad, and then scouted for talent at home that might prove useful. These 
coordinators worked closely with potential recipients to encourage and refine proposals, specifying 
objectives and responsibilities within the collaboration. Whereas government departments were seen as 
bureaucratic environments—driven by rules and regulation—the architects and early patrons of ACIAR 
saw a need to create an intellectual environment—driven by scientific collaboration. Early employees 
came from the aid bureau, CSIRO, universities, CGIAR centers, and foreign affairs. All found that their 




Doing Well by Doing Good  
ACIAR governance included a Board of Management and a Policy Advisory Committee. The ACIAR Board 
included senior representatives from the academic community, the Australian aid bureau, CSIRO, state 
governments, and the national farmers' federation. Crawford’s presence as the first Board Chairman 
provided the gravitas to attract senior representatives and build a common perspective on what the 
Centre was to become. The Policy Advisory Committee provided insights on the agricultural problems of 
developing countries and Australia’s capacity to assist in their solution. It operated as a scientific 
advisor, with members selected for their knowledge of the subject matter. The Policy Advisory 
Committee included all the Board members, plus additional Australians drawn from universities and 
state governments, plus representatives from developing countries, often drawn from the agricultural 
science or policy departments within their national government.    
ACIAR governance thus reflected the performance regime. The Board brought together the stakeholders 
that were vital to the Centre’s success, and those that might resist if ACIAR was perceived as detrimental 
to their interests. The Board held formal duties for oversight and strategic direction, and served as the 
informal crucible for forging consensus and support among key stakeholders. All projects required Board 
approval, preventing the Centre from funding an activity that might harm the interests of farmers, 
universities, or state governments. Meanwhile the Policy Advisory Committee gave voice to additional 
Australians as well as to the intended beneficiaries in developing countries. The Committee gave advice 
on potential priorities and partners, and debated policy guidelines, instilling in its members a sense of 
ownership over the Centre’s operations. In sum, the governance structure bridged national funding, 
talent throughout Australia, and potential partners in developing countries. 
ACIAR had started operations in June 1982 with a small office within Canberra's Reserve Bank Building. 
Crawford continued to play a lead role as Chairman of ACIAR’s Board of Management. He interviewed 
prospective staff members and had hired the first Director, Jim McWilliam. The new staff quickly 
established its thematic priorities, including soil & water management, plant improvement, animal & 
fish production, farming systems, post-harvest technology, forestry, socio-economics, and 
communications. Eligible projects needed to respond to the expressed needs of developing countries, 
address problems of national or regional significance, involve developing country scientists, and exploit 
Australian research capacity. The first project focused on pigeon pea improvement and involved 
participants in Thailand, Fiji, Indonesia, alongside the University of Queensland and the International 
Crop Research Institute for the semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India.  
ACIAR followed Australia’s foreign policy focus on neighboring countries. The portfolio concentrated on 
the Pacific islands and Southeast Asia, particularly Papua New Guinea which Australia governed until 
1975. The Centre also supported work in South Asia and China, and to a lesser extent in a handful of 
African countries. ACIAR’s Board established and monitored allocation targets for each of these regions, 
inspiring staff to fast-track projects in any regions that appeared to be falling behind. Project selection 
started with those countries with a similar climate and agricultural problems to Australia. To emphasis 
the point, early consultations in China and Nigeria superimposed an inverted map of Australia over 
these countries to demonstrate similarities in latitudes and growing conditions.  
ACIAR pursued a partnership model of commissioning research. Projects sought to match countries 
within the aid program with areas of expertise where Australia had a “natural research advantage.” In 
other words, it addressed problems on which Australian researchers were perceived to be at least 
relatively strong, if not world-class. Projects aimed to boost agricultural productivity or reduce costs 
abroad, as well as make a contribution at home. Such pragmatism was required to entice reluctant 
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employers to permit their scientists to participate, as working on ACIAR projects presented direct costs 
and opportunity costs. Employers had to contribute financial or in-kind support, as the Centre limited its 
funding to 70% of direct project costs. Plus time spent overseas, or working on somebody else’s 
problems, detracted from support to farmers at home. ACIAR needed to dispel suspicion that it “gave 
away” hard-earned Australian know-how, aiding Australia’s competitors in export markets. Thus the 
Centre unabashedly touted the benefits at home, such as improved control of pests before they reached 
Australian shores. 
ACIAR staff actively shaped projects. They surveyed interest in working with developing countries, and 
drew on their networks of contacts to address needs abroad. As ACIAR became better known, 
researchers began to approach staff with their ideas. Concept notes describing project ideas went 
through an iterative in-house review process. Coordinators critiqued these ideas, deciding collectively 
which ones to pursue and how to enhance their design, for example identifying additional experts that 
could contribute each project. The process was intensely competitive, with each coordinator viewing 
project ideas through the lens of their own discipline, with subtly different views as to pertinent 
questions, methods, and standards of evidence. For example, a crop scientist might find her or his 
project harshly critiqued by a soil scientist or agronomist. The resulting feedback was given to 
proponents who then prepared a detailed proposal specifying objectives, responsibilities, and budget. 
These proposals received another round of in-house review before being recommended to the Board of 
Management for approval. ACIAR believed that staff needed to broker the partnerships to ensure 
mutual benefit for project participants at home and abroad.  
While thematic priorities and selection criteria would evolve over time, these early directions would still 
influence practice thirty years later. On the surface, ACIAR remained remarkably consistent: a modest-
sized organization that stayed true to its original purpose and design. Yet on closer examination, the 
Centre was subject to changing expectations, navigated by successive managers who decided how to 
respond to the Canberra context.  
 
Making friends before sunset  
The new Centre had established its program priorities, staff roles, and grantmaking practices; yet there 
was no guarantee that any of it would survive. The ACIAR Act contained a “sunset” clause limiting the 
Centre’s lifespan to twelve years. ACIAR needed to convince Parliament that its work was worth 
renewing if it was to continue into the future. This motivated the Centre to establish a unit focused on 
economic evaluation, to help identify research priorities and to assess the benefits derived from the 
research supported. Early studies looked at ex ante priorities, comparing different crops and countries, 
estimating the potential benefits based on the expected gains in overall agricultural production and its 
likely effect on local markets.18 This information fed into ACIAR’s priority setting and was shared with 
partner countries and international organizations. As the first generation of projects came to 
completion, attention turned to ex post valuation of the results of that work: quantifying the value of 
new or increased production, or of the inputs saved—such as fertilizers or machinery—by using more 
efficient techniques. It was hoped that such studies would establish whether project successes justified 
the funds invested.  
 
18 These studies considered changes in marginal supply and demand. Prices might decrease with increases in 
production, yet advances in agricultural productivity could still generate substantial overall gains.   
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While the Centre began with substantial political support, management soon acquired an acute sense of 
vulnerability. Not only did ACIAR face a possible expiration date, government had only committed 
funding for the first three years, totaling A$25 million. From there the Centre’s fortunes were subject to 
the annual budgeting process and reliant on allies within the bureaucracy and Parliament. The latter 
eroded quickly as Bob Hawke’s Labor government came to power in 1983, and Sir John Crawford passed 
away in 1984, depriving ACIAR of its intellectual grandfather and most powerful ally. The new 
government introduced an austerity budget in 1986 and reduced spending in all departments, including 
health and public services. After four years of growth, ACIAR suddenly lost one-fifth of its budget. The 
honeymoon was over. Political support was no longer guaranteed and it was far from certain that a 
future government would renew the Centre.  
ACIAR’s found a new ally in Derek Tribe, former dean at the University of Melbourne, fellow of the 
Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering (ATSE), and member of the Order of the 
British Empire. Tribe proposed that ATSE create a new organization dedicated to promoting agricultural 
research. The creation of the CGIAR at the international level had revealed a need for national-level 
counterparts that could build awareness of its work and encourage links with domestic researchers. In 
1987, Tribe’s idea became the Crawford Fund for International Agricultural Research. The Fund drew 
financial support from governments, companies, and individuals; and engaged parliamentarians to raise 
awareness of Australia’s support for research abroad. Whereas ACIAR focused on partnerships between 
Australian and developing country researchers, the Fund provided scholarships and training abroad. 
More importantly, where ACIAR was part of the machinery of government, the Fund was able to lobby 
parliamentarians and build a domestic constituency for research abroad. It launched a series of annual 
seminars in Parliament House, to encourage bipartisan support by presenting how Australia benefited 
from such research. Doug Anthony, former leader of the National Party, agreed to serve as the Fund’s 
Chairman, and the Fund later attracted former deputy Prime Ministers Tim Fisher and John Anderson.  
The end of decade saw ACIAR’s budget recover and exceed its pre-1986 level. By 1989, the Board of 
Management received a mid-term review of ACIAR’s strengths and weakness. This review set the stage 
for the first leadership transition as George Rothschild succeeded Jim McWilliam as the ACIAR director. 
The review was largely positive, yet echoed the sense of vulnerability from the 1986 budget cut and 
upcoming sunset review. In particular, the review suggested a need “to strengthen the mechanisms that 
provide parliamentary awareness of ACIAR [such as] briefings with MPs” (Arnold 1989). It also found the 
Centre’s research portfolio had evolved in response to requests for collaboration, the availability of 
Australian expertise, staff expertise and disciplinary background, and the scientific and economic 
assessment of projects. 
The late 1980s also saw changes in Australian research policy, aligning government support with 
industry. The Australian Research Council was established to fund university research, and a Chief 
Scientist position was created to advise government on its use of—and support for—science and 
technology. The Primary Industries and Energy Research and Development Act gave industry a formal 
role in governing and funding the rural R&D corporations (RDCs). The government introduced a 150% 
tax credit to replace direct support for industrial R&D. Meanwhile CSIRO was required to raise 30% of its 
funding from outside of its Parliamentary appropriation, by selling its services to government 
departments or the private sector. A new program of Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) drew 
together science performers from universities, industries and government to work on priority areas. The 
watchwords for Australian research policy had become: priority, concentration, selectivity, 
accountability and evaluation (Australian S&T Council 1990).  
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Yet ACIAR fortunes were looking up as Paul Keating took up leadership of the Labor government in 1991. 
The country had experienced the glow of its bicentennial celebrations and the mood of the country was 
optimistic. Derek Tribe penned an eloquent and influential argument for agricultural research abroad—
entitled “Doing well by doing good”.19 Rather than a technical report, the book was an accessible read 
intended for politicians and farmers, responding to domestic fears that the information and benefits 
from Australian know-how were being given away as part of foreign aid. Tribe (1991) argued that 
Australia received much more than it gave, citing the use of wheat germplasm from CGIAR, which had 
generated over two billion dollars of additional income for the Australian wheat industry.  
The sunset review finally came in 1992, conducted under the parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade. The review focused on the “effectiveness of ACIAR as an element of 
Australia's official development assistance” and the desirability of its continued existence. The review 
was exceedingly positive and praised the Centre’s work crafting partnerships that both mobilized 
research expertise and improved the well-being of people at home and abroad. The committee 
attributed this performance to the Centre’s independence as a statutory authority, and recommended 
that similar organizations be established for R&D assistance other fields, such as manufacturing and 
human resource development. The review even called for the Centre to receive a fixed share of the aid 
budget (3.5%), with an additional sum (1.5%) dedicated to provide core funding to international 
agricultural research centers (Australia 1992). The government removed the sunset clause from the Act 
and expanded the Centre’s mandate to include project-related training. It also made ACIAR responsible 
for Australian funding to the international agricultural research centers, transferring this function away 
from the aid bureau. ACIAR thus began its second decade with a renewed lease on life.   
Thus ACIAR’s first decade, saw the performance regime offer the Centre a limited lifespan within which 
to prove its worth. Program theory can be summarized under the motto “doing well by doing good,” 
seeking mutual benefits at home and abroad by mobilizing Australian talent. Grantmaking focused on a 
partnership model of commissioning projects that matched state-level government, CSIRO and 
university scientists with local partners abroad, primarily in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with a 
tendency to work where there was an existing pool of researchers able to articulate requests for 
collaboration and ready to work with Australian counterparts.  
 
Renewed Mandate  
ACIAR’s second decade included shifts in programming and multiplying lines of work. Following the 
United Nations’ Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the Centre embraced the 
concept of sustainable development and began to downplay its previous emphasis on boosting 
agricultural yields. New work examined environmental costs with projects on conserving natural 
resources and minimizing impacts on the environment, such as zero-tillage planting or avoiding the use 
of pesticides. The decade saw ACIAR’s budget double in size, yet new funding from the aid bureau was 
tied to specific activities rather than core funding for the Centre to allocate as it saw fit. Beyond time-
limited collaborative projects, the Centre was now responsible for allocating Australia’s funding 
contribution among the international research centers, including the CGIAR and other centers 
independent of the CG system. ACIAR began to incubate the Centre for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR), inspired by Australian expertise with tree plantations. CIFOR would eventually move to 
 




Indonesia to become part of the CGIAR, and signaled the growing complexity of ACIAR’s work. While 
thematic programs of commissioned research remained ACIAR’s main line of business, the Centre 
developed new lines of work. 
ACIAR recruited a new Board chairman and a new Director, with Ross Garnaut and Bob Clements joining 
in 1994 and 1995. Garnaut had served as Prime Minister Hawke’s senior economic adviser, as 
Ambassador to China, and later as chairman of Lihir Gold Ltd. Clements came from CSIRO, having led its 
work on tropical crops and pastures. Together Garnaut and Clements brought in strong links with 
government, business, and science. ACIAR moved its Canberra headquarters to Fern Hill Park in 1996, 
and new representatives were appointed within Australia’s embassies in Papua New Guinea, South 
Africa, and India. 
ACIAR also shifted the geographic coverage of its work, withdrawing from some rapidly-growing 
countries and expanding further afield. Australia’s aid program was involved in over sixty countries, and 
the government sought to scale back by exiting from—or “graduating”—those countries that could fund 
their own development (Australia 1997). ACIAR followed this trend and discontinued its programming in 
Malaysia and Thailand. Yet at the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was 
eager to see the Centre expand as “a useful contribution to Australia's overall diplomatic impact” 
(Arnold 1989). The majority of ACIAR work remained focused on neighboring countries of Southeast Asia 
and Pacific, yet the Centre began to work in the Middle East and Africa. Expansion also came at the 
behest of the Foreign Minister, who on occasion requested the Centre to fund “something” with 
countries that were of interest to Australia, including North Korea or East Timor. Such requests were 
taken seriously and literally, leading to projects that fostered scientific collaboration as a form of “track 
two” diplomacy. Within ACIAR, such efforts were seen as special projects, something outside the regular 
portfolio, motivated more by politics than by science. The implicit understanding in-house was that such 
efforts enhanced the Centre’s standing with the Minister, and helped secure the funding needed to 
continue what ACIAR saw as its main work.  
Paul Keating’s Labor government (1991–96) created the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) giving development policy greater independence from foreign affairs. Upon 
coming to power, John Howard’s Liberal-National government (1996–2007) commissioned the Simons 
Review, whose report—entitled “One clear objective”—recommended focusing foreign aid solely on 
reducing poverty. Yet national interests continued to figure prominently. Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer argued that “it is in our self-interest to help...  the aid program helps foster stability and expand 
trade and investment opportunities for Australia. Through aid, we are also addressing many threats to 
our own prosperity” (Australia 1997). In responding to the Simons Review, the government identified 
agriculture and rural development as a priority, justified by: 
The returns to developing countries from agricultural research and development are very high 
and include social and economic benefits beyond the agricultural sector. The benefits to 
Australia from international agricultural research are also enormous, estimated at $3 billion over 
the last 20 years. This is a tangible demonstration of how effective development is in our 
national interest. (Australia 1997)  
 
ACIAR began to shift its ex post evaluation efforts to look at the diffusion of new agricultural techniques 
and the extent to which farmers adopted them in practice. The criteria of success became the real-world 
use of ACIAR work by poor women and men, rather merely establishing the potential benefit of a 
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technology within controlled settings of laboratories or field trails. The Centre could control the extent 
to which research outcomes and training came about, yet only contributed to the outcomes now of 
interest, including diffusion of farming practices and improved livelihoods of poor people. In 1998, 
ACIAR’s economic evaluation unit was renamed the “impact assessment” program. A new suite of 
adoption studies commissioned the principal investigators of closed projects to assign a qualitative rank 
describing the extent to which different audiences had taken up the findings. These adoption studies 
began to use a random sample of all projects, instead of the previous tendency to “cherry-pick” and 
understand the most successful projects.  
Yet the argument that ACIAR generated rates of return far exceeding its costs continued to prove useful 
in rallying a domestic constituency. ACIAR refined the argument of how it reduced poverty abroad, 
linking greater yields and new crops to lower prices for staple foods and new income for rural people. 
These savings and income could be invested in the farm and family to acquire access to new lands, 
afford a better diet or health care, and support children to go to school. ACIAR also continued to refine 
the argument for how Australia benefitted from its work, including the control of pests and diseases—
such as fruit flies or guava rust—to ensure they did not appear in Australia, or at least ensuring expertise 
existed at home if they did. Such arguments were vital for maintaining the support of the Centre’s 
domestic constituency of farmers and politicians. 
 
Competing for talent 
Meanwhile Australian research policy shifted towards shorter time horizons and reduced autonomy for 
researchers. Australia removed many of the agricultural subsidies at home, expecting its farmers and 
industry to compete with the world. This heightened the importance of the rural R&D corporations 
(RDCs) which controlled A$262 million in 1993–94 (Industry Commission 1994). This budget came from a 
levy paid by producers, matched dollar-for-dollar by the national government, plus additional funding 
from industry. The government Department of Finance moved to limit government’s liability to 0.5% of 
the gross value of production, and industry subsequently became more influential within RDC 
governance. A number of the RDCs were privatized to become industry-owned companies, removing 
government nominees from their boards and aligning more with commodity marketing corporations. 
The decade saw RDCs move towards shorter-term improvement of existing production techniques, 
rather than longer-term invention of new products and techniques. These moves signaled a shift away 
from the original mission of research, development, and extension, towards a new role of marketing, 
promotion, and industry representation (Kerin 2010).   
By the mid-1990s, the national and state governments were reassessing their role in research policy. At 
the national level, the Industry Commission (1994) identified principles for designing public research: 
building on private incentives where possible, and encouraging “contestability” or ensuring that 
research funding opportunities were open to all researchers. Researchers were expected to compete for 
public funds through market-like mechanisms, yet government was seen to be a poor judge of what 
specific research projects needed to be done and who should perform them. To address this gap, the 
Prime Minister established a Science, Engineering and Innovation Council to formulate national science 
priorities. The state would identify higher-level themes for the national research effort, and leave the 
allocation of funds to peer review and industry.  
At the state level, lean budgets and new priorities combined to squeeze the resources available for 
agricultural research. A number of states transformed their department of agriculture into departments 
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of “primary industries”, reflecting a horizontal shift to consider other sectors beyond agriculture, as well 
as a vertical shift to consider the value chain beyond the farm gate. Changes in government priorities, 
plus the rising influence of industrial funding, began to reshape research capacity at home. Government 
reduced the number of public servants working on agricultural research. Scientists increasingly worked 
on industrial interests, and graduate students began to pursue new career paths. Consequently it would 
become more difficult for ACIAR to engage Australian researchers, as fewer of them worked on ACIAR’s 
thematic programs or the kind of research needed in developing countries. 
ACIAR continued with a matrix management approach that blended the topic and location of Centre-
supported research. Projects were selected under different programs, while the budget was allocated by 
geographic region. Southeast Asia received more than half of ACIAR funding. The Pacific Islands, China, 
and South Asia each received between 10% and 20%, while Africa received a modest 5% to 10% (ACIAR 
1999). The program coordinators in Canberra were the senior staff, supported by a small number of 
junior representatives based in Australian embassies abroad. Nonetheless management sensed a need 
to update the Centre’s approach, and commissioned an external review of the Centre’s operations.  
This review was once again largely positive, but recommended changes to ACIAR’s program structure 
and staffing. Nairn et al. (1998) congratulated ACIAR on its “clever mix of proactivity and reactivity in 
project selection, working within developing-country research priorities and matching these to 
Australian research strengths”. Yet they feared that the program structure inhibited multidisciplinary 
research, and that the modest size of research projects—an average of A$150,000 over three-to-five 
years—encouraged a short-term “grant mentality”. The Centre was advised to engage recipients in a 
longer-term dialogue regarding their research priorities and strategies. This would require an ongoing 
core of professional staff, rather than the existing practice of hiring program managers for a fixed term 
of three years—often as a secondment.  
The Nairn review also identified challenges in ACIAR’s grantmaking. The Centre found it difficult to work 
in countries where research infrastructure was weak. Grantmaking based on the partnership model 
encouraged the Centre towards countries that had a local research community, ideally one that already 
collaborated with Australian scientists. This was relatively easy in larger, middle-income countries, yet 
more difficult in smaller, lesser developed countries. ACIAR’s approach was predicated on working with 
local scientists, yet such talent was scarce or non-existent in the poorest countries that increasingly 
dominated the aid program. The review recommended changes to the Centre’s grantmaking, including 
the use of open calls for expressions of interest and offering to cover the indirect costs of conducting 
research. 
With the review in hand, the ACIAR Board of Management crafted a new policy statement to guide the 
Centre into the new millennium. ACIAR’s mandate was reinterpreted as (1) encouraging scientists at 
home use their skills for the benefit of developing countries and to resolve Australia’s own problems, 
and (2) helping developing countries to help themselves, thus contributing to their well-being and 
general economic growth. ACIAR’s programs were intended to contribute to food security, poverty 
alleviation, and natural resource management. The Centre sought the outcomes of improved incomes, 
health, and skills. Research for the developing world was to contribute to these outcomes through 
adoptable technologies and policy influence; increases in the body of scientific knowledge; and 
increases in research capacity abroad. Moving forward, ACIAR’s programs would address agricultural 
and natural resource economics, animal production, crop production, fisheries, forestry, management of 
land and water resources, and post-harvest technology (ACIAR 1999).  
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The Board also created a new deputy director position, to take responsibility for managing the internal 
process of matching country needs with Australia’s scientific capacity. This freed the director to manage 
external relationships with the Minister and Australian aid agency (AusAID), as well as with research 
providers within state government, universities, and CSIRO. Whereas ACIAR used to work 
independently, the Centre’s fortunes depended on being well connected within the Australian research 
community.  
During ACIAR’s second decade, the performance regime had enshrined poverty reduction as the 
purpose of foreign aid, coinciding with a shift in ex post evaluation to demonstrate real-life adoption of 
new technologies and techniques. Simultaneously, changes in Australia’s research policy began to 
hollow out the capacity of state-level government and shift the center of gravity in Australia towards 
university research. Program theory sought to boost rural incomes, linking poor women and men with 
markets beyond the farm gate and the valued added as food moved from “paddock-to-plate”. ACIAR 
continued its grantmaking practice of partnerships for mutual benefits, but increasingly relied on 
Australian researchers in academic settings. The Centre also modified its grantmaking to exit countries 
that attained middle-income status and enter countries that became a foreign policy priority. 
After twenty years ACIAR remained a scaled-up version of Crawford’s vision, but shifts were underway. 
The most obvious was the countries covered by the Centre’s programming, which evolved to follow 
Australia’s aid program and foreign policy interests. More subtle was an evolution in program theory 
and evaluation criteria. ACIAR had rallied arguments based on the production added or costs averted, 
asserting that these contributions greatly exceeded the Centre’s overall costs. The Centre began to 
frame its arguments in terms of real-world impact in the lives of poor women and men, carrying out 
adoption studies on the extent to which research results were used in practice.  
Australia experienced changes in the structure of, and incentives for, publicly-funded research. Budget 
pressures and competing priorities within the state departments “hollowed out” their research capacity 
in forestry, crop sciences, and veterinary medicine. Within the RDCs, industrial representatives became 
more influential, and moved funding towards the shorter-term practical concerns of producers. Within 
the Australian research community, the center of gravity shifted towards universities, diminishing the 
relative weight of CSIRO and government departments. The conditions placed on these organizations 
required them to recover the full cost of research, rather than contributing in-kind or financial support. 
Meanwhile the Cooperative Research Centres emerged as the pre-eminent funding opportunity: 
offering greater prestige, larger budgets, and collaboration with industry. In short, ACIAR now needed to 




Figure 5.2: Performance regime surrounding ACIAR. Solid lines represent formal lines of authority, 
dotted lines describe the flow of program ideas, and dashed lines show funding relationships. Upper 
portion represents governance context: formal authority came through the minister, yet the foreign 
ministry, aid agency, and universities were influential. The relative influence of farmers' federations and 
state-level governments faded over time. AusAID merged with the foreign ministry in 2013. Lower 
portion describes grantmaking, with shaded circles represent recipients abroad. ACIAR retained a 
partnership model of matching research providers abroad with talent at home.  
 
Passport to Engage  
The early 2000s saw ACIAR’s fortunes increasingly tied to the aid program and foreign policy. Worldwide 
funding for agricultural research was on the decline, and Australia was drawn into the “war on terror” 
following the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the 2002 bombing of nightclubs on the island of Bali, 
Indonesia. The security agenda was ascendant in Canberra, prompting the aid program to pay greater 
attention to fragile states, recovery from conflict, and improved policing. ACIAR management feared the 
Centre was misunderstood, vulnerable, and had grown too distant from government. The relationship 
with the Foreign Minister had weakened, and ACIAR staff found it difficult to engage colleagues in 
AusAID and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). While satisfied with the Centre’s 
direction, the Board of Management fretted over the prospect of “a mismatch between our program 
and Australian Government regional priorities ...a lack of recognition by key groups of the Australian 
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In 2002, Peter Core was appointed as the new ACIAR director, replacing Bob Clement. Whereas Clement 
was a researcher at heart, Core came from the world of public management. Core had served as 
Secretary of the federal departments of transport and of industrial relations, and as deputy Secretary of 
the department of primary industries, before managing the Rural Industries Research and Development 
Corporation. Core was someone in tune with government expectations and his tenure would see a 
number of salient changes in ACIAR. These included the adoption of an annual operational plan, greater 
emphasis on country programming, and reform of the Centre’s governance model. 
Under Core’s leadership, ACIAR adopted the government practice of preparing an Annual Operational 
Plan for the year ahead. This added to the existing five-year corporate plan looking into the future, and 
annual reports that reflected on the past. The new operational plan described the types of activities that 
ACIAR intended to fund and specified key performance indicators. The plan was intended to encourage 
greater interaction with the Minister—who signed off on it—and to focus management’s discussion with 
the Policy Advisory Committee on reviewing the assessment of research needs abroad. The plan 
communicated ACIAR’s priorities to potential recipients and signaled staff where to focus their 
attention, ignoring unsolicited requests from Australian researchers. Before proceeding with any project 
idea, staff needed to determine whether it was compatible with the priorities in the plan.  
The Operational Plan also shifted ACIAR’s budgeting process. Country strategies became the budgeting 
unit, replacing the past practice of regional expenditure targets. Each strategy included an analysis of 
the country’s context and identified a few priorities of ACIAR programming. The plan provided 
Australian and foreign embassies an overview of what the Centre intended to do in each country. 
Program managers were asked to specialize in a few countries, becoming knowledgeable about the 
research providers there. They were expected to visit Australia’s diplomatic missions each time they 
went abroad, and link with embassies and desk officers in Canberra. The intention was to give ACIAR a 
passport to dialogue with the Minister, AusAID, and heads of mission. Regular contact affirmed that 
ambassadors greatly appreciated ACIAR projects because, for relatively small amounts of money, they 
provided a tangible example of public diplomacy and collaboration between local people and 
Australians.  
These changes in planning and budgeting shifted ACIAR’s matrix management, strengthening the 
geographic axis and de-emphasizing the thematic axis. The organizational logic began to rely more on 
programming with particular countries and less on particular set of problems. The shift to country-based 
budgets reflected the level at which the Minister was involved. Given his schedule, meetings with the 
ACIAR Director were often restricted to just twenty minutes. The Minister might request the Centre do 
more in a particular region or country, but there was no engagement in the technical aspects of the 
projects. While ACIAR remained focused on the Asia-Pacific, it was encouraged to further expand its 
work in Africa and the Middle East, including new projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.20   
 
Advising the Minister 
ACIAR’s third decade also witnessed a change of governance: as the role of its Board diminished from 
one of providing strategic direction, to one of advising the Minister. Analogous to a Crown corporation 
in Canada, a statutory authority in Australia is a public entity established to pursue a specific policy 
 
20 For example, work on controlling soil salinization outside Baghdad—announced ahead of a state visit by the Iraqi 
Prime Minister—and on dryland wheat farming across Iraq, Syria, and Western Australia. 
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objective. Whereas a line department assumes a broad set of responsibilities and is tightly bound to 
ministerial direction, a statutory authority has a narrow mandate and operates under its own governing 
board. Statutory authorities were established in areas that were seen to demand technical skills and 
non-partisan policy implementation, at arm’s-length from ministerial direction, such as the Central Bank. 
While ACIAR was unique within the aid program, it was just one of over 150 statutory authorities within 
government.  
The Department of Finance began to review the governance of statutory authorities, with an eye to 
incorporating insights from the private sector. Known as the “Uhrig report”, this review proposed that 
all statutory authorities adopt one of two options: governing board or advisory committee. The former 
was for organizations where the board had the power to determine and alter strategic direction, 
whereas the latter was for those organizations where this power remained with the Minister. Advisory 
committees were restricted to “ensuring alignment of operations with the specified delegation and the 
priorities of the Minister” (Uhrig 2003, 35). While the Board of Management was originally responsible 
for ACIAR’s directions, over time the Centre had become more and more responsive to DFAT and AusAID 
interests. While the motivation was to access additional funding, this pursuit unintentionally enhanced 
the role of the Minister in setting ACIAR’s directions. The Uhrig report was also questioned the presence 
of stakeholders on a board, fearing they might “fail to produce independent, critical and objective 
thinking” by being more “concerned with the interests of those they represent, rather than the success 
of the entity they are responsible for governing” (Uhrig 2003, 43).  
The Uhrig reforms coincided with pressure to rebrand public entities within the Australian government. 
ACIAR began to de-emphasize its old logo of three hexagons that had featured prominently on technical 
papers, annual reports, and website. In its place, central agencies required the coat of arms of the 
Commonwealth government featuring a kangaroo and emu. Some publications retained a stylized 
version of the old logo as a faded watermark in the background, but the Australian coat of arms soon 
adorned the office and business cards. It was a symbolic recognition that the performance regime was 
now less tolerant of independence, and ACIAR’s fortunes were tied to being seen as part of—rather than 
apart from—the machinery of government.  
The Howard government amended the ACIAR Act in 2007, converting the position of Director into a 
Chief Executive Officer, and transforming the Board of Management into a seven-member expert 
Commission. This CEO became directly accountable to the Minister for administrative and financial 
purposes. The following Annual Report described the Commission’s role as to ensure that ACIAR met the 
expectations of the Minister. The Commission was to advise “the Minister on the strategic directions of 
ACIAR, while the CEO provides operational leadership… [and] is now directly responsible to the Minister 
for managing the affairs of ACIAR in a way that ensures proper use of the Commonwealth resources” 
(ACIAR 2008). The change in governance model had the effect of enhancing the relationship between 
the CEO and the Minister, effectively reducing the role of the Board chairperson.  
There was a short-lived experiment with a public statement to clarify what the Minister expected of 
each statutory authority in his or her portfolio. Uhrig envisioned (2003, 7) “[t]his document would 
outline relevant government policies, including the Government’s current objectives… and any 
expectations Government may have on how the authority should conduct its operations.” ACIAR staff 
drafted such a statement in late 2008, calling on the Centre to keep the Minister “fully informed of 
ACIAR’s activities... and provide timely information to the Secretary of DFAT and Director General of 
AusAID... to reinforce DFAT’s role as the principal source of advice… on portfolio policy and program 
delivery matters” (ACIAR 2008). The statement envisioned the Minister receiving monthly reports on 
ACIAR operations, meeting annually with the new ACIAR Commission, and approving the Annual 
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Operational Plan as well as those projects that were in new countries or in post-conflict and post-
disaster settings.  
Two features of the statement were remarkable. First, it described a flow of information up to the 
Minister, but was silent on the reverse flow back down to ACIAR management. It thus did not contain 
any insight on how the Centre was expected to contribute to government policy. Second, the amount of 
reporting mechanisms enumerated in the statement implied a regular and deep contact with the 
Minister. Yet such frequent contact went against history: the Minister could not afford to dedicate much 
time to ACIAR, given the competing demands of being in Cabinet and Parliament, representing 
Australia’s foreign policy abroad, and running the larger organizations of Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFAT) and AusAID. It is thus hardly a surprise that the statement remained a one-time experiment. 
Kevin Rudd’s Labor government (2007–10) subsequently discontinued any further reforms to the 
governance of statutory authorities.   
 
Bridging innovation and foreign aid 
In 2001, a new science and technology strategy—“Backing Australia’s Ability”—increased funding to the 
Australian Research Council and further boosted the portion of public research performed within 
universities, rather than within government. To its surprise, CSIRO was ignored in the new funding 
announcements. Traditionally the powerhouse of public research, CSIRO operated as a loose collection 
of thematic divisions, each engaged in their own projects, not unlike ACIAR. The shock of being bypassed 
for new funding acted a wake-up call, prompting management to restructure CSIRO into a set of flagship 
programs. These were “multidisciplinary research partnerships… [with] external collaborators to tackle 
big, audacious goals in areas of major national significance”. For example, one program sought to 
achieve a ten-fold increase in the economic, social, and environmental benefits from water by 2025. 
These flagship programs were intended to recapture the imagination—and support—of government 
through ambition, relevance to national interest, and application of research findings. The reforms 
served to rekindle government support as CSIRO benefitted from an additional five billion of funding 
announced in the subsequent edition of Backing Australia’s Ability in 2004. The lesson of CSIRO 
restructuring appeared to be “continually question your role and what your stakeholders expect of you” 
(Sandland and Thompson 2012, 264). 
In 2002, the government identified a set of four National Research Priorities. These were intended to set 
the agenda for the country’s publicly-funded research and included: sustainability in the use of land, 
water and energy; promoting and maintaining good health; frontier technologies for building and 
transforming industry; and safeguarding Australia.21 The priorities were purposely broad, identifying 
themes whose importance was relatively self-evident and non-controversial. The Howard government 
appeared to feel that research done at public expenses should contribute to the government’s agenda, 
yet did not feel that government was well-placed to select the best projects or providers. The 
government understood its role as setting the agenda to guide the internal self-governance with the 
research community that selected projects based on traditional notions of scientific excellence.   
Various government agencies, including ACIAR, began to report on how their activities contributed to 
these priorities. Between 2002 and 2007, the Centre’s annual report tracked spending towards various 
 
21 These general themes were supported by 21 sub-priorities including: biotechnology, ICTs, and advanced 
materials, as well as “understanding other cultures” and protecting against terrorism. 
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sub-priorities, such as the sustainable use of soil and water, and protecting Australia from pests and 
disease. These priorities did not really shift ACIAR’s research agenda, but allowed the Centre a new 
means to argue how its work contributed to the national interest beyond the aid program. ACIAR was 
attentive to the language of Australian research policy because it mattered to researchers at home, 
including universities, state government, and CSIRO. Senior managers in these organizations needed to 
justify their work in relation to the national research priorities, thus ACIAR recast its work in the same 
terms in order to mobilize in-kind and financial support for the Centre’s projects.  
The Centre began to describe itself as bridging innovation and foreign aid policy. ACIAR (2006) argued 
that it occupied “a unique position as a funder of R&D… part of Australia's innovation system as well as 
part of the development assistance program”. This tactic seized upon rising government interest in 
promoting science as means of enhancing the country’s economy. Public research enjoyed a rising 
budget and prestige, while foreign aid had a stable budget and the foreign policy portfolio was 
increasingly focused on security. ACIAR also needed to be sensitive to the incentives shaping the 
willingness of researchers at home to engage with ACIAR programming. From the in-house review 
process to the monitoring of ongoing projects, the organizational practices within ACIAR had more in 
common with CSIRO or the research council than with AusAID or DFAT. The Centre’s routines involved 
crafting and managing a portfolio of research projects towards achieving change over the long term. In 
the 2004 annual report, ACIAR expressed an intent for two-fifths of new projects to have impacts within 
five years, with the remainder aiming for impacts within ten-to-fifteen years.  
The National Research Priorities were not without its critics. Government policy was based on the 
assumption that Australia needed to “concentrate its resources within selected areas in order to 
maximise benefits” (Barlow 2006). Yet scale was not equally important in all scientific efforts, as 
evidenced by the number of Nobel prizes awarded to small teams. Furthermore, the Australia’s public 
sector would always be small compared to the amount of research performed in the private sector and 
in larger economies. The policy challenge was not to achieve a scale rivaling the world’s largest research 
efforts, but to identify those projects with the potential to make a valued contribution to knowledge, 
technology, or skills. The task facing research funders was to assemble promising people and ideas into a 
portfolio that would enhance those contributions, rather than merely imposing priorities or a research 
agenda. Meanwhile, performance management within universities—now the heart of the public 
research system—was reshaped with the Research Quality Framework (RQF) introduced in 2005. The 
framework proposed to use narratives, examined by review panels, to assess wider benefits of publicly-
funded research. The intention was to assess university research from the perspectives of both an 
academic audience (referred to as “quality”) and end-users beyond academia (referred to as “impact”). 
The government wanted to link academic research to the concerns of industry and business (Donovan 
2008).  
The RQF offered mixed incentives for university researchers to work on research for the developing 
world. On the one hand, performance was increasingly judged based on publications. Agricultural 
research often adapts known techniques to the agro-climatic conditions in a specific place. Such 
attributes make this work less attractive to top journals seeking to describe the frontiers of knowledge 
on topics that interest an international readership. Furthermore training and collaborating with 
colleagues abroad required time than otherwise could be invested in preparing publications. On the 
other hand, research for the developing world was not merely curiosity-driven, but intended to 
contribute to the economy and livelihoods. An ACIAR grant could serve as an example of how a 
researcher’s work did more than merely adding to the scientific literature. It also offered an opportunity 
to travel overseas, see how science is performed in other countries, and expand one’s network of 
professional contacts. University researchers appeared to respond by dividing their time between RQF 
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criteria of “quality” and “impact”: willing to participate in one or two ACIAR projects, but alone after 
amassing a record of publications sufficient to establish their academic career.  
The overall context of research policy at home offered ACIAR an opportunity to articulate with the 
government’s agenda beyond the confines of the aid program. Under Kevin Rudd’s Labor government, 
the national research priorities and research quality framework temporarily lost some of the political 
weight behind them. Yet these imperatives later re-emerged with a new Excellence in Research for 
Australia (ERA) system to measure research quality in universities and efforts to update the strategic 
research priorities. The new expectations of public research and the incentives they created were here 
to stay.   
Research was also part of Australia’s growing aid program. In 2005, the Howard government announced 
its intention to double aid by 2010 to reach over A$4 billion per year, while the subsequent Kevin Rudd’s 
Labor government would promise to double it again towards a target of 0.5% GDP by 2015–16. A new 
review examined options for this increasing budget, recommending that AusAID country strategies 
become a “whole-of-government” framework for the delivery of Australian aid (Duncan et al. 2005). A 
subsequent white paper affirmed this direction, calling for ACIAR to integrate its work into the aid 
agency’s rural development strategy (AusAID 2006). The Centre faced new pressure to fit within—and 
justify its programming choices against—cross-government strategy. AusAID was also encouraged to 
increase its support to research “to improve the quality and effectiveness of Australian aid” by helping 
to “inform where and how our own and our partners' resources can most effectively be deployed” 
(AusAID 2012b). In keeping with the principle of untied aid, there was new pressure to open such 
funding opportunities to all nationalities, through greater use of competitive calls for proposals. The aid 
agency expected research to inform development decision-making, find solutions to global problems, 
and strengthen the capacity of partner countries' to use research. Over the next five years, the aid 
agency expected to increase its research funding from A$30 million/year to over A$106 million/year, 
projections that would eclipse ACIAR’s budget and eventually represent more than two percent of aid 
spending.  
These new investments in research for the developing world implied tension between the aid agency’s 
new approach and ACIAR’s existing program theory. Yet this tension was secondary to the ongoing 
pressure upon the aid program to align with foreign policy. Australia’s own peace and economic well-
being relied on having stable neighbors, countries able to look after themselves, generate economic 
growth, and reduce poverty. The security agenda dominated development policy. Agricultural research 
was justified through convoluted logic linking insecurity to dissatisfied rural people and minorities and 
the need to extend to them the benefits of development. Across the aid program, the test for public 
spending was how to improve stability abroad and in turn enhance the safety of Australians.  
 
Responding to global food security 
After twenty-five years, ACIAR found itself in a strange position. Its former independence had eroded as 
strategic direction increasingly originated outside the Centre. The aid agency had entered the research 
funding business, and cast ACIAR as an add-on to its rural development strategy. Given rapid growth in 
the foreign aid, the Centre was responsible for a shrinking portion of Australia’s development assistance. 
Poverty reduction, economic growth, and international security were the watchwords of the moment, 
largely crowding out ACIAR’s original mandate. Funding for agricultural research had decreased abroad, 
and the importance of agriculture had declined at home, as a boom in mining accounted for a larger 
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share of the national economy. Agricultural science had expanded beyond field-based activities to 
enhance the production of crops on farms, to embrace both lab-based work in genomics and the market 
value-chains from “paddock-to-plate”.22 The Centre also faced a tension between what researchers 
needed in order to maintain their academic careers and what ACIAR needed to deliver to the 
development agenda. Researchers needed opportunities for publication, and development practice 
demanded tangible improvements in the lives of poor people. ACIAR needed to maintain its credibility 
with both audiences, yet had less freedom to do so. Yet ACIAR’s third decade still had some surprises in 
store.  
A global crisis began in 2007–08 as food prices increased dramatically due to droughts, rising demand 
among middle-class consumers, low reserves within grain stockpiles, and increased prices for inputs of 
fuel and fertilizer. Whereas the threats of terrorism and failed states captured headlines and policy 
agendas early in the new millennium, the specter of hunger now garnered attention it had not seen 
since the 1980s. By 2011, famine once again displaced thousands of people in the Horn of Africa. Yet the 
understanding of food security had evolved. While humanitarian aid remained indispensable to attend 
to people’s short-term needs, livelihoods and viable food markets were essential in the longer term.  
Food security was a good fit for ACIAR and provided the basis for renewing its program theory, 
incorporating how its work had evolved and reframing the link with development policy. The Centre 
began to argue that:  
food security is not only about providing enough food, but is also concerned with income 
generation driven by productivity and diversification. The flow-on effects of increasing 
productivity for smallholder farmers, who represent half the world’s poor, achieve other 
outcomes, such as education for children, access to health services and, in many cases, gender 
equality. Progress in achieving productivity gains and the associated benefits are central to each 
of the eight MDGs (ACIAR 2010).  
 
The Rudd government however was interested in a broader response beyond any single organization. 
The government’s budget for 2009 included a “Food Security through Rural Development” initiative 
providing A$450 million over four years, shared among AusAID country strategies, the World Food 
Programme, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank. To secure additional funding, ACIAR needed to 
identify how its work contributed to this whole-of-government strategy, rather than defending the 
merits of its own stand-alone programming. As Nick Austin became CEO, he inherited an ACIAR that 
needed to compete for attention against both the multilaterals and an international expectation that 
Australia would coordinate its response with other donor countries.  
The commitment to reach 0.5% GDP survived into Julia Gillard’s Labor government (2010–13) which 
held onto power with the support of a handful of independent MPs. The government once again 
launched a review of the aid program to guide its still-growing budget. This time it called for organizing 
the aid program around the principle of value-for-money, understood as ‘‘the quality of the outcome 
 
22 During this period, ACIAR declined AusAID interest in funding a biosciences hub at the International Livestock 
Research Centre in Nairobi. The reasons appear to be a perceived mismatch in substance and modality, support for 
genomics research and ongoing laboratory infrastructure did not fit the business model of field-based, time-limited 
research projects. AusAID turned to CSIRO which eagerly accepted the funding and began an ongoing Africa-
Australia collaboration with the new centre (ironically involving former ACIAR employees). 
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achieved and the efficiency with which it is achieved” (Australia 2011). More than ninety federal and 
state government agencies were engaged in spending aid dollars. This was seen as a strength “as it 
enhances linkages and networks across a wide range of specialised fields and is much better value-for-
money than attempting to build in-house capabilities in AusAID” (Australia 2011). Yet the logic of value-
for-money also suggested Australia exit aid delivery altogether, investing instead in programs designed 
and managed by other donor countries. Such “delegated cooperation” arrangements were running or 
planned with New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and the European Union. 
In other words, the aid budget would not necessarily go to AusAID or ACIAR. These organizations 
needed to demonstrate how they were better value than both multilateral organizations and the 
bilateral programs of other donor countries.  
Once again, the aid review was favorable towards research, arguing that large successes in foreign aid 
involved deploying new technologies. Future development was seen to “increasingly hinge upon 
relevant and vibrant research... focused upon improving the condition of the world’s poor” (Australia 
2011). The review recommended more aid funding for research by Australian and international 
institutions, particularly in agriculture and medicine. ACIAR seized upon this recommendation and 
commissioned the government’s Chief Scientist, Ian Chubb, to design a framework for expanding 
support for international agricultural research, including its rationale, geographic focus, priorities, and 
models for delivery. This framework reiterated some previous arguments noting that:  
Collaborative research with our neighbours serves our national interests, with direct benefits 
through improving our own agricultural productivity... and protecting crops and livestock from 
pests and diseases—there is a two-way flow of know-how. Furthermore, there are intangible 
benefits built up through the goodwill of overseas… scientists and students …similar to that 
derived from the Colombo Plan (ACIAR 2011).  
 
By the end of the year, Australia came full circle. Thirty years after the 1981 announcement in 
Melbourne to create ACIAR, the country once again hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting in Perth. On this occasion, the Prime Minister announced A$33 million over four years to 
establish an Australian International Food Security Centre, to be housed within ACIAR and dedicated to 
improving the adoption of agricultural innovations. At first glance, it is unclear why the government 
would opt to establish this new center rather than simply invest in the existing one. The announcement 
could be dismissed as perchance, a habit of politicians to announce something of their own creation, 
rather than acknowledge the works of their predecessors. Yet it also signaled a lack of enthusiasm for 
the ACIAR approach. Compared to the scale of global food security challenges and the growing budget 
and ambition of the aid program, ACIAR programming was perceived to be too modest, too technical, 
and taking too long to contribute to development outcomes. The appetite within the aid agency had 
turned towards more real-time research, such as mapping of value chains and piloting of modifications 
in them. The aid agency determined success based on the number of farmers who gained access to 
agricultural technologies, and addressing food security was seen to require more than business-as-usual 
from ACIAR.  
In summary, during this third decade, the performance regime adopted whole-of-government strategies 
towards Australia’s engagement within developing countries, particularly in response to the “war on 
terror” and later the global food crisis. Meanwhile, public research needed to justify itself within 
national priorities and program-level outcomes, such as contributing to Australia’s economy and 
security, rather than simply pursuing individual projects based on their own merit. ACIAR’s program 
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theory sought to bridge Australia’s innovation system and foreign aid, emphasizing agricultural research 
as a form of science diplomacy that promoted stability and food security abroad. Grantmaking 
continued to rely on commissioned partnerships, yet these were increasingly framed within country 
strategies in order to give staff a “passport to engage” government colleagues and embassies. 
Responding to foreign policy priorities also led ACIAR to support work in countries with a weak or 
nonexistent domestic research community. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Australia's R4D spending since 1980.  ACIAR expenditures (left axis) compared to Australia's 
official development assistance (right axis). All amounts are expressed in real terms in million $A 
adjusted to 2011. The shaded years represent times when the Liberal, right-of-centre party was in 
power. (Sources: ACIAR Annual Reports and OECD statistics) 
 
Key Points 
Looking across thirty years of history reveals three key ways that ACIAR both adapted and refused to 
adapt to changing expectations within the performance regime. On the one hand, the Centre clearly 
redefined its contribution to the government’s agenda, redesigning how it measured success and 
responding to priorities of the day with science and foreign policy. On the other hand, the Centre 
responded less readily to forces reshaping the research community at home, which hollowed out the 
capacity of state governments that provided extension and research service for domestic farmers. The 
Centre remained dedicated to its stand-alone business model of commissioning research partnerships, 
despite rising expectations that research be awarded through open competition and that ACIAR would 
fit within whole-of-government strategies. 
The Centre initially enjoyed high-level government support that had led to its creation. ACIAR’s initial 
value proposition was to provide Australia with prestige on the world stage following its announcement 
at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. Yet the inclusion of a sunset clause in the Act 
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existence using arguments based on the economic valuation of the potential to boost productivity, 
reduce costs or enhance the value of commodities. These measures articulated how the Centre 
benefited Australia, garnering support with farmers and the National Party. Helping agriculture in other 
countries was not just about helping others; it was in Australia's direct interest, as captured by Derek 
Tribe’s phrase “doing well by doing good.” The Centre often described its cost as more than justified by 
the tremendous benefits stemming from a handful of projects. The weakness of this tactic was that it 
justified ACIAR on its own terms, but was modest in comparison to the overall aid program and 
disconnected from foreign policy interests. When poverty reduction became the purpose of foreign aid, 
ACIAR augmented its evaluation techniques to consider real-life adoption of new techniques in addition 
to assessing their potential benefits. The Centre also gave more consideration to who benefitted from 
its research, their linkages with markets beyond the farm gate, and how additional income could enable 
them to overcome poverty.  
Programming evolved in response to the Minister’s geographic priorities. Primarily focused on the Asia 
Pacific, the Centre tended to work in countries where there was an already established research 
community, leading to a substantial number of projects involving India and China. Yet ACIAR also 
supported work in Papua New Guinea, East Timor, North Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These countries 
had relatively weak domestic research communities, and attracted less interest from the Australian 
scientists, thus tended to required greater time and effort by staff. The program logic of “increasing 
production” initially focused ACIAR’s portfolio on key staple crops in populous countries with an existing 
pool of domestic scientists ready and willing to collaboration with Australian counterparts. Yet the 
expectations of the aid program and foreign policy slowly encouraged a focus on poor farmers in 
smaller, less developed countries, often with a weak or nonexistent domestic research community. 
ACIAR’s third decade saw new pressure to fit into “whole-of-government” strategies framing Australia’s 
engagement within partner countries. At the same time, management repositioned the Centre as the 
interface of Australia’s innovation and aid agendas.  
The cornerstone of the partnerships model was the existence of qualified Australian researchers with 
skills and knowledge that were applicable to agriculture overseas. Yet the landscape of Australian 
science evolved over three decades since 1982: universities became much more prominent, accounting 
for a larger share of research funding, and employing a greater share of scientists. In contrast, the state-
level governments moved away from maintaining their own laboratories and research staff, and—like 
CSIRO—the capacity that remained was increasingly expected to justify itself within larger-scale 
priorities and program-level outcomes, rather than simply pursuing individual projects based on their 
own merit. Australian research policy shifted towards issues judged to be in the national interest by 
mobilizing capacity beyond government. Public funding moved away from supporting individual 
organizations based on past performance, towards funding constellations of actors based on their 
potential to contribute to the economy or to enhancing Australia’s standing in world science. ACIAR’s 
relative influence and ability to command the attention of Australian researchers diminished as new 
funding programs emerged that were more interested in practical applications at home. Involvement in 
ACIAR programming needed to offer Australian scientists an opportunity to get ahead in their careers. 
At a personal level, young researchers could find it personally rewarding to help reduce hunger in Africa 
rather than contribute to incremental production of sugar or beef at home. Yet work abroad is a luxury 
to be entertained after establishing an academic career and the required record of publications.  
Within both the aid program and science policy, it is no longer suffices to argue that taxpayers’ dollars 
are being spent on good projects. Politicians expect that spending contribute to government’s larger 
goals and the national interest. This pressure was once more rhetoric than substance, a means of 
framing what ACIAR did rather than changing it. Yet as access to new funding is tied to cross-
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government initiatives, the Centre increasingly became an instrument of Australian policy, rather than 
merely good at what it does.  
In terms of the resources available, ACIAR experienced three periods of rapid growth separated by two 
periods of relatively flat budgets (figure 10). Rapid expansion lasted until Australia’s austerity budget in 
1986, an event that inspired the creation of the Crawford Fund to renew public and political support for 
R4D. After passing its “sunset review”, ACIAR gained responsibility for Australia’s contribution to the 
international agricultural research centers. Access to additional resources was contingent on 
demonstrating the Centre was aligned with the government’s geographic priorities, ending 
programming as countries attained middle-income status and entering countries that were a foreign 
policy priority. Meanwhile changes in state-level departments “hollowed out” expertise in agricultural 
extension that were the source of ACIAR’s partners. A more recent rise in ACIAR’s budget was triggered 
by the global food crisis in 2008–09 and Australia’s response to it.  
In terms of public management, the “sunset” clause motivated ACIAR to demonstrate the benefits of its 
work for Australians. Over time, the Centre shifted from estimating the potential value of enhanced 
production to examining real-life adoption of technologies, production techniques, and policies. Yet the 
ACIAR structure of thematic research programs was disconnected from foreign ministry and aid agency 
structure based on country desks. In its third decade, ACIAR placed a stronger emphasis on country 
strategies in order to provide staff the means to engage government colleagues and embassies. The 
Centre also adopted the government practice of annual operational plans, while governance reforms 
converted the independent Board of Management into an advisory Commission. Both these steps 
reinforced ties to government and reliance upon the Minister. While conceived as an autonomous 
statutory authority, ACIAR now justified its existence based on its fit within whole-of-government 
strategies and Australian foreign policy. 
In terms of research policy, ACIAR retained its original approach, inspired from philanthropic 
foundations, with staff brokering partnership between developing countries researchers and their 
Australian counterparts. The Centre saw “demand” as coming from developing country governments, 
and its “clients” as the researchers in these countries and at home in Australia. Nonetheless, as public 
universities and research evaluation systems became more prominent in Australia’s research system, 
ACIAR funding became less prestigious and attractive. Contributing to capacity abroad did not 
necessarily contribute to career prospects at home. Academic incentives encourage researchers towards 
other funding opportunities, such as the Cooperative Research Centres, which multiplied inside a rising 
science budget. Meanwhile, decreased government funding for the rural R&D corporations increased 
the prominence of industry’s goals, favoring more short-term, incremental improvements to existing 
techniques over longer-term strategic research. Yet CSIRO’s transformation from a “university without 
students” into a set of audacious challenge programs shows public research can attract support by 
adopting a more ambitious agenda. ACIAR also began to describe its work in terms of the national 
research priorities, and cited science policy as an additional source of legitimacy alongside the foreign 
policy priorities of the day.  
ACIAR’s program theory remained rooted in the concept of mutual benefit. This reflects the political 
reality when the Centre was founded, which led ACIAR to emphasis benefits at home, rather merely 
building capacity abroad. ACIAR started with the agricultural needs of developing countries, and 
developed promising project ideas if there was an Australian partner with some “natural research 
advantage” on the topic at hand. Australia possessed specialists in tropical coastal and dryland climates 
similar to conditions in parts of Asia and Africa. During its first two decades, ACIAR expanded from the 
productivity of single crops or species, to the more efficient use of natural resources. With the advent of 
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poverty reduction as the main goal of Australian aid, ACIAR strengthening its work on boosting rural 
incomes and the valued added as food moved from “paddock-to-plate”. Drawing Funnel and Rogers’ 
(2011), ACIAR’s approach to research for the developing world combined the “diffusion” and “networks” 
theories of change, underpinned by “capacity” and “carrots-and-sticks” program designs: brokering 
partnerships between Australian and local researchers to create and share new agricultural techniques 
and enhance the ability of partners in the host country. 
In terms of grantmaking practice, ACIAR remained consistent in its partnership model of commissioning 
projects in response to the agricultural needs abroad. Research coordinators sought out expertise at 
home and brokered partnerships with local institutes abroad. The ACIAR portfolio initially included a 
number of state-level departments of agriculture, yet evolved as the center of gravity in Australia’s 
public research system shifted towards universities. Project approval depended on passing an in-house 
review that subjected proposals to cross-disciplinary critique, which could result in modifications to the 
research design to incorporate additional disciplines or partners. The Centre retained a narrow set of 
expectations on its recipients, namely that they would do “good science”, there would be some transfer 
of skills and experiences, and the results would be useful abroad and at home. 
 
 
Changing context: public management and research governance 
The key argument of this chapter is that the governance context matters. The changing pressures in this 
context encouraged funders to periodically redefine “success” and performance in terms that were 
favorable to different stakeholders and power holders. Chapter two introduced three drivers that 
encourage change among public research funders. The first is the availability of public resources: waves 
of budget growth permit funders the opportunity to become more ambitious and expand their work, 
while waves of budget cuts require being more focused and scaling back. The second driver is the trends 
in public management: funders are embedded within government and respond to waves of ideas from 
various sources on how to demonstrate performance and how the funder “fits” within whole-of-
government initiatives. The third driver is research management: efforts to get “more” out of work 
funded from the public purse encouraged a shift from responsive to targeted funding and required that 
funders demonstrate how their grantmaking contributes to outcomes. This chapter begin by reviewing 
the extent to which each driver appears in the case studies.  
The chapter proceeds to elaborate on the turn all three countries experienced towards emulating 
markets as a means to justify and direct public investment in research. Information asymmetries plague 
the relationship between those that fund and those that perform research. Funders surmounted these 
asymmetries using professional staff that are proficient in research and enjoy some standing in the 
scientific community. Each funder is an intermediary: simultaneously an agent to government and 
principal to the scientific community. Over time funders lost some of their autonomy and were pressed 
to align with government priorities. Decision making shifted upwards and outwards as a wider set of 
actors gained influence over the definition and choice of research problems, strategies, and approaches. 
Yet researchers still choose whether to respond to or ignore different funding opportunities. The 
multiplication of research funding options at home and abroad rebalances the public research “market” 





The importance of this driver is in some ways self-evident: research funders cannot exist without money 
for their programs, and the rise and fall of budgets influence the scale of such programs. Less evident 
are the conditions placed upon access to public funding, both the expectations placed on the funder 
when it receives additional funding and the scrutiny it receives in times of austerity. In all three cases, 
funding research for the developing world was part of the government budget for official development 
assistance. Each of the funders grew when there were more aid dollars, and each experienced budget 
cuts when aid dollars declined. Yet the relationship was by no means directly proportional. Rising aid 
budgets did not automatically translate into more research funding: it required active engagement—
even lobbying—by managers and their allies, constantly reasserting the importance and value of such 
work. For IDRC and ACIAR, there was implicit competition with the aid agency in how to use foreign aid 
dollars, plus the need to canvass the support of the foreign ministry by linking their work to the foreign 
policy agenda. During budget cuts, the ability to mount a campaign in favor of research—rallying friends 
within and beyond the bureaucracy—helped preserve funding, or at least kept the cuts proportional to 
those experienced by others.  
Before the Second World War, the UK had firmly established programs for supporting research in and 
about its tropical colonies, underwriting the costs of local research facilities abroad and world-class 
centers of excellence at home. By mid-century, the shift to “overseas development” coincided with 
efforts to reduce overall costs by getting the former colonies to manage their own affairs. For research 
budgets, this meant scaling back on support to facilities abroad, encouraging the governments of the 
newly independent countries to assume the financial responsibility for running them. Up to the 1980s, 
the Overseas Development Administration funded a number of research institutes in the UK that 
specialized in research on the problems of developing countries; yet shifted from core funding to 
competitive work programmes in part to rationalize government expenditure. Later the precipitous rise 
of official development assistance in the 2000s enabled an even faster rise in research funding. Yet the 
New Labour government applied strict controls on the resources available for staffing and other internal 
costs, encouraging DFID to move from “retail to wholesale,” supporting larger projects. More recently, 
austerity budgets heightened the scrutiny placed on DFID, coinciding with a perspective that viewed 
research as evidence regarding the “value-for-money” of aid investments.  
In Canada, the fortunes of IDRC rose through its first two decades, but fell in the 1990s with the 
government’s efforts to rationalize Crown corporations and reduce the deficit. Under Bezanson, IDRC 
sought to reduce its reliance on government funding, contracting out its services and securing project 
co-funding from other sources. This helped mitigate the impact of a falling aid budget, yet meant that a 
share of resources was pre-committed to particular purposes. The first rise of IDRC’s budget in the late 
1990s was largely due to the special purpose allocation to the Micronutrient Initiative, and much of the 
later rise in funding was tied to demonstrating the Centre’s alignment to the government’s priorities in 
development policy. The Centre saved itself from some of the pain of budget cuts and shared in a rising 
aid budget, yet in both came with conditions, rather than core funding for the IDRC board to allocate in 
isolation.  
In Australia, ACIAR witnessed three periods of rapid growth separated by two periods of relatively flat 
budgets. For the first five years, ACIAR expanded to an early peak that coincided with the government’s 
austerity budget in 1986. While cutbacks were distributed widely across government, the experience 
inspired the creation of the Crawford Fund to assert the case for Australian investment in agricultural 
research. ACIAR successfully passed its sunset review to earn a new lease on life and rising budget, 
including responsibility for the country’s contribution to the CGIAR and other international centers. Yet 
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ACIAR also needed to align with the government’s geographic priorities, ending support to countries 
that attained middle-income status and engaging countries that were a foreign policy priority, either as 
science diplomacy (North Korea) or through the war of terror (Afghanistan and Iraq). A subsequent rise 
in budget came as part of Australia’s response to the global food crisis in 2008–09, and saw ACIAR even 
more tightly connected to a whole-of-government strategy on food security. 
The national science budget began to rise in all three countries in the 1990s, predating a subsequent rise 
in official development assistance in the 2000s. Yet science spending had little direct effect on monies 
dedicated to research for the developing world, which came predominately from foreign aid. Despite 
having the fact that their business was research grantmaking, the structure of government placed DFID, 
IDRC and ACIAR outside their country’s science portfolio. Yet rising science budget had an indirect 
impact, creating new funding programs and performance frameworks altering the incentives available 
for the scientific community at home. In the UK, parts of the now emboldened research community 
lobbied for greater use of science within DFID. In the UK and Canada, funders enhanced their 
cooperation with the granting councils in order to re-engage domestic researchers after a period of 
focusing predominately on catering to the needs of recipients abroad. In Australia, a rising science 
budget exposed ACIAR to greater competition for the attention of domestic researchers. It also 
encouraged new fields of science and “hollowed out” more traditional ones. Furthermore, as 
government scaled back its investment in rural R&D corporations, industry funding became more 
prominent, favoring shorter-term tactical goals over longer-term strategic aims, further altering the 
incentives and careers of Australia’s agricultural scientists. 
 
Public management 
The advent of new ideas on the purpose and role of government—and how to organize it—encouraged 
changes in funding research for the developing world. Yet old ideas remained influential even as the 
governance context embraced new ones.  
In the UK, Haldane’s original concern following the First World War was to ensure the country was 
proficient in new technologies that might prove decisive to future war efforts. He introduced the idea 
that government departments should have a budget line for research, to commission work that could 
directly inform or assist government in achieving its goals. Following the Second World War, the 
government shifted mindset from colonial administration to overseas development. The newly-created 
ODA was to maintain the UK science base, inheriting a diverse array of research centers specialized in 
the problems of tropical climates. From the 1970s, market-inspired thinking encouraged separation 
between those who commissioned research and those who performed it. Subsequently, Thatcher’s 
government pressed for privatizing previously public services, and dividing policy making from its 
implementation. By the early 1990s, ODA embraced these agendas and exited service delivery, 
progressively outsourcing research performance and spinning off its scientific units to stand on their 
own, merge into universities, or fold entirely. The Blair government’s push—for an evidence-based 
approach to policy—would once again reach fruition a decade later, encouraging DFID to shift the 
rationale of its research from a public good to an internal service. Whereas the new millennium began 
with a focus on contributing the international agenda beyond the UK, DFID subsequently focused part of 
its energy on informing the aid agency’s actions and investments. In each shift, support to research for 
the developing world responded to an existing idea within the governance context: whether separating 
customer and contractor or demonstrating “value for money” during times of austerity.  
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In Canada, the inspiration for IDRC came from the philanthropic foundations in the United States, 
including their independence from politics and government bureaucracy. Yet as a Crown corporation 
largely dependent on an appropriation from Parliament, government periodically attempted to reassert 
control. Before the end of its first decade, Cabinet began to question how IDRC fitted into Canada’s 
science and foreign policy. Scrutiny by Treasury Board encouraged the Centre to establish planning and 
evaluation functions, in line with then best practice in public management. The 1990s saw efforts to 
rationalize Crown corporations and a proposal to eliminate IDRC or convert it into a departmental 
corporation. The Centre avoided this fate by cultivating allies within the bureaucracy and associating 
itself with a new mandate to implement Agenda 21. This century emphasized alignment with the 
government’s priorities in aid and foreign policy. Initially applied to the annual increment of a rising aid 
budget, this test soon applied to the entire International Assistance Envelope (IAE) through the process 
of strategic reviews required by central agencies. As a Crown corporation, IDRC was both an insider and 
outsider to development policy and budget decisions. IDRC was allowed to make proposals and 
participate in discussions among bureaucrats, but was excluded from decision-making among deputy 
ministers. At the same time, the Centre was out-maneuvered in defining “development research” as the 
Department of Finance promoted innovative financing mechanisms, and outside proposals gained favor 
with Ministers. As a result, strategic decisions about program choice moved away from the Board of 
Governors, towards Cabinet and senior government officials.  
In Australia, the ACIAR Act initially limited the Centre to a twelve-year lifespan. This motivated 
management in two ways: first to continually show the benefit to Australians—both as participants and 
beneficiaries—and second to focus evaluation on demonstrating those benefits. In its early years, ACIAR 
estimated the potential value of increased productivity as a means to decide which crops represented 
the biggest potential gains from an investment in research. As the Centre’s first generation of projects 
came to fruition, attention shifted from ex ante estimates to ex post evaluation of research findings. 
After the Centre passed the sunset review, evaluation increasingly examined the real-life adoption of 
technologies, production techniques, and policies. In this century, ACIAR found its structure of thematic 
programs did not connect well to the country desks within the foreign ministry and aid agency. 
Management reinforced the geographic axis of its matrix management, seeking a “passport to engage” 
government colleagues and embassies. Central agencies converted the independent Board of 
Management into a Commission to advise the Minister, and ACIAR adopted the government practice of 
annual operational plans. Conceived as an autonomous statutory authority, ACIAR now had to justify its 
existence based on its fit within whole-of-government strategies and Australian foreign policy. 
In all three cases, politics at home in the Capital mattered. In Ottawa and Canberra, Strong and Crawford 
championed IDRC and ACIAR. These were high-level individuals who were well connected and well 
respected, adept at navigating the machinery of government in their respective countries. Both 
individuals were key to getting the founding legislation approved by Parliament and providing each 
young Centre with the autonomy to set their own program theory and grantmaking practice. They also 
continued to protect their creations at different times: Strong defended IDRC from proposals to change 
its status in 1992 and 1996, and Crawford’s posthumous legacy proved instrumental to ensuring ongoing 
support among parliamentarians. Over time, IDRC Presidents found their job to be as much about 
maintaining relationships at home as it was providing direction to their Centre’s program abroad. While 
a degree of proficiency in scientific research and knowledge of international development was useful, 
the CEO’s essential most important asset was a thick rolodex and network of contacts in key places 
across government, including the foreign ministry and central agencies.  
In the UK, research for the developing world benefited from both external and internal champions. 
Outside of government, the domestic scientific community was a key stakeholder and long-time 
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beneficiary of foreign aid spending. UK recipients accounted for 96% of total value of research grants 
made between 1990 and 1996. This portion fell to 46% of total value of grants between 2004 and 2010, 
the period when DFID untied aid and focused on the international agenda. The shift away from domestic 
research providers coincided with a fierce critique of the aid agency’s use of science, which prompted 
DFID to create the position of a Chief Scientific Advisor and to join the UK Collaborative of Development 
Sciences. Inside ODA, staff crafted each work programme to ease the transition for existing recipients 
while moving towards competitive funding. They sought to maintain their credibility within the aid 
agency, as well as their own standing in the scientific community. Later each Director of DFID research 
drew on their own backgrounds: Paul Spray massaged the Central Research Department together based 
on an intimate knowledge of the previous thematic programmes, Gordon Conway brought in a focus on 
platform technologies such as ICTs and genomics, while Chris Whitty imparted a model inspired by 
clinical medicine to provide inform development investments. Each was an active policy entrepreneur 
within the aid agency, picking up and acting upon certain signals within the governance context.  
In short, individuals and their leadership mattered. The governance context provided a setting in which 
these individuals found themselves, but they each played an active role in shaping how their 
organizations pursued research for the developing world. The performance regime and principal-agent 
relations influenced, but did not determine the program theory and grantmaking practice adopted. Over 
time, the ideas held—and choices made—by these leaders and their successors selectively responded to 
outside influences, incorporated some and ignoring others. Each organization embodied and built upon 
the visions of its founders. It is impossible to understand DFID, IDRC, or ACIAR without acknowledging 
the visions of Haldane, Hopper, and Crawford. Politics at home delimited, but underdetermined, both 
their founding vision and the organization’s subsequent evolution from this point of departure. 
Individual champions were left to give life to somewhat ambiguous mandates. They were the policy 
entrepreneurs that mobilized support within the bureaucracy—brokering between what government 
wanted done and what the research community wanted to do—while staying true to an altruistic vision 
of research for the developing world.      
 
Research policy 
The UK experienced the widest swings among the three countries. The work led by Haldane in the early 
20th century led to funding streams for both block grants to universities and project funding to 
researchers. Over time, the scientific community established a “Haldane principle” of self-governance 
guided by peer review and the Mertonian norms of communality, universality, disinterestedness, 
originality, and skepticism. Scientists saw the government as a benign benefactor, providing the 
resources for them to carry out their work. Yet Haldane was not to catering to scientists, his aim was to 
ensure the country had domestic expertise in new technologies that might prove vital in world affairs. 
Beyond university grants and research councils, his ideas inspired research budgets within line 
departments for commissioning work the government needed. Rothschild later altered the governance 
context, introducing the market-inspired “customer-contractor” principle. Government departments 
were expected to become intelligent consumers, specifying exactly what they needed from the research 
community, and demanding a competitive price for that service. While domestic science and 
international development were separate portfolios, ODA and DFID held Haldane-inspired research 
budgets and were subject to evolving ideas regarding how government was to use this budget.  
A number of shifts are particularly prominent in this evolution. First was a shift from responsive to 
targeted funding: from responding to the interests of the scientific community—based on their curiosity 
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and professional consensus about original and promising avenues of work—to instead encouraging work 
on the interests of government—based on the department’s needs or perception of public good. Second 
was a shift from intellectual steward to intelligent consumer. Parts of the scientific community related to 
a department’s mandate were considered a close ally worthy of support, whether in the fields of 
defense, health, or development. Yet with the advent of the Rothschild principle, researchers were re-
cast as distant consultants, to be managed through contractual relations. All three countries 
progressively scaled back the portion of science spending dedicated to work performed within 
government departments and labs, accentuating the predominance of universities as the primary 
location of public research. 
The UK did not simply abandon Haldane in favor of Rothschild. These names provide useful shorthand 
for describing extremes of self-governance and market-inspired governance, yet the two coexisted, 
being championed and undermined by different actors at different times. Notably there were delays in 
implementing new policy directions. Over a decade passed between Rothschild’s call for “customer-
contractor” relations and ODA spinning off its scientific units and adopting competitive funding 
mechanisms. Even then, the relationship with the scientific community was not entirely arm’s-length as 
the work programmes initially sought to soften the blow and reduce dependency on core funding from 
government. Government officials also turned to researchers for assistance in identifying the 
government’s needs and crafting the terms of references for future funding opportunities. A similar 
decade-long time lag separated Blair’s original call for evidence-based policymaking and the fruition of 
this agenda under Cameron. While DFID focused inward, UK researchers looked outwards. The 
department wanted to assess the “value-for-money” of its programming, while researchers needed to 
demonstrate their contributions to the scientific literature through publications that counted towards 
the Research Assessment Exercise. Tenure and publication motivated the research community, 
mitigating somewhat the aims of government departments.  
This century was both Rothschild’s triumph and Haldane’s revenge: a dynamic tension between what 
government wanted done and what researchers were interested in doing. Government departments 
were a modest part of the overall funding landscape, allowing self-governance to survive and thrive. The 
scientific community used exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) when they were dissatisfied with the 
offerings on hand from government departments. Talented researchers would simply ignoring 
departmental funding when the conditions onerous or misaligned from their own interests or career 
goals. The scientific community used its voice to assist officials in crafting calls for proposals and to apply 
lobby Parliament for certain approaches to research policy. Finally—almost as a last resort—researchers 
demonstrated loyalty by aligning and evolving their efforts to what ODA or DFID required.  
While most prominent in the UK, efforts to create a marketplace was also present in Canada and 
Australia. Over time, IDRC adopted competitive calls for proposals with explicit deadlines, eligibility, and 
selection criteria, in contrast to its original “foundation” approach that was more open-ended, seeking 
out some proposals, and selectively responding to others. ACIAR was persisted with this approach, 
believing that staff needed to be involved in crafting the projects to ensure mutual benefit between 
participants at home and abroad. Yet similar to the UK, academic incentives became more influential in 
shaping a researcher’s career prospects making these grants less attractive relative to newer funding 
opportunities.  
Governments sought to establish demand for research and encouraged funders to identify with “client” 
needs. Certain fields were selected based on their perceived relevance to national interests, or the 
relative strengths of the scientific community at home compared to other countries. Recipients were 
expected to collaborate with an audience of potential “users” and to demonstrate how their work 
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contributed to social or economic benefit. ODA and IDRC sharpened their use of targeted programs: 
from an initially broad focus on particular disciplines towards a narrow set of problems. For example 
funding for agriculture and health gradually evolved into specific funding envelopes for reducing 
micronutrient deficiency and combating specific “killer” diseases. In this way, funders sought to 
demonstrate that their grant portfolios addressed real-world concerns, rather than merely responding 
to researcher curiosity. DFID and IDRC also emphasized the uptake (or “utilization”) of research results: 
recipients needed to identify and reach an audience of policymakers and practitioners. All three funders 
became progressively more explicit in arguing how the research they funded contributed to 
development outcomes.  
In Australia, the government interpreted the increasing presence of industry funding and industrial 
partners as indicating “demand” for research. Yet it arguably pushed publicly-funded research from 
longer-term strategic goals, such as developing new crops and technologies, towards shorter-term 
tactical goals, such as incremental enhancements to existing technologies. Initially burdened by its 
image as a “university without students”, CSIRO improved its standing with government by restructuring 
around “challenge programs” with audacious goals expressed as a specific target. “Demand” was tied to 
national priorities, such as enhancing the efficient use of scarce water on a dry continent.  
In the UK, research was originally a service to former colonies, through support to scientific units abroad 
and centers at home that specialized in tropical climates. Yet over two decades, the aid agency shifted 
from considering itself as a “proxy consumer” for developing countries, to instead becoming the “client” 
for the research. In contrast, neither Canada nor Australia had a historic specialization of research on 
the problems facing developing countries, allowing the founders of IDRC and ACIAR to shape these 
organizations as they saw fit. Yet the lack of a domestic constituency meant research for the developing 
world was less visible and inherently vulnerable to government cutbacks. As few voters depended on 
IDRC or ACIAR for their livelihood, each organization needed to rally a network of allies within the 
bureaucracy or among parliamentarians.  
Yet both organizations linked to, and were affect by, research policy. Neither IDRC nor ACIAR was 
directly funded by their country’s science budget, but found refuge in the language provided in national 
science strategy. In their respective annual reports, IDRC highlighted how its program choice matched 
the perceived strengths of Canada’s research community, while ACIAR described its work in terms of the 
national research priorities. Science policy provided an additional source of legitimacy, when foreign 
policy priorities of the day was less conducive to research for the development world. More importantly, 
research policy mattered because it reshaped the scientific community, altering the career paths 
available to scientists at home and the incentives for working abroad.  
Table 6.1: Comparison of governance contexts 
 Drivers that encourage funders to adjust their programs 




● Move away from colonial 
administration to reduce 
expenses  
● Treasury imposes 
controls on internal 
spending 
● Rising aid budget in 
2000s 
● Government as intelligent 
consumer 
● Progressive outsourcing: 
retain funding & privatize 
performing 
● Pressure to demonstrate 
value for money  
● Haldane principle of 
researcher autonomy  
● Rothschild principle of 
customer-contractor  












● Rise with aid budget & fall 
with cutbacks  
● Earmarking funds to 
special purposes  
● Align with aid priorities to 
access new funding 
● Adopt planning & 
evaluation functions  
● Crown corporation outside 
policymaking & eroding 
Board independence   
● Outside proposals gain 
traction at ministerial level 
● Shift from selecting 
projects to designing 
programs as  portfolio of 
projects 
● Pressure to show that 
research is applied & 
responds to “demand” 
● Increased use of 








● Austerity budget in 1986 
inspires Crawford Fund 
● Access to funds 
contingent on being 
“useful” to Minister  
● Follow aid policy in exiting 
middle-income countries 
and entering fragile states 
● Sunset clause creates 
need to show results 
within ten years 
● “Fit” within whole-of 
government strategies  
● Autonomous Board 
converted into Advisory 
Commission 
● Industrial funding of public 
research pushes shorter-
term tactical issues 
● Research moves from 
government departments 
to higher education  
● Shift from responsive to 
targeted funding  
 
Emulating markets, eroding autonomy  
The above changes in the resources available, public management, and research policy describe an 
overall shift toward more market-inspired governance. The advent of a neoliberal values as the 
justification for government action affected the rationale used to justify public investment in research. 
Official development assistance partially shielded DFID, IDRC, and ACIAR from these expectations, 
nonetheless each organization received an infusion of market-based vocabulary and thinking from its 
surroundings. By the early 2000s, existing funders found their “market share” eroding as government 
chose to invest its rising science and aid budgets elsewhere. All three organizations lost their monopoly 
over the government’s funding of research for the developing world, as new mechanisms emerged and 
outside ideas competed for policy space and budget. In the UK, the UK Collaborative of Development 
Science positioned the research councils and line departments as alternative channels for delivering 
funds and services. Grand Challenges Canada arose as a new voice implicitly competing with IDRC, while 
AusAID and CSIRO bypassed ACIAR to collaborate on biosciences in East Africa.  
Each funder requires a pool of candidates within the scientific community willing to apply for its grants. 
The funder provides a set of incentives to researchers to conduct work, at the same time individual 
researchers strive to define and pursue their own careers, choosing among, and drawing upon different 
sources of funding. A researcher’s work surpasses the limits of any one project or grant, yet researchers 
rely on these as building blocks to construct their longer-term career path in a bricolage fashion. The 
increases in the budget of the research granting councils diminished the relative weight of DFID, IDRC, 
and ACIAR. Being a Canada Research Chair or part of a Cooperative Research Centre carried greater 
prestige and arguably fewer constraints than a grant from IDRC or ACIAR. In the UK, recipients had little 
incentive to, or reward from, coordinating the work of others in a consortium or consulting work that 
responds to the department’s knowledge needs. 
The UK explicitly attempted to set up a marketplace between the demand of departmental needs and 
the supply of presumably numerous potential providers in the scientific community. Yet the market 
analogy is imperfect due to a lack of competition and independence. First, by definition, there are only a 
limited number of providers in specialized fields of science, giving rise to a supply that is more 
monopsony than competitive. For extremely specialized pursuits, such as a locust control research, it 
was arguably more efficient to have one national or world-class center than support multiple competing 
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efforts. Second, the research market is plagued by information asymmetries, such that government 
required skilled researchers to identify its knowledge needs and understand the potential opportunities 
for science to address them. Government officials could tender for research services blindly, but risked 
asking the impossible or casting researchers as mere consultants.   
The three funders surmounted information asymmetries through in-house scientific expertise, staff who 
were themselves proficient in research and who enjoyed some standing in the scientific community. This 
made the funder a more “intelligent consumer,” striving to be simultaneously independent of, and 
connected to, the scientific community. Staff had dual identities, coming from the world of research, but 
working “on the other side” as grantmakers. They sought to maintain their standing and credibility in 
the world of research, to which they might return to at a later stage in their career. In this respect, the 
links of principal-agent relations are not merely one-way lines of authority and control, but two-way 
processes of negotiation and accommodation. The scientific community could and did speak back to 
government, in part through funding agencies that as intermediaries sensitive to both sides. In this 
respect, the daily tasks and responsibilities of staff offered a richer set of insights than simply studying 
the funder’s corporate strategy.  
IDRC and ACIAR were initially granted the autonomy to express a distinct identity openly and proudly. 
Similarly research was initially given pride of place when DFID was established. Yet the governance 
context surrounding all three funders progressively became less tolerant of such autonomy. The shift 
toward market-inspired governance eroded the political support for a distinct mandate, forcing each of 
these organizations to find more covert ways to pursue their work. Each funder modified their strategies 
and grantmaking to more closely match what was politically viable at the time. For DFID and IDRC, 
important shifts occurred over the 1980s and 2000s. In contrast to the IDRC Act twelve years previous, 
which focused on building capacity abroad, ACIAR’s founding legislation focused on mobilizing the 
domestic research community for mutual benefit at home and abroad. This vision could more readily 
pass through Australian Parliament at the time than the more altruistic Canadian mandate.  
Over time, each funder became increasingly embedded within government policy. Setting corporate 
strategy was initially an open-ended exercise under which funders largely determined their own goals 
and program design. Yet this autonomy eroded as central agencies reasserted control, conditions were 
placed on the access to new money, funders were pressed to align with government priorities, and fit 
their efforts within “whole of government” strategies. Decision making shifted beyond the funder’s 
board and management, upwards toward minister’s offices and outwards towards other parts of the 
governance context. This was a gradual shift, punctuated with tipping points reflected in modifications 
to the founding legislation and reductions in the powers and size of board and management. This shift 
matches a wider trend of outside actors gaining influence over the definition and choice of research 
problems, strategies, and approaches supported with public money (Whitley 2011). Funders were left 
with reduced discretionary space and operated under constraints that limited their ability to manage 
strategically (Poister, Pitts and Edwards 2010).  
Yet each organization continued to pursue its vision of research, even when the policy environment was 
less than favorable to that vision. One means of coping was to connect to other government priorities 
while remaining true to their core beliefs and the integrity of their research agenda. Analogous to 
private companies responding to diverse consumer demands, each research funder had to choose 
whether to diversify its offerings or focus on its core product. ODA and DFID were very responsive: 
reinventing its research division and diversifying its grantmaking with changes in leadership, rising 
budgets, and new demands in the governance context. IDRC was moderately responsive, adding 
thematic programs and grantmaking mechanisms to reflect the perceived demands in developing 
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countries and within Canadian foreign policy. As the smallest of the three case studies, ACIAR remained 
the most specialized, both in terms of thematic focus on agriculture and dedication to downstream 
application, even as the pool of Australian research providers began to privilege the upstream science of 
genomics.  
Each funder was an intermediary: simultaneously an agent to government and principal to the research 
community. They formed a link in a chain of principal-actor relationships between government and the 
scientific communities at home and abroad. Each competed for government money against alternative 
uses of public funds, and competed for the attention of researchers against alternative demands for 
their time and ideas. This was not a passive role, as each funder actively brokered opportunities that 
satisfied the interests on both sides, and could not afford to alienate either side completely. Changes in 
performance regime occasionally inspired the funder to revise how it contributed to the government’s 
agenda. Thus the funder catered to different actors in the governance context, alternatively finding 
favor within science and foreign policy priorities or among central agencies.  
Each funder actively shaped a role for itself between government and the scientific community, finding 
allies and building a coalition that provided financial resources, political support, and an audience of 
grant seekers willing to engage in its programs. On the surface, the different periods of time identified in 
the case studies reflect a shift in funder program theory following a change in the governance context. 
Yet these changes also represent a realignment of coalition: the sets of actors that provided the funder 
with its sustenance, substance, and legitimacy. The language of market competition and demand was 
adopted in the governance context, and by the funders themselves. Yet the image of a discrete 
marketplace for research was an illusion. Funders were not independent purchasers of knowledge 
among perfectively competitive providers, but the political interface between government and scientific 
communities, at home and abroad.  
Universities became the predominant location for public research as governments scaled back on the 
number and size of government-owned centers and labs. This introduced a tension for domestic 
researchers, between how performance was measured within academia and how it was assessed by 
DFID, IDRC, or ACIAR. These funders embraced a growing list of expectations intended to enhance 
“development impact,” requiring grantees to do more than merely good science, in a single discipline, 
accepted by their peers. Best practice was redefined to incorporate insights and methods from multiple 
disciplines, enhance the skills of developing country partners, communicate with lay audiences of 
policymakers and practitioners, and demonstrate that their work is used to benefit the lives of poor 
women and men. Yet the career prospects for many researchers was shaped by the need to 
demonstrate frequent, original, specialized, and highly-cited contributions to their chosen field. Some 
researchers escape this bind by working with non-governmental organizations or policy think tanks, 
where the expectations of their individual performance aligned with the aims of influencing policy and 
informing practice. Overall where a previous generation of domestic researchers pursued a career-long 
specialized in the problems of the development world, for many it is now something altruistic and fun, 
only to be entertained once their academic career is firmly established.  
In many developing countries, funding from abroad still provides a significant share of the overall 
funding available for research. There is less tension between the funder’s expectations of “development 
impact” and the interests of the local scientific community, as catering to the latter is seen as an indirect 
contribution to the former. This was especially so during times when funders privileged “capacity 
building.” Yet an increasing number of developing countries have established their own granting 
councils and funding agencies which provide new opportunities for local scientists and reduce their 
reliance on foreign funders. Whether at home or abroad, any source of funding requires researchers to 
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balance between responding to the funder’s priorities and expectations—perhaps at the cost of 
modifying their own research interests—or foregoing the offer of potential resources. The multiplication 
of research funding options at home and abroad rebalances the public research “market”, requiring 




On the surface, it appears axiomatic that funding organizations adapt to changes in the governance 
context. Yet the consequences of this adaptation means that program theory—the generalized 
understanding underpinning the funder’s change model—is influenced by the performance expectations 
of other actors, including aid agencies, foreign ministries, other line ministries, central agencies, and 
even the Prime Minister’s agenda. Evaluation theory expects a logical framework to be constructed in a 
step-wise fashion, starting with objectives, and proceeding to activities, outputs, and outcomes. Yet the 
case studies suggest programs are partially constructed to bridge government priorities on one side and 
the interest of scientific communities on the other side. Objectives and outcomes are predetermined by 
the policy process. The funder must craft a program theory that provides space for researchers to 
populate funding opportunities with activities that bridge these predetermined objectives and 
outcomes. Information asymmetries plague the relationship between those that fund and those that 
perform research. Funders surmounted these asymmetries using professional staff that are proficient in 
research and enjoy some standing in the scientific community. Each funder is an intermediary: 
simultaneously an agent to government and principal to the scientific community. 
All three funders faced changing expectations of their performance and eroding independence within 
government. The governance context turned towards emulating markets as a means to justify and direct 
public investment in research. Funders selectively adopted market-based thinking into their work and 
were exposed to greater competition in their quest to access government funding. Multiplying, and 
often conflicting, expectations threatened to “wag the dog” as performance management regimes 
circumscribed the space available to managers to pursue their mandate. Over time funders lost some of 
their autonomy and were pressed to fit their efforts within “whole of government” strategies. Decision 
making shifted upwards and outwards as a wider set of actors gained influence over the definition and 
choice of research problems, strategies, and approaches. Yet in another sense, research funders fought 
back, drawing legitimacy from different areas of public policy and reshaping their policy environment.  
Simultaneously researchers still choose whether to respond to or ignore different funding opportunities. 
The multiplication of research funding options at home and abroad rebalances the public research 
“market” as funders must compete for scarce talent, as much as researchers compete for scarce 
funding. 
Looking back: program theory and grantmaking practice 
Each of the three funding organizations adapted to changes in the governance context by altering their 
program theories and grantmaking practice: the “change model” of how research was understood to 
contribute to development, and the “action model” of how the funder supported that contribution. The 
previous chapter focused on the governance context surrounding funders: changes in the resources 
available, public management, and research policy. Yet these drivers did not determine program theory 
and grantmaking practice. Funders were selective, responding to some signals and ignoring others. This 
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chapter examines how organizations exercised their own agency in deciding whether—and how—to 
adapt to a changing context.  
Recall the concepts of program theory and grantmaking practice introduced in chapter two. Program 
theory is the proposed casual explanation of how the organization’s activities are intended to contribute 
to real-world results, while grantmaking practice is what actually happens in terms of everyday routines 
informed in part by past experience. Program theory is comparable to Chen’s (2005) “change model” of 
the determinants understood to cause a problem the organization seeks to address, and the 
interventions employed by the organization to affect those determinants. Program theory is embedded 
in sometimes ill-defined philosophy and ethos of how the organizations understood “research for the 
developing world”. In contrast, grantmaking practice is related to Chen (2005) “action model” consisting 
of delivery protocols, plans for arranging the organization, and efforts to ensure a supportive 
environment. This practice evolved over time, including shifts in who received funding, and is encoded 
into the daily routines of employees and the values that motivated them. 
Each of the case study organizations persisted over time, adapting to substantial change in the 
governance context, including periods of limited resources, new ideas in public management, and a 
market-inspired shift in research policy. IDRC and ACIAR showed remarkable consistency in how they 
organized their grantmaking despite some variation in corporate strategies and priorities. This reveals an 
ability to preserve elements of their business even while responding to a changing context, more 
evolution rather than reinvention. In contrast, ODA/DFID fluctuated more widely, reflecting its more 
vulnerable position as part of a government department rather than a stand-alone, for-purpose 
organization.  
All three organizations were active participants in the governance context shaping the policy space 
conducive for their mandate. These were not passive actors simply responding to the whimsical 
expectations of diverse stakeholders. They persisted in part due to an ability to mount arguments in 
favor of their way of doing business. In the UK, willingly or not, ODA/DFID was embroiled in the larger 
debates on research policy. In Canada, IDRC periodically formed and renewed a network of allies across 
the federal government reaching beyond foreign aid, to provide an early warning of policy discussions 
and funding decisions that might affect the Centre. In Australia, the Crawford Fund worked to renew 
public and political support for agricultural research in general, and ACIAR’s mission in particular. Each 
funding organization engaged government to create a favorable policy environment. The links of 
principal-agent relations flow both ways, influencing both sides. In other words, the performance regime 
both drives, and is affected by, the funder’s program theory and grantmaking practice.    
Program theory  
At a corporate-level, the notions of how research contributes to development were often stated in 
general terms and did not meet the test of an explicit theory of change (Funnell and Rogers 2011) or 
detailed change model (Chen 2005). Such detailed logic was often delegated to the project or program 
level. Yet looking at the organization as a whole, one can identify general thrusts that subsequently 
guided grantmaking decisions of who received funding and what their activities were expected to 
achieve.   
An initial vision guided each of the three organizations in the period before explicit corporate strategies. 
In the UK, Haldane provided that government departments should have a separate line item for 
research, and ODA inherited the colonial legacy of a research community at home specialized in the 
problems of tropical climates abroad. In Canada, Strong and Hopper saw the young IDRC focus on the 
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second part of its mandate, building the capacity of developing countries researchers. In Australia, 
Crawford and McWilliam responded to the political reality of the times by focusing ACIAR on mutual 
benefit, including the application of findings at home. IDRC and ACIAR were established as for-purpose 
corporations, at arm’s-length from government, in the belief that R4D was longer-term and required 
fundamentally different skills compared to the aid agency or foreign ministry. Each of the three funders 
began funding projects in general themes, yet over time adopted incrementally more detailed program 
theories.  
At any given time, each organization had a particular perspective on research was to contribute to the 
developing world and what it was expected to achieve. This broad narrative provided the umbrella for 
different programs to elaborate more detailed explanations of how their work contributed to change. 
Research for the developing world was not aimless: corporate strategies were somewhat vague, but 
encompassed programs in which staff invested substantial time and effort in planning, implementing, 
and refining. In other words, program theory tended to exist more at the program level, naturally 
enough, rather with the corporate strategy providing a framework for multiple program theories that 
coexisted at any one time.  
In the UK, the initial focused was on science at home, maintaining highly-qualified people and already 
established centers. Program theory evolved in response to the Rothschild expectation of being an 
“intelligent consumer,” and began to offer competitive funding for projects towards outcomes of 
interest to the aid agency. Since 1997, three distinct program theories cascaded through DFID. The first 
saw research as a public good contributing to the global development agenda created in coordination 
with other donors. The second was the promise of technology—particularly genomics and ICTs—which 
was open to the scientific community beyond those that self-identified as working on international 
development. The third emulated clinical medicine expecting research to provide evidence on what is 
needed and what works. Yet as each new program theory cascaded through the organization, it did not 
completely displace previous ones, leading to multiple grantmaking practices. For example, DFID 
continued to provide core funding to the Overseas Development Institution despite long abandoning a 
commitment to maintain the UK science base. Furthermore, DFID continued to fund vaccine research 
despite the recent focus on evidence to inform internal decision making. A growing research budget 
provided space for multiple program theories to coexist and thrive.  
In Canada, IDRC remained close to the Strong-Hopper vision of building the capacity of developing 
country researchers. After the first two decades, this emphasis was interpreted by Bezanson as 
“empowerment though knowledge.” Underneath this consistency in goal, the Centre refined its 
understanding of what made a project successful in contributing to development, preferring applied and 
interdisciplinary research with clear plans for utilization. Consequently, IDRC moved away from basic or 
disciplinary research that did not appear to have an audience. Cutbacks in the 1990s triggered a 
substantial restructuring, dissolving the old divisions of agriculture, health, information, and social 
sciences and replacing them with problem-based programs related to the post-Rio agenda of 
“sustainable and equitable development.” This move saw the Centre adopt program-level evaluation 
that required staff to prepare progressively more detailed program theories. The objective of policy 
influence subsequently took prominence over capacity building, and the Centre began to seek additional 
for-purpose funding from within Canada and from other donors. IDRC adopted a mantra of “innovating 
for development” yet continued to see its business as “grants-plus” support developing country 
researchers. The advent of the Internet shifted the program officer’s role from “wandering minstrel”—
providing access to scientific literature and contacts not available locally— to “engaged peer” supporting 
the research interests of recipients. 
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In Australia, ACIAR remained rooted in the concept of “mutual benefit.” The Centre started with the 
agricultural needs of developing countries, and elaborated on promising project ideas if there was a 
local partner abroad to work with, the potential benefits outweighed project costs, and there was an 
Australian partner with some advantage in the discipline. With similar coastal and dryland climates as 
parts of Asia and Africa, Australian experience and expertise were directly applicable for enhancing 
farming abroad. This was explicit in how ACIAR sought to strengthen Australia’s relation to the 
international agricultural research centers, and to bridge between Australia’s innovation system and 
development assistance program. The role of research coordinators was to assess the needs abroad and 
broker partnerships with talent at home. ACIAR expected its staff to be top minds in their respective 
fields, joining the Centre for a limited time—as a secondment from government departments and 
universities—rather than career specialists in international development. ACIAR initially focused on 
particular crops or species, and later evolved to support work on farming systems, soil conservation, and 
reducing the use of pesticides. Meanwhile the Centre’s evaluation effort shifted emphasis from 
estimating the potential value of improved production to measuring the real-life adoption rates of new 
techniques and technology. When poverty reduction became more prominent in aid policy, ACIAR 
strengthening its work on market chains and boosting income for the rural poor. Similar to DFID, new 
perspectives did not completely displace older thinking, but rather Centre’s work combined efforts 
toward improved production, environmental conservation, and poverty reduction.  
 
Grantmaking practice  
Changes in program theory translated imperfectly into grantmaking practice, or the daily routines of the 
organization. It is one thing to espouse a new set of priorities or program theories; it is another thing to 
implement them within grantmaking practices. In chapter two, grantmaking practice was described in 
terms of: selection criteria guiding the choice among potential recipients and proposals, the role of staff 
in the research process, the portfolio of grants made by the funder, and the implications for the 
research community.  
In the UK, changes in program theory had direct consequences for grantmaking. ODA’s initial selection 
criteria was based on the historic relationships with institutes at home and abroad. To rationalize these 
relationships, ODA shifted from core funding to project funding for institutes, which were expected to 
provide at least part of their own operating costs. The shift to competitive calls ought to have 
encouraged the entry of new actors, yet the pool of recipients contracted as some entities were merged 
together or with universities, and others ceased to exist. As the government rationalized the public 
sector, ODA’s scientific units were spun off to fend for themselves. The Administration became 
exclusively a research funder, losing the ability for in-house research. Meanwhile the staff role of a 
“research advisor” evolved. Initially focused on engaging the scientific community outside of 
government, staff became grant managers monitoring the performance of recipients and in-house 
subject-matter experts within the Ministry. Within DFID, a tension emerged between the London-based 
department responsible for research, and the bilateral programmes in the field responsible for the 
majority of spending.  
With the creation of DFID, the selection criteria initially shifted to focus on contributing to the 
international development agenda beyond the UK, with an increase in funding to research abroad. 
Where domestic recipients accounted for 96% of the value of grants during 1990–96, they were just 46% 
in 2004–10. Funding followed the logic of focusing on poorer countries, emphasizing work in South Asia 
and Eastern Africa. DFID introduced new modalities into its grantmaking. The first was Research 
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Programme Consortia, bringing together multiple recipients at home and abroad, around a shared 
agenda aligned with DFID’s priorities, and involving larger amounts of funding. The second was to 
partner with the UK research councils, which required the participation of UK scientists and saw 
scientific merit return to prominence in the selection criteria. Under DFID, research funding opened to a 
diverse set of recipients at home and abroad, including scientists who had skills that could apply to the 
needs of poor people, regardless of whether they had specialized in poor countries.  
Over time, recipients needed to satisfy an increasing number of expectations beyond merely producing 
research that was of acceptable scientific quality and relevant to the needs of developing countries. For 
example, agricultural sciences experienced a period in the 1980–90s that privileged participatory 
methods involving farmers in the research process, while the health sciences witnessed a rise of a “one 
world” understanding of global health and universal expectations of what constituted ethical research. 
Beyond merely performing “good science” with the potential for development impact, recipients were 
to play a role in realizing that potential: becoming effective communicators to help get “research into 
use”. Beyond generating new knowledge and technologies, projects were expected to actually deliver 
development, demonstrating their contribution to outcomes such as raised incomes and improved well-
being. Within Research Programme Consortia, principal investigators took on a managerial role: 
coordinating multiple activities, involving multiple participants, across multiple institutes. Meanwhile 
other grants—particularly those aimed at informing DFID actions—cast researchers as consultants, 
synthesizing existing knowledge rather than conducting original research. 
In Canada, IDRC sought to emulate the approach used by philanthropic foundations. Program officers 
would identify and encourage potential recipients, even engaging with them in proposal writing. The 
Centre also responded to unsolicited proposals submitted by researchers seeking support for their ideas. 
Emphasis was placed on the originality of a project idea, its potential contributions to a particular 
discipline, and its perceived relevance to the problems facing the developing regions of the world. After 
restructuring in the 1990s, staff received the delegated authority to approve projects that fit within a 
Board-approved program, placing the emphasis on constructing a portfolio of projects that contributed 
towards this a defined program strategy.  
IDRC consistently favored recipients based in developing countries, accounting for between 82% and 
98% of the amount of grants made. The introduction of competitive calls saw IDRC express its selection 
criteria explicitly, including relevance to development priorities, the quality of research design and 
methods, and experience and qualifications of the applicants. Following cutbacks in the 1990s, the 
search for additional funding meant that outside interests became more influential in IDRC’s program 
choice. Programs flourished in part due to their ability to attract support from donor agencies and 
philanthropic foundations, or to secure part of Canada’s expanding aid budget. Yet rather than identify a 
select number of “focus countries,” IDRC sought to address problems common to multiple countries or 
that spilled across borders.  
IDRC also multiplied the expectations it placed on recipients. The initial emphasis on capacity building 
meant the Centre expected projects to generate new skills and strengthen local institutions. IDRC did 
not require “world-class” research outputs, but rather sought to improve local researchers through 
greater experience and stronger connections with—and contribution to—the international scientific 
community. Over time, IDRC expected projects to adopt interdisciplinary research designs, influence 
policy abroad, and contribute to positive change in the lives of poor women and men. IDRC further 
expected recipients to be good communicators: to reach policymakers and practitioners, rather than 
merely scientific peers.    
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In Australia, ACIAR remained consistent in its partnership model of commissioning projects in response 
to agricultural needs abroad, identified by staff in their travels and by the developing country 
governments. Staff sought out expertise at home and brokered partnerships with local institutes abroad. 
Project approval depended on passing an in-house review process that subjected proposals to cross-
disciplinary critique, leading to modifications in research design to incorporate additional disciplines or 
participants. ACIAR concentrated the bulk of its support in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and privileged 
project development whenever a region was underrepresented in the geographic distribution of grants. 
The Centre also supported projects that engaged key countries in Australia’s foreign policy, including 
Papua New Guinea, East Timor, North Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  
In contrast to the other two funders, ACIAR retained a narrow set of expectations, namely that its 
recipients would do “good science”, transferring skills and experiences, and producing results that were 
useful abroad. ACIAR collected studies on the economic value of successful projects, and later on the 
adoption rates of a random sample of projects. Recipients were expected to contribute to the projects 
costs both through in-kind and financial contributions. This was intended to ensure commitment on 
behalf of each participant, but became increasingly difficult at home as Australian researchers had less 
‘free’ resources to invest and were encouraged to charge the full cost of their activities.  
The ACIAR portfolio initially included a number of state-level departments of agriculture, yet evolved as 
the centre of gravity in Australia’s public research system shift from government to universities. The 
Centre’s projects tended to focus downstream on field-level application, yet the agricultural sciences 
became increasingly upstream and bench-based with the genomics revolution. ACIAR relied on the 
altruism of Australian researchers and their interest in “doing good” abroad, yet with these same 
researchers face the academic requirements of “publish, patent, or perish.” Dedicating substantial time 
and effort to working with less proficient peers abroad distracts from this imperative, forcing ACIAR to 
compete harder to attract the interest of Australian researchers.   
Table 7.1: Funders as adaptive organizations 
 How research was defined and funded 
 Program theory  Grantmaking practices 
UK ● Maintain UK science base  
● Government as intelligent consumer 
● Contribute to development agenda  
● New technologies & evidence to 
inform aid 
 
● From core support to competitively-
tendered projects  
● Majority of funding to UK institutions 
● Staff as grant administrator & in-house 
expert  
● Multiplying expectations of recipients 
 
Canada ● Build research capacity abroad 
● Empowerment through knowledge 
● Influence policy abroad 
● “Grants-plus” model of opportunity, 
engagement, and access  
 
● Support local researcher interests  
● Majority of funding to institutions abroad 
● Staff as talent scout & knowledge broker  
● Multiplying expectations of recipients 
 
Australia ● Support mutual benefit with Australia  
● Build on “research advantage” at 
home 
● Rally evidence on increased 
production, economic value, & 
adoption rates  
 
● Partnership model of commissioned 
projects, involve providers at home & 
abroad 
● Staff identify research problems & talent 






Changes in grantmaking  
The choices funders make affect who gets funding to do what, privileging certain lines of research over 
other. The advent of market-inspired governance prompted all three funders to identify a source of 
“demand” which encouraged shorter time horizons. This accentuated two sets of changes in their 
grantmaking practices. First was a shift in who received funding, moving away from governmental 
recipients in favor of working more with academic institutions, NGOs, international organizations, and 
even private sector. Second was the point of delivery, moving away from rural field sites in the 
developing world, towards more work in laboratories on platform technologies and in urban capitals on 
policy advocacy.  
Demand in the UK was defined by the needs of the government department over time. Initially this need 
was to sustain scientific expertise and infrastructure at home and in former colonies abroad. 
Subsequently, the department cast itself as a proxy client for developing countries, shaping a research 
agenda and purchasing knowledge and technologies that responded to perceived needs abroad. This 
peaked with the advent of DFID and the untying of aid, during which funding shifted from privileging 
fields in which the UK was perceived to excel, to instead contributing towards a global research agenda 
for international development negotiated through the UN, OECD, and other multilateral fora. 
Subsequently, DFID aimed to satisfy its own demand for evidence—becoming a direct client rather than 
a proxy client—to inform the design of bilateral development assistance. In the case of systematic 
reviews, DFID moved to purchasing a synthesis of existing knowledge, rather than funding the creation 
of new knowledge.  
The timeframe for research activities was compressed; projects were expected to translate into 
development outcomes more quickly. Whereas the UK once funded decade-long research strategies, 
grants now require annual or quarterly reports demonstrating progress towards the promised results. 
The governance context requires quicker results from research. In terms of recipients, academic 
institutions continuously played a sizable role in the ODA-DFID portfolio, yet the recent emphases on 
platform technologies and policy influence witnessed an increased funding to laboratories and think 
tanks. The Chief Scientific Advisor and work with the UK research councils led DFID to engage scientists 
engaged in platform technologies, such as genomics, ICTs and climate modelling, regardless of their 
experience in developing countries. Meanwhile the shift to consortia grants and funding international 
initiatives favored recipients with the administrative capacity to coordinate large budgets and multiple 
sub-grantees.   
In Canada, IDRC was founded on the conviction that local research capacity was a public good worth 
nurturing for its own sake. Yet over time, IDRC encouraged its recipients to respond to some form of 
local “demand” for research and this became an explicit part of the selection criteria. Recipients were 
required to demonstrate this ex ante and ex post demand: that the problems examined were relevant to 
local stakeholders, and that the results of the research reached—and used by—a local audience. This 
mirrored a rising expectation in Canada that publicly-funded research would contribute to socio-
economic benefit. IDRC also moved towards shorter time horizons, with more frequent turnover in its 
programs and recipients, both exiting and entering different areas of research more quickly. After 
restructuring during the late-1990s, IDRC adopted a regular cycle of program evaluation every five years, 
as well as an annual budgeting process in which the allocation to each program varied on management’s 
assessment of its importance, quality, and the potential to make effective use of new funds.  
IDRC also shifted the type of recipients it funded. While governmental institutions accounted for 24% of 
the total amount granted by IDRC during 1985–89, this portion fell to 7% during 2005–10. During the 
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same period, the share of funding going to NGOs increased from 35% to 56%. A simple scan over the 
names of these NGOs suggests that recipients combined research with policy advocacy or the delivery of 
development interventions, providing a link to a potential audience and use for the funded research. In 
contrast, government recipients are driven by their own cycle of policy formulation and implementation, 
while academic recipients are constrained by their own cycles of academic publication and supervising 
graduate students. In both cases, the time required for these activities could easily exceed the reduced 
time horizons during which IDRC programs had to demonstrate results. 
In Australia, demand was understood to come from farmers and governments that wanted technology 
and practices to boost productivity and income. ACIAR was somewhat protected from the general shift 
among rural R&D corporations towards shorter-term refinement of existing production techniques, and 
away from the longer-term development of novel crops and techniques with more distant and uncertain 
payoff. ACIAR nonetheless had to adapt to the incentives shaping the careers of research providers at 
home. The relative weight of state-level governments diminished as the center of gravity of public 
research shifted from government to universities. ACIAR projects tended to focus downstream on field-
level application by farmers, yet the genomics revolution saw the agricultural sciences become 
increasingly upstream and lab-based. Simultaneously, ACIAR initially relied on the altruism of Australian 
researchers and their interest in “doing good” abroad. Yet as more and more researchers relied on 
universities as their institutional home, they were increasingly driven by the academic requirements of 
“publish, patent, or perish.” Dedicating substantial time and effort to working with less proficient peers 
abroad distracted from this imperative, forcing ACIAR to compete harder to attract the interest of 
Australian researchers. 
In summary, funders responded to the shift in governance context by changing time-horizon, recipients, 
and point of delivery. In other words, there were clear changes in grantmaking regarding how long, for 
whom, and for what. The trend in all three cases was towards a compressed timeframe in which 
research funding was to lead to development outcomes. Where a former generation of programs aimed 
to achieve outcomes over decade or longer, current programs must demonstrate success within three-
to-five years with regular signs of progress along the way. In terms of recipients, all three organizations 
shifted away from funding government institutions. The UK directed a greater portion of funding to 
research councils at home and international initiatives abroad, as well as for-profits and non-profits of 
sufficient scale to administer large, complex projects. In Canada, IDRC directed a greater portion of 
funding to NGOs in developing countries, while in Australia, ACIAR directed more of its funds to 
domestic universities. In terms of point of delivery, there was a trend towards diversification. While 
IDRC initially favored field-based work in rural areas of developing countries, its portfolio grew over time 
to include laboratory-based work in Canada and abroad, as well as work performed by think tanks in 
urban centers. ACIAR largely retained its focus on field-based work, while part of Australia’s aid budget 
also went to lab-based work in CSIRO and abroad. With the longest history and largest budget of the 
three, ODA-DFID funded research at various points of delivery, layering new grantmaking practices onto 
its existing portfolio with each shift in its program theory. These new practices did not completely 
displace older ones, and the portfolio continued to include a mix of project types and recipients.  
These shifts in grantmaking practices demonstrate that research funding is an evolutionary system 
(Whitley 2011, Ziman 2000). Different practices represented alternative approaches to knowledge 
production. These variations were selectively retained because they enhance the funders’ fit within the 
governance context, the relationships with key stakeholder and power holders. Whitley (2011) cautions 
against an exclusive focus on ex ante design of projects to fit public policy goals and produce expected 
results, warning that this can limit the range of blind variations and reduce the diversity of research 
results and knowledge claims. Fortunately, the governance context often underdetermined program 
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theory, allowing funders to also elaborate, refine, and persist with grantmaking practices based on 
project monitoring and ex post evaluation.  
 
Persistence in grantmaking 
The politics of the home capital influenced all three of the case study organizations in terms of the 
strategies they pursued and the practices used in their grantmaking. It is tempting to dismiss funders as 
merely responding to the whims of government policy and budgeting processes, yet their historical 
experience is more nuanced. All three invested substantial time and effort elaborating, enacting, and 
revising their program theory. Beyond formal corporate and program strategies, each held an 
underlining philosophy of what constituted research for the developing world and an ethos regarding 
their responsibilities towards researchers at home and abroad. Staff considered themselves first and 
foremost part of DFID, IDRC or ACIAR: a distinct identity apart from the public service, privileging poor 
countries and scientific excellence, over national interest and adherence to political agendas at home.     
Drawing Funnel and Rogers’ (2011) typologies, each funder pursued distinct program theories and 
interventions. Historically, research for the developing world was described as information: providing 
knowledge, technology or evidence that create new opportunities for international development (Arrow 
1962, World Bank 1998, Helpman 2004, Molenaar et al. 2009). Yet the logic behind each case study 
reveal program theory based on the logic of diffusion, empowerment, and networks. This logic inspired 
grantmaking practices based on direct delivery through in-house scientific units, case management of 
projects tailored to particular recipients and problems, or providing “carrots” or incentives for the 
external research community.  
In the United Kingdom, research for the developing world was most often based on diffusion theory, 
initially underpinned by direct delivery. ODA inherited a set of scientific units at home that saw 
government responsible for performing research. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a slow move to 
competitively-awarded work programmes and the phasing out of direct delivery. While ODA adopted 
the rhetoric of the “customer-contractor” principle, it simultaneously sought to ensure that the work 
programmes provided for the transition and survival of its scientific units. With the establishment of 
DFID and substantial budget growth, research oscillated between diffusion and reasoned-action 
theories, which interpreted research as technical innovation and evidenced-based policy. In both cases, 
research was underpinned by a “carrots” approach of providing financial incentives to do work that 
benefitted developing countries. DFID became more instrumental in its research funding, seeking to 
inform its own operations. Yet an expanding budget for research allowed space to pursue multiple 
program theories and grantmaking practices. Indeed the increase in the average project budget 
essentially re-delegated responsibility for program logic back to the research community, particular the 
lead institution with each Research Programme Consortium.  
In Canada, IDRC initially pursued a program theory predicated on empowerment, inspiring interventions 
to build capacity: supporting researchers in poor countries to exercise greater control over their own 
development. Such a perspective was dominant from Hopper’s 1970 inaugural speech through to 
Bezanson’s 1991 strategy, appropriately titled “empowerment through knowledge”. Under O’Neil, IDRC 
supplemented this core philosophy with program theory predicated on networks and case management 
intervention: recipients were encouraged to cultivate relationships towards informing policy abroad, 
with IDRC support adapting to the unique circumstance in each project. In contrast, the emergence of 
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Grand Challenges Canada in 2010 exploited a gap in Canada’s research landscape, embracing a diffusion 
theory of change underpinned by providing “carrots”.  
Meanwhile, periodic changes in program theory saw the funder switch which segments of the research 
community benefited most within its grant portfolio. For example, prior to the 1990s, IDRC strongly 
favored and found support among the scientific community engaged in agriculture and health. During 
the decade, IDRC revised its program offerings, essentially switching its allegiance to the scientific 
community engaged in natural resource management and information and communication 
technologies. In the late 2000s, the Centre swung back to the agriculture and health segments of the 
research community.  
In Australia, ACIAR based its program theory on a combination of diffusion and networks, leading to 
interventions that combined capacity building and “carrots”, The Centre brokered partnerships between 
Australian and local researchers to create and share new agricultural techniques and enhance the ability 
of partners in the host country. ACIAR revised the countries where it worked to respond to foreign 
policy priorities, and consistently emphasized the benefits accruing to Australian researchers, farmers, 
and economy. Nonetheless, ACIAR consistently followed its model of partnerships for mutual benefits, 
continuing to pursue a program theory in line with Tribe’s philosophy of “doing well by doing good”. 
 
Key Points 
Program theory incorporates generalized notions of how research is understood to contribute to 
change, and is underpinned by a series of more specific programs. Over time, some programs persist or 
evolve as they successfully broker the world of politics and science, while other programs are ended or 
created to respond to the closing or opening of opportunities to strike a dynamic balance between 
government priority and researcher interest. Deriving funds from official development assistance, 
research for the developing world was much more prescriptive than funding offered to domestic 
researchers through the granting councils, with the expectations placed upon recipients multiplying over 
time in the UK and Canada. Nonetheless funders seek to maintain their credibility within both 
government and the scientific community, facing challenges when it strays too far in either direction. 
Government occasionally requires the funder to refocus on the priorities of the day or take on new 
roles, such as special initiatives or science diplomacy, yet these pressures are counterbalanced by the 
scientific community which can ignore the funder’s opportunities (exit) or lobby for change (voice). 
While a funder’s program theory evolves to respond to changing expectations, its grantmaking practice 
is more resistant to change. Canada and Australia largely persisted with their grantmaking, with IDRC 
conserving a project-based approach focused on supporting and networking researchers abroad, while 
ACIAR maintained its partnership model matching researchers abroad with talent at home. The UK 
experienced a wider range of grantmaking practices, yet even as new ones were added, they did not 
completely displace older ones, leading to a hybrid portfolio. Similarly, responsibilities were added to 
the job description of an IDRC program officer or ACIAR coordinator, but the core competencies and 
function remained. Staff needed to represent the funder’s interest, verifying that recipients completed 
their work and accounted for their budgets. Yet staff were also expected to engage the scientific 




Ultimately, funders periodically change how they define and fund research for the developing world as a 
means of adapting to the governance context, maintaining a dynamic balance between government and 
the scientific communities at home and abroad. The former provides the funder with the resources and 
authority required to operate, while the latter provides the real-life efforts that give the funder’s 
programs meaning. On the surface, the funder is simultaneously an agent to government and a principal 
to the scientific community. Yet the relationship is not one-way, as the research community can exercise 
influence on the funder, and the funder actively shapes the space for its activities within government. It 




Looking forward: from foreign aid to global challenges 
Research for the developing world is at a critical juncture. On the one hand, the policy space is closing as 
each donor country squeezes public expenditure, cutting back or slowing the rate of growth in their 
official development assistance. As resources for foreign aid become less readily available, there is a 
tendency to concentrate on core priorities framed by international consensus: the successor to 
Millennium Development Goals and a focus on fewer, least developed, and more fragile states. On the 
other hand, new opportunities have opened beyond foreign aid, as donor countries diversify their 
relations with the developing world: placing greater importance in economic and trade relations, 
educational mobility, and science collaboration. There is also a growing middle of both participants and 
problems, with an increasing number of countries surpassing the low-income threshold along with an 
expanding set of global challenges to economy, environment, and health that affect all people. Research 
for the developing world is declining as the R&D of foreign aid, yet rising as part of science diplomacy 
and global problem solving.  
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of how international development is being reimagined, 
shifting from foreign aid toward global challenges. The next sections describe the new rules that govern 
research funding, drawing on institutional design principles from scholarship on commons, or shared 
natural resources. In past decades, funders needed to strike a bargain between their home government 
and the domestic scientific community, yet developing countries increasingly determine their terms of 
engagement in scientific collaboration. The future research for the developing world is one of adaptive 
governance, in which funders no longer shape their programs in isolation, but negotiate their role in 
partnerships with diverse actors at home and abroad.  
Reimaging development  
The idea of “international development” is evolving. From an initial focus on the welfare of people in 
poor countries, the field experienced similar growth and specialization of scholarship and practice as 
many scientific disciplines over the past century. The field stretched to address the provision of 
domestic public goods (such as education and health care), international public goods (such as trade 
relations and biodiversity), and foreign public bads (such as terrorism and absolute poverty). Each of 
these three threads is now pulling apart, engaging more with related fields such as public policy, 
international relations, and subject-specific disciplines, rather than with scholarship on “international 
development” in general. It is tempting to simply re-label the field as global development, recognizing a 
change in world relations similar to the post-war period which saw “international” replace colonial or 
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overseas development. Yet in practice the field is fragmenting into separate dialogues. With relative few 
journals and academic associations to hold it together, researchers and practitioners more readily 
identify and interact with peers in various sub disciplines, including economics, agriculture, and public 
health.  
This fragmentation coincides with a shift in discourse on international development. The field was once 
the realm of grand narratives explaining historic and holistic change in how society is structured and 
functions, embroiled in the clash between capitalist and socialist visions of such change. With the end of 
the Cold War, the aid community embraced the twin imperatives of poverty reduction and results-based 
management as the ends and means of foreign aid. More than two decades later, thinking on 
development centers on marketing products and messages that benefit the poor, experiments with 
targeted interventions in the material conditions of the most disadvantaged. The unit of “success” 
shifted from the nation-state and its aggregate economic growth, towards individual citizens and their 
freedoms and capabilities.  
The grand narratives of social change are overshadowed by frugal innovation to address the needs of 
poor people, including low-cost devices for energy generation, clean water, and medical diagnostics. 
“Successful” innovations not only demonstrate their proof-of-concept, but are expected to scale-up into 
self-financing business models, largely independent of government largesse. University curricula are just 
as likely to emphasize methods of behavioral economics, value-chain analysis, or randomized-control 
trials as they are to impart insights from Karl Polanyi’s great transformation or Robert Chamber’s 
farmer-first approach. The rise of design, technology and engineering to alter the material conditions of 
people has come at the cost of social, cultural, and political inquiry into historic change in society. 
Research for the developing world is now more focused on extending economic opportunity and 
material wellbeing to the Collier’s bottom billion than it is on questioning the roots of power, inequality, 
and justice in society.  
Accompanying this shift in discourse has been rising attention to global challenges, problems that 
surpass the ability of any one country to address. This suggests a different logic for justifying 
investments in research for the developing world. At the risk of oversimplification, one can contrast an 
initial argument based on foreign aid and the new argument based on global challenges. Among other 
reasons, foreign aid was initially justified as a transfer of capital and technical expertise from donor 
countries to aid recipients, from where such resources were plentiful to places where they were scarce. 
Under this framing, foreign aid was intended to provide seed investment to kick-start local accumulation 
of capital, skilled labor, and knowledge that would allow poor countries to provide for themselves and 
participate more fully in the world affairs. This argument holds less sway today as fewer countries 
remain below the low-income threshold and as foreign aid represents a decreasing share of the financial 
flows to the developing world.  
Research for the developing world increasingly relies on an argument based on global challenges. An 
early wave of this argument occurred in the 1990s as international development was briefly 
synonymous with environmental sustainability. The advent of the Millennium Development Goals and 
the “war of terror” at the turn of the century refocused development on conditions abroad in poverty 
hotspots and failed states. Yet within a decade, the world shuttered under global shocks to finance, food 
and fuel. Sudden peaks in the price of credit, grains, and oil eroded development gains in some 
countries and shook the foundations of advanced economies. Donor countries also began to take 
climate change more seriously, unlocking new financing to assist developing countries cope with the 
impacts of hotter, drier conditions. In short, politicians and taxpayers rediscovered their own 
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vulnerability, embracing enlightened self-interest to protect themselves against external threats of an 
interdependent world.  
The logic of global challenges matches how research is now organized. There has been a trend towards 
tying public monies for research to mission-oriented funding programmes specifying the types of 
discoveries or breakthroughs desired. The rhetoric of challenges is intended to rally the efforts of 
existing research talent to ambitious, yet attainable, outcomes the value of which is supposedly self-
evident. At the same time, the world of science has become less rooted as talented individuals seek to 
study at, and work with, renowned centers of excellence regardless of where they are located. The 
mobility of scientific talent does not rival that of international finance, but the dilemma facing 
developing countries has become less about building an autonomous research capacity, and more about 
plugging into the networks of global scientific collaboration (Wagner 2008).  
The future of research for the developing world requires funders to move beyond foreign aid and 
strengthen ties with publicly-funded science at home and abroad. Global challenges are problems that 
are clearly recognized within the language of foreign policy (used to justify action) and the language of 
social or natural sciences (used to guide research). This is distinct from the beginning of the millennium 
when a policy focus on new threats to security, governance, and fragile states was held back as social 
science needed to reformulate these concepts and theories. Similarly, medical science is now ahead of 
policy attention. Whereas decades of development sought to control infectious diseases, the burden of 
disease shifted towards poor diet and sedentary lifestyles as the leading causes of poor health. 
Global challenges imply scale that surpasses national borders. This supranational scale may derive from 
the geographic footprint of the problem, the spatial distribution of suffering, or the potential scope for 
interventions. International public goods obviously requires transboundary cooperation (e.g. climate, 
migration, oceans), while foreign public bads can require coordinating shared or complementary roles 
and responsibilities (e.g. malaria, maternal mortality, food insecurity), and even national public goods 
can involve opportunities for comparative learning (e.g. education, energy, mental health). In each case, 
global challenges imply a contribution of multiple actors in different locations, each of which brings 
some comparative value or assets to the collaboration such as: data, talent, funding, facilities, and/or 
access to field locations and unique phenomenon. Wagner (2008) contrasts more networked or joined-
up efforts on breeding seeds or mapping genomes, to more distributed and site-based work such as 
mapping poverty or testing climate adaption. 
 
Design principles 
Research funding can be considered a common good, with a variety of stakeholders in the government 
and within the scientific community exercising influence over how it is managed. Prior to allocation to 
particular grants and projects, research funding is available to numerous potential beneficiaries within 
the scientific community. Yet it is also scarce, necessitating some means of coping with demand, limiting 
or denying claims based on program design, eligibility criteria, and the quality of their proposals. In the 
language of economics, common goods are rivalrous, meaning that their use by one beneficiary 
necessarily reduces the amount available for others. Common goods are also considered non-excludible, 
meaning that it is difficult to control their access and use. While different disciplines have various 
professional associations, anyone can self-identify as being a member of the scientific community and 
submit an application for funding.  
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Common goods require negotiated, cooperative use of a limited resource in a manner that avoids 
overexploitation or collapse. Scholarship on commons began with pasturelands and was extended to 
irrigation systems, water, fisheries, forestry, and information systems. Historically there was a push to 
enclose commons, converting them into private goods by assigning individual property titles or quotas, 
out of fear that individual users would tend to overexploit the resource to maximize their personal 
benefit. Ostrom (2005) championed empirical study documenting the real-life behavior of communities 
dependent on such resources, identifying a series of institutional design principles that permitted shared 
use of such commons.  
These design principles offer unique insights for crafting research collaborations. Similar to natural 
resource commons, research funding involves the use of scarce monies and talent to generate 
knowledge and solutions to address social problems including poverty, hunger, and disease. Research 
collaboration consists of ad-hoc, time-limited institutional arrangements for governing this common 
good (funding and talent) and common “bad” (shared public problem). Among the design principles 
identified by scholarship are clearly defined boundaries, clear rules of access and use, accountability of 
monitors to users, and locally-devised rules and shared norms among users.  
Clearly defined boundaries include membership in the community of potential applicants, and the 
geographic and thematic coverage of the funding programs. Once critiqued as being a club good for 
researchers within the field of development studies, funding opportunities have widen to a more diverse 
set of potential applicants and skills. This is particularly the case with open competitive calls for 
proposals, rather than foundation approach of talent scouting or responding to unsolicited proposals. 
Moreover the recent emphasis on design, technology and engineering has also broadened the 
opportunities for work on applications for use in the developing world, without necessitating a career-
long specialization in such settings. By definition research for the developing world requires a tie to 
poorer, resource-constrained settings abroad, whether through the nationality of participating 
researchers, the location of field work, or the ultimate application of the research results. Yet research 
funders more readily rely on thematic boundaries, crafting funding programs based on particular 
disciplines or problems, such as food security, maternal health, or youth employment. Researchers with 
skills and interests in these areas constitute the membership pool of potential applicants. Yet this 
membership is dynamic and changes whenever the funder closes existing programs and adopts new 
ones.  
Clear access and use rules are embedded in the grantmaking practices of each funder, including 
selection criteria, categories of eligible expenses, and grant agreement as a legal contract. All granting 
processes include a set of ex ante selection criteria which define the tests to which applications are 
assessed. At the core of this process is some form of merit review to assess to scientific quality of the 
proposed research activities, which departs from the norms of originality, significance, and contribution 
to existing knowledge, as well as considerations of feasibility and ethics. Yet even before reaching merit 
review, proposals must satisfy a host of requirements specified by the funder, these may include letters 
of support from the hosting institutions, participation of particular actors (e.g. private sector or 
institutions based in developing country), and plans to disseminate and promote research findings 
(identifying a “user” audience and how they will be reached). A selected proposal is subjected to further 
scrutiny to ensure the budget compiles with guidance on eligible expenses, including acceptable rates 
for—and overall portion dedicated to—research expenses, staffing, training, travel, and indirect costs of 
the host institution. The funder then issues a grant agreement to the host institution which is a legal 
contract describing the provision of funding for the project and outlining the commitments the 
institution undertakes in accepting those funds. Grant agreement can specify conditions to be met for 
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the continuity of funding over the duration of the project, such as the participation of key personnel and 
the frequency of reporting on the financial and technical progress. 
Accountability of monitors to users is seen in the ultimate feedback loop between research funders and 
the scientific community. Public research funders are subject to various influences within government 
and need to maintain their credibility within the scientific community. This community will be alienated 
if funding programs are too distant from researchers’ interests or what can be feasibly delivered. Under 
such conditions, the scientific community can respond by simply ignoring the funders’ attempts to rally 
its efforts, or exerting pressure upon government entities that can in turn influence the funder. Such 
instances are relatively rare due to the monitoring by research funders, not only receiving progress 
reports and using a milestone approach to grant management, but ongoing engagement with principal 
investigators, research teams, and grant administrators. Regular communication allows for early 
detection and resolution of difficulties encountered during project implementation. Ideally, monitoring 
is a form of peer-to-peer engagement, with the funding staff seen as offering useful advice rather than 
merely verifying compliance with the terms of grant agreements. Staff tend to be subject matter 
experts, capable of understanding and critiquing the work performed, acting as intermediaries working 
for the funding organization while remaining part of the scientific community.  
Locally-devised rules and shared norms among users are vital aspects of how stakeholders self-organize 
to manage commons. Scientific communities have a long history of self-organizing within academia and 
across professional associations. While membership may be somewhat open, status within the 
community is defined by academic rank, professional experience, and record of publications and 
contributions to knowledge. Through their involvement in this community, researchers accept and 
perpetuate a culture of science. While the expression of this culture varies among disciplines, there is a 
common commitment to freedom of inquiry, the use of rigorous methods, internal and external validity 
in data and analysis, and subjecting findings to critique. Research for the developing world cultivated a 
unique expression of this culture in the late 20th century, one embracing further commitments to 
empowering southern researchers, participatory methods that involved local people in the research 
process, and an action-oriented approach towards the use of findings to further development outcomes.  
Changes grantmaking practice eroded these norms somewhat, as funders reached out to a wider 
segment of the scientific community. Once tailoring to the interests of development studies, 
development economists, and experts in tropical agriculture and medicine, funders now engage a wider 
swath of the scientific community including skills in design, engineering, technology, and business. This 
wider community is not only motivated by a desire to “do good” abroad, but by incentives to build a 
career based on responding to the pressure to publish and demonstrate the public, scientific, and 
commercial value of their work. Funders also became more prescriptive in detailing the structure of 
research collaboration, for example requiring applicants to organize themselves into consortia or 
mandating the participation of certain actors, such as industry, private sector, or local government. As 
funders sought to support larger value grants, research projects morphed from ad-hoc collections of 
individuals into formal arrangements among multiple institutions, with a corresponding increase in the 
responsibility for specifying activities, coordinating activities, and managing budgets. Beyond the 
opportunity to simply “do research”, receiving a research grant can impose a certain burden upon 
principal investigators to monitor and manage the participation of others in the project.  
In the past, each funding organization was autonomous in how they governed their support to research 
for the developing world. Funders chose their programs and refined their grantmaking practice, 
cognizant of the governance context at home and the interests of the scientific communities they 
sought to rally. These decisions formed a dynamic balance between what donor governments were 
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willing to fund and what the scientific community was interested in working on. Funders were largely 
implicit with regards to how they set boundaries, rules of access and use, their accountability to the 
scientific community, and the shared norms among researchers. Yet as funders establish international 
initiatives and enter into partnerships with each other, it is necessary to explicitly identify the 
institutional arrangements that govern these relationships. This is particular true with the rise of 
stronger research governance abroad which introduces different goals and incentives.  
 
Rise of the South  
The rules for governing research in and for the developing world are changing as more countries 
establish their own institutions for supporting and guiding science. A generation ago, funders such as 
ODA, IDRC, or ACIAR had very few counterparts in the developing world. They would engage with the 
foreign ministry, universities, or line ministries responsible for agriculture or health, yet in many 
developing countries science academies and granting councils were either fairly weak or entirely 
absence. Slowly that has changed, spurred on by revenue from natural resources, a desire to retain or 
regain highly-qualified scientists, and policy that casts knowledge and innovation as key to global 
competition. On average, the overall amount of research funding in developing countries remains 
modest compared to the OECD, China, and India. Yet the creation or strengthening of science 
academies, granting councils, and research funds in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere in Asia mean 
that many developing countries now set their own research priorities, provide scholarships and funding 
opportunities, and shape the incentives for scientific careers.  
Research governance in developing countries does not necessarily replicate the structure or practices of 
OECD countries nor narrowly adhere to the international development agenda. African science ministers 
established space sciences as a priority while Jordan’s priorities include energy and information 
technologies. These topics do not figure among the Millennium Development Goals, but are seen by 
policymakers as vital for the future of their countries. Akin to science policy in OECD countries, the 
strategic question is how to make the optimal use of scarce scientific talent, research funding, and 
infrastructure. While this may include new understanding and technology to benefit poor people, such 
considerations tend to be secondary to the imperatives of contributing to the economy, informing 
national policy, and enhancing links to global science. These institutions are also interlocutors for 
international collaboration, negotiating bilateral and regional agreements on scientific cooperation, and 
acting as contact points for foreign funding opportunities, such as the European Union’s Horizon 2020 or 
the United Kingdom’s Newton Fund. 
These institutions are crafting their own first principles regarding the purpose of research, what 
constitutes success, the motivation for international collaboration. Research governance in different 
countries emphasizes varying notions of success ranging from peer-reviewed publications and prototype 
technologies, to real-world impact on policy and practice. Similar to their peers in OECD countries, 
funders in developing countries are embedded in a national context surrounded by diverse power 
holders and stakeholders that influence local ideas regarding the purpose of research and what it is 
expected to produce. Funders respond to these ideas crafting different program theories and 
grantmaking practices. In allocating funding, countries assign weight to various criteria including the size 
of an institution’s teaching and research staff, a researcher’s years of service or record of publications, 




Funders also vary in the attention given to the substance of research ideas proposed and the existing 
capacity of potential recipient. For example, Egypt offers project grants through open calls for proposals 
while Tunisia provides block funding to particular laboratories and research teams following a national 
assessment exercise. In allocating a national budget, public funders may also wish to ensure some 
degree of geographic equity within the country and among potential recipients, as funding decisions can 
exacerbate existing divides between urban capitals and more distant regional centers or 
disproportionately favor already established centers.  
The presence of science academies and granting councils in developing countries mean that foreign 
funders must compete for the attention from the local scientific community. On the one hand, foreign 
funders may still have an advantage in facilitating international collaboration, particularly access to 
researchers back in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, etc. On the other hand, domestic institutions 
can provide incentives that shape scientific careers, the type of performance which are rewarded at 
home. The opportunities offered by foreign funders should ideally be crafted with these drivers in mind. 
A funder’s programs must also fit with how science is organized within developing countries. Efforts to 
encourage interdisciplinary work to address global challenges, such as food security, encounter a dearth 
of prospective applicants in settings where there is little communication or collaboration across 
disciplines, such as among nutritionists, sociologists, soil scientists, and agricultural economists.  
In short, research governance abroad in developing countries is increasingly salient. Collaboration is 
easier between countries with certain complementarity in their research landscapes. For example, 
Moroccan applicants were relatively successful in IDRC calls for university research chairs and for work 
on climate adaptation, in part drawing on existing relationships with former professors and diaspora 
scientists in Quebec. Given that funders and researchers are rooted in different governance contexts, 
this limits their ability to buy into a shared program design. Instead it can be easier for different funders 
to make their own contribution towards a common agenda, but in a way that respects their individual 
programs and grantmaking. As the research shifts towards global challenges there is arguably a need for 
more collaboration among like-minded funders. Yet being “like-minded” is more than having similar 
interests in what to fund; it also relies on having a shared understanding of what research is expected to 
achieve and what evidence is needed to satisfy diverse audiences whose hold expectations for the 
funders’ performance.     
One alternative is to simply turn to international initiatives, for-purpose organizations and funds to 
support work on global challenges. A number of these have come into existence over the years, 
including the Collaborative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) to name just a few. These 
initiatives have pursued a two-part mandate, both fostering new knowledge and technology and 
promoting its adoption among beneficiaries. The CGIAR initially grew rapidly from four to eighteen 
centers between 1971 and 1993, before a period of more restricted budgets as members scaled back on 
funding. The food crisis in 2008–09 unlocked additional resources, yet coincided with governance 
reforms and restructuring which accelerated a shift to reorganize research around system-wide 
challenge programs. While younger, GAVI also required some degree of advocacy and personal 
diplomacy in member capitals to maintain funding levels. International initiatives are not immune from 
the politics that public funders face, and must present a set of programs that satisfy the performance 
expectations of different members.  
Philanthropy and private funding are also important streams of support for research in developing 
countries. Western philanthropy remains influential, including Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, 
Wellcome Trust, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Yet these names increasingly coexist with a 
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variety of charities, foundations, and corporate responsibility initiatives based in developing countries. 
The Dorbaji and Ratan Tata Trusts, Carlos Slim Foundation, Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum 
Foundation, and Qatar Foundation are some of the better known names, and there are literally 
thousands more redistributing donations from wealthy people, a growing middle class, and citizens that 
simply want to give back to their societies. In India, new legislation mandates private corporations to 
invest two percent of their profits in social development. Philanthropy and private funding often think 
about research differently than science academies and granting councils. Rather than a discrete a public 
good in its own right, these entities tends to see research as an input into promoting social change. 
Whereas science academies value the creation of new knowledge, charities and social business have a 
more pragmatic perspective of research as feasibility studies, product innovation, and evaluation of 
their interventions.  
Research for the developing world now requires adaptive governance, engaging these new actors 
abroad to foster collaboration on global challenges. Funders can no longer afford to work in isolation. 
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) caution that “devising effective governance systems is akin to a 
coevolutionary race” as the rules crafted to fit one set of conditions erode with new social, economic, 
and technological developments. The reimagining of international development, the decline of foreign 
aid, and rise of research governance abroad require funders to renegotiate their role and function in an 
evolving landscape. One can start with first principles of the purpose of research, what constitutes 
success, and the motivation for international collaboration. Funders can then negotiate a shared 
understanding of thematic and geographic boundaries, rules of access and use, accountability of 
monitors to the scientific community, and shared norms among researchers.  
 
Key Points 
Research for the developing world is at a critical juncture. It is closing as donors concentrate on fewer, 
least developed, and more fragile states. Yet it is also growing with global challenges that surpass the 
ability of any one country to address. The idea of “international development” is fragmenting from the 
welfare of poor countries, into separate dialogues around domestic public goods, international public 
goods, and foreign public “bads”. This fragmentation coincides with a shift from grand narratives of 
change in society towards engineering and business that improve the material conditions of poor 
people. Refocusing on global challenges capitalizes on rising interest in international collaboration, 
rallying existing research talent to work on ambitious goals and plug into the networks of global science.  
 
As more countries join the ranks of middle-income and emerging economies, they exercise greater 
power and authority over the design of international research collaboration. Science academies and 
granting councils abroad are elaborating their own approaches to managing scarce scientific talent, 
research funding, and infrastructure. In short, the rules of the games are changing as research 
governance in the developing world becomes increasingly salient, including international initiatives, 
philanthropy, and private funding for research. It is no longer sufficient for northern-based funders to 
strike a deal between their home government and domestic scientific community, they must engage 
new actors abroad to renegotiate their roles and responsibilities. This means being aware of local 
perceptions of what research is expected to achieve and the incentives shaping scientific careers.  
Research for the developing world is both evolving and returning to its roots as science diplomacy 
predicated on mutual benefit. Looking back, the governance context in donor countries used to permit 
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more autonomy and discretion for public research funders. Looking forward, the response to calls for 
“one world” collaboration on global challenges is constrained as funders must remain responsive to 
different sets of stakeholders and power holders. As governments continue to expect “more” from 
publicly-funded research, there is greater political demand to demonstrate how such research 
contributes to real-life outcomes that matter to politicians and taxpayers, at home and abroad. The 
recent trend was towards emphasizing short-term practical ends. In contrast, a shift towards global 
challenges requires moving research “up & out” toward more ambitious goals—beyond the interests of 




This final chapter considers three aspects of public management: leadership, performance, and impact. 
These concepts have particular and evolving meaning in the world of public research as reflected in the 
experience of funding research for the developing world. The nature of leadership evolved as research-
funding organizations matured and navigated an increasingly complex governance context at home and 
abroad. Leaders create visions of success, mobilize support, and reshape the operating space for their 
organizations. They define performance that satisfies external expectations, striking a balance among 
competing public values and ethics. Research for the developing world tended to be driven by foreign 
policy, yet its performance is increasingly influenced by science policy, including concerns for academic 
productivity and demonstrating research impact. This impact can be described as building scientific 
capacity, informing policy and practice, or spreading innovative technologies. How impact is understood 
depends on the first principles regarding the purpose of research and why science is considered useful 
to society. Whereas funders used to encourage “small is beautiful,” with local experiments in 
development, today the emphasis is on “getting to scale” and delivering innovation through self-
financing models. 
Leadership 
The nature of leadership has evolved over time, from defining and pursuing a unique approach, to 
instead navigating and brokering partnerships with others. Canada and Australia established for-purpose 
organizations with a mandate that focused exclusively on research for the developing world and a 
governance structure that provided substantial autonomy. Leadership for Hopper and McWilliam was to 
navigate this start-up phase, experimenting with and refining a nascent business model that translated 
this mandate into a work culture and grantmaking practice. Within a decade, both organizations had 
cultivated their sense of identity which was then formalized through strategies, programs, and 
procedures. In contrast, leadership for Bezanson and Core was to preside over difficult eras of 
adjustment, as external decision making became more influential. 
Public management no longer afforded these organizations the same degree of autonomy, as the 
powers initially invested in their boards shifted upward toward the minister, and outward toward 
central agencies and other parts of government. These leaders needed to demonstrate that their 
organizations were “fitting in” to external expectations, which required in equal parts: external 
engagement to cultivate and renew relationships within government, and internal change reforming the 
work culture to adjust to this new reality. In this sense, the leadership task began to mirror that in the 
United Kingdom, where research for the developing world was embedded in the aid agency and 
increasingly needed to renew its position within the larger science policy environment. 
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Individual leaders matter. Each organization initially embodied the vision of their founders and 
benefited from high-level champions. How each funder evolved is intimately associated with the ideas 
of Haldane, Rothschild, Hopper, and Crawford. Their leadership defined a vision of research for the 
developing world and navigated competing pressures and expectations within government. Over time, 
successive leaders enriched and reinterpreted these visions to keep up with and influence the 
governance context, selectively revising, adding, and replacing program theories as needed. The ability 
to shape the expectations of others, and the role of individual leaders in that process, are two key 
insights for the literature on public management and the study of public research funding. Leaders are 
entrepreneurs that create visions of success for the future, develop strategies for pursuing those visions, 
mobilize support (Poister 2010), and as needed reshape the operating space for their organizations 
(Fischer 2003). 
In all three case studies, leaders guided their organizations to both retain elements of their program 
theory while adjusting to expectations of their performance. They were afforded this opportunity in part 
due to the tendency of government to underdetermine the policy space surrounding research for the 
developing world. Government identified priorities for international development and national research, 
yet provided funders with freedom to interpret these broad directions in crafting how to respond to and 
enact them. The governance context was more indicative than prescriptive, and although the 
performance expectations outside could not be ignored, and eventually gave rise to fundamental 
changes in program theory and grantmaking practices, leaders still had the space to mediate this 
process. More recently, the governance context became increasingly prescriptive, with governments 
determining on what, to whom, and where research funding is to be targeted. With an eroded 
autonomy, funders are afforded less opportunity to set and pursue their own program theory, and 
consequently they move closer to government and away from the scientific community. 
Leaders are responsible for maintaining the credibility of their organizations, within the changing 
notions of performance in government and amid the evolving governance of the scientific community. 
Individual leaders also guided their organizations in “speaking back” to the governance context. They 
refused to be the passive victims of shifts in government policy and discourse, and instead actively 
sought to reinsert the ideas cultivated from their program theory back into the policy process. Leaders 
sought to inform this context with learning derived from their organization’s routines and experience, 
including program evaluation, as well as their own vision for where and how investments in research 
could make a difference. They engaged powerful actors to reshape performance expectations, making 
the case for their way of doing business, rather than merely accepting that their grantmaking practices 
may no longer fit with contemporary fads in public management. 
This suggests a continued need to balance competing goals, something these funders have done for over 
three decades. In the near-term, research funders must remain agile, nimbly adjusting their 
management structure and funding opportunities to maintain their relevance to, and support from, 
both their home government and the scientific community. There is progressively less space for multiple 
program theories to coexist or to preserve grantmaking practices that do not resonate with current 
expectations. Consequently, research funders are becoming more corporativist: streamlining themselves 
to concentrate a greater portion of resources into fewer, larger programs that are more tightly aligned 
with the assumed contribution to the world beyond. IDRC and ACIAR already witnessed their Boards’ 
influence erode compared to outside influences. 
Looking forward, research for the developing world is turning from foreign aid toward global challenges. 
This new reality places an even greater premium on the ability of leaders to broker new partnerships in 
an evolving context for research governance at home and abroad. A generation ago, funders 
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encouraged “small is beautiful,” researchers moving beyond universities and labs to work with local 
communities using participatory approaches. Today, international development has been reimagined as 
“getting to scale,” working with entrepreneurs to ensure solutions are implemented widely to reduce 
poverty and improve lives. Whereas success used to be associated with demonstrating a proof of 
concept, this is now appreciated as an initial step toward prototyping, refining, and delivering 
innovations. The task for leaders is both to adapt and shape such visions, navigating the performance 
expectations of others, and reshaping programs and grantmaking as needed. 
Performance 
Leadership means slicing through the Gordian knot of performance expectations to craft program theory 
that satisfies the values and ethics underpinning public management. Leaders need to identify which 
actors are salient in their governance context and the means by which these actors seek to influence the 
performance of public organizations. Given the degree of discretion in the parliamentary systems in 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, one could be forgiven for assuming that public sector 
“performance” is merely whatever the minister and central agencies define it to be at any given time. 
Yet the concept of performance has deeper intellectual roots than the opinions and biases of power 
holders and stakeholders in the governance context. 
Talbot (2010: 83) describes organizational performance from a realist perspective, drawing on historical 
institutionalism to analyze changing governance of that performance over time. He sees performance as 
both “brute facts” and socially constructed meanings attached to such facts. The dimensions of 
performance are epistemologically real, as are the positions, attitudes, and beliefs held by real groups 
and individuals. Talbot cites Moore’s triad of public value (1995) as delivering public services, achieving 
social outcomes, and maintaining trust and legitimacy; as well as Fried’s triad of ethics (1976), including 
responsiveness to public demand (democratic ethic), compliance with rules (legal ethic), and economy in 
the use of resources (work ethic). His argument is that the sum of such varied influences shapes or 
steers performance for specific organizations. 
Over time DFID, IDRC, and ACIAR were subject to diverse performance measures, ranging across 
compliance with foreign policy, economy in the use of operational budgets, the spread and adoption of 
technology, and the number of poor people reached. Three salient observations can be drawn from the 
histories of these three funders. First is that any one formal system of performance measures was 
consolidated for a relatively brief period of time, seldom exceeding a decade. Public sector agreements 
under Blair in the United Kingdom, or the minister’s public statement following the Uhrig reforms in 
Australia, ultimately faded and were replaced with newer systems which refocused attention on a 
different combination of values and ethics. While the public sector was buffeted by this ebb and flow of 
performance measures imposed from outside, they weaved into the performance story crafted by 
strong public leaders on the inside. Leaders provided their organizations with a sense of purpose, a 
description of what success looks like, and clear tests for assessment. This internal understanding of 
performance provides greater continuity than the external measurement systems. 
Second is that research for the developing world was more sensitive to concepts of performance within 
foreign policy than within science policy. This followed simply from the practical realities of 
governmental budgeting and lines of ministerial authority. All three funders relied on the budget line for 
official development assistance, the policy around which formed the test for access and use of financial 
resources. DFID and its predecessor were particularly focused on development policy, placing its 
research funding in the position of serving that agenda. Meanwhile in Australia and Canada, 
considerations of foreign policy were more salient than notions of effective development. ACIAR and 
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IDRC were positioned under the foreign minister, and any matters they wished to raise with the minister 
competed for attention with world events, ongoing diplomacy, and internal affairs of the foreign 
ministry. While development trumped science in formulating performance expectations, science 
occasionally struck back. In the United Kingdom, DFID was critiqued by the scientific community and 
pressed to appoint a Chief Scientific Advisor. Meanwhile changes to science policy in all three countries 
altered the notions of performance by hollowing out government science, assessing academic 
productivity, privileging partnerships beyond academia, and requiring demonstrations of research 
impact. Looking forward, the concept of performance is evolving as foreign aid is eclipsed by research on 
global challenges and scientific collaboration with the developing world. 
Third is a tension between the improvement and oversight functions of performance measures. No one 
can argue with the desire to improve an organization’s operations and achievements over time. Such a 
desire is not new and has inspired various tools of public management over time, including 
organizational mandates, corporate strategies, program evaluation, and horizontal planning. From an 
early stage, all three funders were required to prepare annual reports detailing how they used public 
resources and what was achieved. Each new edition implicitly compared recent achievements to 
previous years, with the intention of continuous improvement. Leaders also experimented with tailored 
performance measures, negotiated among management–board–minister, elaborated in-house, and 
ultimately discontinued when they proved unworkable or were codified in operational routines and 
grantmaking practices. 
Yet the rise of externally imposed performance measures accompanied the slow shift from 
organizational autonomy toward instructions emanating from central agencies, aid agencies, and foreign 
ministries. Such measures formed part of the evolving governance context that pressed the funders to 
“fit into” and contribute to whole-of-government efforts rather than crafting their own strategies and 
programs. The oversight function of performance measures suggests a lack of trust in public managers 
and a trend toward circumscribing the space available for them to exercise leadership. At the extreme, 
external performance measures undermine the organization’s public policy mandate, establishing a 
check-list of what activities are useful to others rather than encouraging a focus on the organization’s 
raison d’être. 
The performance expectations surrounding research for the developing world are encouraging a focus 
on demonstrating tangible results over shorter timeframes. Whereas ODA once supported a ten-year 
program on natural resources and sustainable agriculture, funding programs and research projects are 
now regularly assessed within three to five years. The potential for renewed support is partially 
dependent on meeting the expectations in vogue at the moment when such reviews are carried out and 
decisions need to be made. Over the past decade, the performance test considered the extent to which 
such work: contributed to development and foreign policy priorities, complied with policy directions 
from central agencies, and cooperated with others government entities (including foreign ministries and 
domestic granting councils). Today, the performance test is consolidating around the expectation that 
programming will scale up innovation beyond proof of concept and partner with private sector to create 
self-financing model for delivering solutions. Both tests define the criteria by which funders are assessed 
within the governance context, helping secure access to aid budgets or retain existing resources in 
spending reviews. Yet such tests also threaten to “wag the dog” by fixating on ideas in good currency 
within government, ignoring past experience, and shifting allegiances within the scientific community. 
Ultimately, attention to performance measures must not become substitutes for organizational 
purpose. To paraphrase one respondent, the ultimate performance test is meeting the minister. Within 
a few minutes, the CEO needs to provide a concise and convincing description as to what is achieved and 
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how that is important to the minister and taxpayers. More than one CEO found this to be the first vital 
step. Provided the minster accepted the argument offered, the conversation would then turn to one or 
two opportunities to enhance operations in ways that interested the minister, such as a particular 
priority, theme, budget line, or bilateral relation. Yet the organization’s performance story ultimately 
needs more than ministerial direction and signals from the governance context. Leaders provide that 
direction by defining performance that satisfies external expectations, strikes a balance among 
competing public values and ethics, and is tailored to their particular mandate. 
Impact 
In order to demonstrate and justify public expenditure on research, the United Kingdom and Australia 
elaborated assessment frameworks for research quality and excellence. While Canada has not 
elaborated a formal system—as higher education is a provincial rather than federal responsibility—
government has nonetheless directed granting councils to privilege support to industrial partnerships 
and business-led research collaboration. The criteria used privilege considerations of value within 
academia, yet have added considerations of how research is valued by others, including actors in 
industry, policy, and professional practice. For example, the most recent UK framework defines impact 
as an effect on, change, or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, 
environment, or quality of life beyond academia. 
Penfield et al. (2014) note that the concept of impact borrows ideas from economics, such as return on 
investment and the time frame required for the stream of benefits to pay back the costs of the research 
activity. In Australia and the United Kingdom, the concept of impact distinguishes between significance 
and reach, intended as measures of the relative importance of the benefit derived from research 
impact, as well as the size and breadth of the audience affected. Bastow et al. (2014) note a tension 
between the two measures, as significance is easier to substantiate at a more local level, while reach 
rewards impact that involves larger numbers of beneficiaries or that occurs at wider spatial scales. 
Assessing the impact of research is fraught with difficulty. First is the time required to achieve impact, 
which can vary from days to decades, and the potential for such impact to shift over time. For example, 
research on new vaccines or seeds requires time to pass through the phases of discovery, clinical or field 
trials, and widespread adoption, with different opportunities as each stage. Second is the difficulty in 
establishing attribution for real-world changes, as these are seldom neatly the product of a single piece 
of research. More often than not policy and practice evolve in response to the accumulation of 
knowledge over many years, including conceptual change in the ideas and theories used to frame 
problems and identify potential solutions. For example, recent insights into cognitive biases and 
behavioral economics are undoubtedly a step forward from past models based on rational actors, but 
emerge from a body of work rather than a particular study or project. Third is the difficulty of gathering 
evidence to substantiate such impact, whether through bibliometrics, altmetrics, narratives, surveys, or 
testimonials. Ultimately, in the words of Penfield et al. (2014) “every piece of research is a unique 
tapestry of impact” that can span across invention, innovation, insight, and inspiration. 
Research for the developing world was ahead of the curve in responding to the impact agenda for 
publicly funded science. Whereas science policy in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
increasingly embraced the goal of public funding leading to social and economic impact, this imperative 
was already firmly established within ACIAR, IDRC, and DFID. These funders have long had to prove their 
value for money, competing with aid agencies, multilateral organizations, and foreign ministries. They 
long abandoned any notion of funding research for its own sake, or merely catering to scientific 
curiosity. Before the general rise in scrutiny of domestic science policy, these funders needed to justify 
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their spending compared to such alternative uses for official development assistance. This required a 
sensitivity to the changing goals of development programs, which ranged from economic growth and 
poverty reduction, to human freedom and women’s empowerment. Research was expected to 
contribute toward tangible changes that advanced such goals. 
The rhetoric used to describe impact evolved over time, yet tended to frame it in terms valued by both 
the scientific community and government backers. Notions of quality and excellence refer to 
methodological construct, complying with the quality standards within academia, whereas notions of 
utility and relevance are political constructs referring to how research is valued by—and benefits—those 
beyond academia (Grant et al. 2010). These terms were often interpreted as presenting certain 
extremes to be avoided, or trade-offs to be made in grantmaking. For example, funders tended to 
eschew theoretical research in favor of work with real-life applications, yet also avoid mundane pursuits 
which aimed simply at evaluating operations or interventions without a link to established theory and 
scholarship. Meanwhile the enthusiasm for methodological rigor and validity was often limited to 
ensuring research was of sufficient quality to justify action among or investments by intended 
beneficiaries, such as farmers, policymakers, or aid practitioners. Such tensions were the natural 
outcome of the interplay of the principal–agent relations on either side of research funders. They 
needed to both secure budget and authority from government, and attract interest and ideas from the 
scientific community. Contrasting notions of impact stemmed from the multiple ways in which each side 
valued research, creating the space available to craft funding opportunities and identify the results 
sought. 
Impact is the second-order consideration, derived from the first principles regarding the purpose of 
research and why science is considered useful to society. Research for the developing world can be 
defined in various ways, including efforts to build scientific capacity abroad, to inform public policy and 
aid agency practice, and to design and spread the use of innovative technologies. Each offers something 
for both sides of the governance context in which funders operate. The impact of each can be described 
in various ways, including: advances in knowledge, the skills and experience embedded in highly trained 
people, and real-life contributions to development goals such as enhanced opportunities for income and 
well-being. In speaking to their governments, research funders chronicle their impact in terms of new 
insights and innovations nurtured, the career achievements of current and former recipients, and 
numbers of people positively affected by their efforts. In speaking to the scientific community, funders 
encourage applicants to describe a pathway to impact: why their research findings might prove 
important to society, how those findings might be used, and the efforts that would be taken to reach 
that audience of potential research users. 
As research for the developing world shifted toward market-inspired governance, the criteria by which 
funders were judged tended toward the utility of research. Once based on its intrinsic value for 
empowering developing countries, research was increasingly assessed based on its instrumental value 
for furthering whole-of-(donor)-government strategies. This shift narrowed the research agenda by 
privileging those programs that resonated with foreign policy, reducing the opportunities for novel, 
curiosity-driven work based on local interest. The research agenda gravitated toward subjects that were 
political safe, either by addressing questions of technological innovation or rooting itself in the accepted 
policy discourse within donor capitals. Funding opportunities also became increasingly open to a 
plurality of voices within the larger scientific community beyond development studies. Funders are 
afforded less discretion over whom and what they fund, as home governments proactively identify the 
themes, and even particular projects, they wish to support. At the same time, research funders are 
pressed to be more critical of their grants: to demonstrate the outcomes from and cost-effectiveness of 
their work. They have embraced measures of significance and reach, seeking not only the proof of 
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concept and the potential for improving lives, but delivering at scale to affect with renewed programs 
that seek impact at scale. 
Final Points  
Together the three aspects of leadership, performance, and impacts form a golden braid tying together 
research governance. Research for the developing world is changing, fading as the R&D of foreign aid, 
and rising as a response to global challenges. Its future is uncertain, but its past provides key insights for 
public management. 
The nature of leadership evolved from defining and pursuing unique approaches, toward navigating and 
brokering partnerships with others. The powers initially invested in governing boards shifted upward 
and outward, placing a premium on the ability of leaders to work within an increasingly complex context 
for research governance. Leaders create visions of success, mobilize support, and reshape the operating 
space for their organizations. Leaders provide direction by defining performance that satisfies external 
expectations, striking a balance among competing public values and ethics, tailored to their particular 
mandate. 
Research for the developing world tended to be more sensitive to concepts of performance within 
foreign policy; yet changes to science policy heightened concern for academic productivity, partnerships 
beyond academia, and demonstrations of research impact. Performance measures have also been used 
as an oversight mechanism, circumscribing the space available for leaders and, at the extreme, 
undermining an organization’s mandate. Where funders used to encourage “small is beautiful” with 
local experiments in development, success is now seen as “getting to scale,” creating self-financing 
models to deliver innovations that eliminate poverty and improve lives. 
Research impact is the second-order consideration, derived from the first principles regarding the 
purpose of research and why science is considered useful to society. Assessing the impact of research is 
fraught with difficulty, including the time required to achieve impact, establishing attribution for real-
world change, and gathering evidence to substantiate such impact. As research began to shift toward 
market-inspired governance, the criteria by which funders were judged tended toward the utility of 
research. Once based on its intrinsic value for empowering developing countries, this utility was 
increasingly assessed based on its instrumental value for furthering donor strategies. Moving forward, 
the definition of impact will increasingly depend on research governance abroad and contributions 




ACIAR (2011) Strategic Framework for International Agricultural Research within Australia’s aid program.  
 
— — —.  (2010) ACIAR Annual Report 2009–2010 
 
— — —.  (2008) Statement of Expectations received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in September 
2008 
 
— — —.  (2006) ACIAR and public funding of R&D. Submission to productivity commission study on 




— — —.  (2003) ACIAR Annual Report 2002–2003 
 
— — —.  (1999) Staying ahead: future strategies for ACIAR. Policy statement by the Board of 
Management following the external review 
 
Arnold, Michael H. et al (1989) External Review of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research, March 15 (http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/398/Review - Mid term review report.doc, 
accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1962) “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources to invention,” in Richard 
Nelson (ed.), The rate and direction of inventive activity: economic and social factors. Princeton 
University Press. 
 
AusAID (2012a) AgResults: Innovation in Research and Delivery. Draft concept note 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ accessed 31 March 2013) 
 
— — —. (2012b) AusAID Research Strategy 2012–16 
 
— — —. (2006) Australian Aid: Promoting growth and stability. A white paper on the Australian 
government’s overseas aid program.  
 
Australia (2011) Independent review of aid effectiveness 
 
— — —. (1997) ‘Better Aid for a Better Future’, the Government's Response to the Committee of Review 
of Australia's Overseas Aid Program given by Minister Alexander Downer on November 18th  
 
— — —. (1992) Government response to the Review of the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
 
— — —. (1990) Setting directions for Australian research: a report to the Prime Minister. Australian 
Science & Technology. Council Australian Government Publishing Service 
 
— — —. (1982) Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982. [Online] 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00015 (Accessed 12 May 2012) 
 
— — —. (1981) Speech by Minister Street on the occasion of the second reading of the ACIAR Act during 
the 32nd session of Parliament on October 27th 
 
— — —.   (1979) Australia and the Third World: report of the committee on Australia's relations with the 
Third World. Australia government publishing service: Canberra. 
 
Barlow, Thomas (2006) The Australian miracle: an innovative nation revisited. Pan Macmillan: Sydney 
NSW 
 
Bastow, Simon, Patrick Dunleavy, and Jane Tinkler (2014) The impact of the social sciences: how 




Barney, Jay B. and Delwyn N. Clark (2007) Resource-based theory: creating and sustaining competitive 
advantage. Oxford University Press. 
 
Baum, Joel  (1996) “Organizational ecology,” in Clegg, S.R.; C. Hardy, T.B. Lawrence and W.R. Nord (eds.), 
Handbook of organization studies.: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Beattie, Anthony (1994) Experience of Commissioning Research and Development, in Hay, R.K.M. (ed) 
Science in government: rise of the intelligent consumer. Scottish Agricultural Science Agency: 
Edinburgh, UK 
 
Beemans, Pierre (1999) Re-inventing IDRC in the 1990s. Presentation to SID-Ottawa Luncheon 18 May. 
(<http://hdl.handle.net/10625/23852>, accessed 27 April 2013) 
 
Benner, Mats (2011) In search of excellence? An international perspective on governance of university 
research. In Bo Göransson and Claes Brundenius (eds.) Universities in transition: the changing role 
and challenges for academic institutions. New York, NY: Springer. 
 
Boden, Rebecca, Deborah Cox and Maria Nedeva (2006) The appliance of science: new public 
management and strategic change. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 18(2), 125–141. 
 
Boden, Rebecca, Deborah Cox, Maria Nedeva and Katharine Barker (2004) Scrutinising science: the 
changing UK government of science. Palgrave MacMillan: Hampshire, UK. 
 
Braben, Donald. 2004. Pioneering research: A risk worth taking. New York: Wiley Interscience. 
 
Braun, Dietmar (2003) Lasting tensions in research policy-making – a delegation problem. Science and 
Public Policy 30(5): 309–321 
 
— — —.  (1993) Who governs intermediary agencies? Principal-agent relations in research policy-
making. Journal of Public Policy 13(2):135–162. 
 
Bryson, John M.; (2004) Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations. San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass, an imprint of John Wiley and Sons, Inc.. 
 
Burawoy, Michael (2011) Redefining the public university: developing an analytical framework. Social 
Science Research Council. (<http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/burawoy-redefining-the-public-
university/> accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
Canada (2012) Economic Action Plan 2012, tabled by James Flaherty on March 29th 
(http://www.budget.gc.ca accessed 8 May 2013) 
 
— — —. (2010) The Budget Plan 2010, tabled by James Flaherty on March 4th (http://www.budget.gc.ca 
accessed 31 March 2013)  
 
— — —. (2008) Speech from the Throne. November 19 (http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca accessed 6 May 2013). 
 
— — —. (2007) The Budget Plan 2007, tabled by James Flaherty on March 19th 
(http://www.budget.gc.ca accessed 31 March 2013)  




— — —. (2005) The Budget Plan 2005, tabled by Ralph Goodale on February 23rd  
(http://fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/bp2005e.pdf accessed 27 April 2013) 
 
— — —. (2004) Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin in Reply to the Speech from the Throne. February 
2 (http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca accessed 27 April 2013). 
 
— — —. (2003) The Budget Plan 2003, tabled by John Manley on February 18th 
(http://www.budget.gc.ca/ accessed 27 April 2013). 
 
— — —. (1995) The Budget Plan 1995, tabled by Paul Martin on February 27th 
(http://www.budget.gc.ca/ accessed 27 April 2013). 
 
— — —. (1992) The Budget 1992, tabled by Don Mazankowski on February 25th 
(http://www.budget.gc.ca accessed Apr 26, 2013) 
 
— — —. (1991) The Budget, tabled by Michael Wilson on February 26th 
(<http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/1991-plan-eng.pdf>, accessed 27 April 2013). 
 
— — —. (1988) Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 4 Well-Performing Organizations, 
tabled November 1st Office of the Auditor General (http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca accessed 27 April 
2013) 
 
— — —. (1987) For whose benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
International Affairs on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs  
 
— — —. (1970) International Development Research Centre Act (<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-
19/FullText.html>, accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
— — —. (1968) Memorandum to Cabinet: International Development Centre, October 9 
(http://hdl.handle.net/10625/38415 accessed 22 March 2013)  
 
Carden, Fred (2009) Knowledge to policy: making the most of development research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Chen, Huey-Tsyh (2005) Practical Program Evaluation: Assessing and Improving Planning, 
Implementation, and Effectiveness. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.  
 
Cd 9230 (1918) Report of Machinery of Government Committee.Ministry of Reconstruction: London, UK.  
 
Cm 7656 (2009) Eliminating world poverty: Building our common future. White Paper on International 
Development 
 
Cm 6876 (2006) Making Governance work for the Poor. White Paper on International Development  
 




Cm 4310 (1999) Modernising government. White Paper presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister. 
TSO: London, UK 
 
Cm 3789 (1997) Eliminating world poverty.  White Paper on International Development.  
 
Cm 2250 (1993) Realising our potential: a strategy for science, engineering and technology. HMSO: 
London, UK 
 
Cmnd 5046 (1972) Framework for government research and development. HMSO: London, UK 
 
Cmnd 4814 (1971) The Organization and management of government R&D, Framework for Government 
R&D 
 
Collis, Brad (2002) Fields of discovery: Australia’s CSIRO. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW. 
 
Conway, Gordon and Jeff Waage (2010) Science and Innovation for Development. UK Collaborative for 
Development Sciences: London, UK.  
 
Core, Peter (2009) A retrospective on rural R&D in Australia. Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Canberra, ACT 
 
Crawford Study Committee (1976) A proposal to establish an international research assistance 
foundation in Australia (< http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/398/Crawford Study Committee Report 
201976.pdf  >, accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
Daniels, Doug and Tim Dottridge (1993) Managing agricultural research: views from a funding agency. 
Public Administration and Development 13: 205–15 
 
Davies, Huw T.O. and Sandra M. Nutley (2002) Evidence-based policy and practice: rhetoric to reality, 
Research Unit for Research Utilisation, discussion paper 2, University of St Andrews 
 
Demeritt, David (2000) The new social contact for science: accountability, relevance and value in US and 
UK science and research policy. Antipode 32(3):308–329 
 
DFID (2011) UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results Department for International Development: 
London, UK 
 
— — —. (2009) DFID Research 2009–2010: providing research evidence that enables poverty reduction. 
Department for International Development: London, UK 
 
— — —. (2008) Research Strategy 2008–2013. Department for International Development: London, UK 
 
— — —. (2004) Research Funding Framework 2005–2007. Department for International Development: 
London, UK 
 
— — —. (2000a) DFID Research: 1999/2000 prepared by Knowledge Policy Unit. Department for 




— — —. (2000b) Science and Innovation Strategy 2001–2005. Department for International 
Development: London, UK 
 
Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom and Paul C. Stern (2003) “The struggle to govern the commons” Science 
302:1907–1912 
 
Doern, G. Bruce and Christopher Stoney (2009) Research and Innovation Policy: Changing Federal 
Government-University Relations. University of Toronto Press.  
 
Donovan, Claire (2008) The Australian research quality framework. New Direction for Evaluation 118: 
47–60. 
 
Duncan, Ron; Meryl Williams and Stephen Howes (2005) Core group recommendations report for a 
white paper on Australia’s aid program. AusAID: Canberra, ACT 
 
Economist (2010) First break all the rules: the charms of frugal innovation. The Economist Apr 15 
 
Edgerton, David (2009) The ‘Haldane principle’ and other invented traditions in science policy. Wilkins-
Bernal-Medawar Prize Lecture on 20 April at UK Royal Society 
 
Edwards, Michael (2010) Know-how, know-what and the politics of knowledge for development. Speech 
at HIVOS conference ‘Knowledge & change: theory and practice of development dilemmas’ 
September 29 in Hague, Netherlands  
 
Ely, Adrian and Melissa Leach (2010) Innovation, sustainability, development: a new manifesto. STEPS 
Centre. Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 
 
Farrer, Keith (2005) To feed a nation: a history of Australian food science and technology. CSIRO 
Publishing: Collingwood, NSW 
 
Faulker, David O. and Andrew Campbell (2003) Oxford handbook of strategy. Oxford University Press 
 
Ferlie, Ewan and Annabelle Mark (2002) Organizational research and the new public management in 
McLaughlin, K. et al (Eds) New public management: current trends and future prospects. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Fischer, Frank (2003) Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Fried, Robert C. (1976) Performance in American Bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company 
 
Funnel, Sue C. and Patricia J. Rogers (2011) Purposeful Program Theory: Effective Use of Theories of 
Change and Logic Models. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, an imprint of John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
 
Gibbons, Michael et al. (1994) The new production of knowledge: the dynamics of science and research 




Gordon, J. King (ed.) (1979) Canada’s role in science and technology for development. Proceedings from 
a symposium held at the Ontario Science Centre. IDRC report 141-e.  
 
Grace, Cheri (2010) Product Development Partnerships (PDPs): Lessons from PDPs established to 
develop new health technologies for neglected diseases. DFID Human Development Resource 
Centre 
 
Grimpe, Christoph (2011) Extramural research grants and scientists’ funding strategies: Beggars cannot 
be choosers? Research Policy 41:1448–1460. 
 
Guston, David H. (2000) Between politics and science: assuring the integrity and productivity of research. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Habermann, Birgit and Margarita Langthale (2010) Changing the world of development research? An 
insight into theory and practice. Development in Practice 20(7): 771–783. 
 
Hagen-Zanker, Jessica et al. (2012) Making systematic reviews work for international development 
research. Briefing paper for Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
 
Helpman, Elhanan (2004) The mystery of economic growth. Harvard University Press 
 
Hirschman, Albert O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States. Harvard University Press. 
 
Holmes, John and Brian Harris (2010) Enhancing the contribution of research councils to the generation 
of evidence to inform policy making. Evidence & Policy 6(3): 391–409 
 
Hopper, William D. (1979) “Time is all important” Mazingira: 8:59–64.  
 
— — —. (1973) “Research policy: eleven issues” IDRC report 14-e. [online] 
http://hdl.handle.net/10625/308 (accessed 23 August 2013) 
 
House of Commons (2012) Building scientific capacity for development. Science and Technology 
Committee, 4th Report of Session 2012–13, HC Report 377 
 
— — —. (2004) The Use of Science in UK International Development Policy, Science and Technology 
Committee, 13th Report of Session 2003–04, HC Report 133  
 
— — —. (1983) Foreign affairs committee: the Overseas Development Administration’s scientific and 
special units. HMSO: London, UK 
 
House of Lords (2012) The role and function of departmental Chief Scientific Advisors. 4th Report of 
Session 2010–12.  HL Paper 264 
 
— — —. (2010) Setting priorities for publicly funded research. Science and Technology Committee. 3rd 





IDRC (2009) Innovating for Development: Strategic Framework 2010–2015. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC 
 
— — —. (2006) Competitive Grant Projects at IDRC. Evaluation highlight 8. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC 
[online] http://hdl.handle.net/10625/29989 (accessed 23 August 2013) 
 
— — —. (2004) Corporate Strategy and Program Framework 2005–2010. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC 
 
— — —. (2002) “Closing the loop: communication for change at IDRC” 
(http://hdl.handle.net/10625/21181 accessed 26 April 2013). 
 
— — —. (2000) IDRC Annual Report 1999–2000. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. 
 
— — —. (1996) IDRC Annual Report 1995–1996. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. 
 
— — —. (1995a) IDRC Annual report 1994–1995. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. 
 
— — —. (1995b) “1995–6 Program update”, memo from Caroline Pestieau to Board of Governors dated 
October 11th 
 
— — —. (1994) IDRC Annual Report 1993–1994. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC. 
 
— — —. (1977) "Clarification of the IDRC's role" Memo from Sylvie Plouffe to David Hopper, 19 August 
 
— — —. (1970) “Statement to the inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors”, by W. David Hopper. 
Ottawa, Canada, 26 October. Document IDRC-002e 
 
Industry Commission (1994) Research and development. Report no. 44 May 15 Australian Government 
Publishing Service: Canberra ACT 
 
Jefferies, Charles J. (1964) A review of colonial research 1940–1960. Overseas Research Publication no. 
6, Department of technical cooperation (HMSO: London) 
 
Jansen, Dorothea (2007) New forms of governance in research organizations. Springer 
 
Kerin, John (2010) Speech on ‘what policy framework would I now establish for agricultural research, 
development and extension’ given at University of Melbourne, May 5th 
 
Khagram, Sanjeev et al. (2009) Evidence for development effectiveness. Journal of development 
effectiveness. 1(3): 247–270. 
 
King, Kenneth and Simon A. McGrath (2004) Knowledge for development? Comparing British, Japanese, 
Swedish and World Bank aid. HSRC Press and Zed Books: Cape Town, South Africa and London, UK. 
 
KPMG (2008) Holy Grail or achievable goal? International perspectives on public sector performance 
management. 
 
Lundvall, Bengt-Åke (1988) Innovation as an interactive process, In Dosi, G. et al (Eds) Technology and 




Meier, G.M. (1994) Review of development research in the UK: report to the Development Studies 
Association. Journal of International Development 6(5): 465–517. 
 
Merton, Robert K. (1942) “The normative structure of science,” in (1973) The sociology of science: 
theoretical and empirical investigations. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Meyer, Michael and Matthew Kearnes (2013) Intermediaries between science, policy and the market. 
Science and Public Policy 40: 423–429 
 
Mintzberg, Henry (2007) Tracking strategies: towards a general theory of strategy formation. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Molenaar, Henk; Louk Box, and Rutger Engelhard (Eds) (2009) Knowledge on the move: emerging 
agendas for development-oriented research. International Development Publishers: Leiden, 
Netherlands. 
 
Moore, Mark H. (1995) Creating public value: strategic management in government. Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Muirhead, Bruce and Ron Harpelle (2010) IDRC: 40 Years of Ideas, Innovation and Impact. Wilfrid Laurier 
Press: Waterloo, Canada. 
 
Nairn, Malcom E.; Gella T. Castillo and Robert B. Dun (1998) Staying ahead: report of a review of the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. Canberra, ACIAR 
 
Nelson, Richard R. and Sidney G. Winter (1982) An evolutionary theory of economic change. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
— — —.  (1977) In search of useful theory in innovation. Research Policy 6: 36–76. 
 
Nutley, Sandra M.; Isabel Walter and Huw T.O. Davies (2007) Using evidence: how research can inform 
public services. Policy Press: Bristol, UK 
 
ODM (1978, 1977, 1975, 1974) Report on research and development, Ministry of Overseas 
Development. HMSO: London. 
 
ODA (1994, 1993, 1992) Report on research and development. NRI: Chatham, UK 
 
— — —. (1988) Report on research and development. ODNRI: Chatham, UK 
 
— — —. (1980, 1979) Report on research and development. Overseas Development Administration: 
London, UK 
 
OECD (2010) The OECD innovation strategy: getting a head start on tomorrow. OECD: Paris 
 




— — —.  (2002, 1963) Frascati manual: proposed standard practice for surveys on research and 
experimental development, 6th edition. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 
Paris, France. 
 
OECD/Eurostat (2005, 1992) Oslo manual: guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data, 3rd  
edition. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Paris, France. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
Paarlberg, Laurie E. and Wolfgang Bielefeld (2009) Complexity science – an alternative framework for 
understanding strategic management in public serving organizations. International Public 
Management Journal 12(2):236–260 
 
Pearson, Lester B. et al. (1969) Partners in development: report of the commission on international 
development. New York, Washington and London: Praeger. 
 
Penfield, Teresa et al (2014) Assessment, evaluation, and definitions of research impact: a review. 
Research Evaluation 23: 21–32. 
 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salanick (1978) The external control of organizations: a resource-
dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper & Row 
 
Plumptre, Arthur F.W. (1968) Memorandum to Maurice Strong, subject Proposed International 
Development Research Institution, 24 January (http://hdl.handle.net/10625/39635 accessed 22 
March 2013) 
 
Poister, Theodore H. (2010) The Future of Strategic Planning in the Public Sector: Linking Strategic 
Management and Performance. Public Administration Review: S246–S254. 
 
Poister, Theodore H.; David W. Pitts and Lauren H. Edwards (2010) Strategic management research in 
the public sector: a review, synthesis and future directions. American Review of Public 
Administration 40(5): 522–545. 
 
Polanyi, Michael (1962) The republic of science. Minerva 1: 54–73. 
 
Polster, Claire (2003) Canadian university research policy at the turn of the century: continuity and 
change in the social relations of academic research. Studies in political economy 71/72: 177–199.  
 
Ravallion, Martin and Alan Gelb (2010) Research for development: a World Bank perspective on future 
directions for research. Policy Research Working Paper 5437. World Bank: Washington, DC 
 
Reid, Walter V. et al (2010) Earth system science for global sustainability: grand challenges. Science 330 
(6006): 916–917. 
 
Rip, Arie (2003) “Societal challenges for R&D evaluation,” in P. Shapira and S. Kuhlmann (eds.), Learning 
from Science and Technology Policy Evaluation: Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
 




Rogers, Patricia (2000) Program theory evaluation: practice, promise and problems. New Directions for 
Evaluation 87: 5–13. 
 
Rousseau, Denise M. (2006) Is there such a thing as “evidence based management”? Academy of 
Management Review 31(2): 256–269 
 
Sandland, Ron and Graham Thompson (2012) Icon in crisis: the reinvention of CSIRO. Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press 
 
Schubert, Torben (2009) Empirical observations on New Public Management to increase efficiency in 
public research – boon or bane? Research Policy 38:1225–34. 
 
Scoones, Ian and Melissa Leach (2006). The slow race: making technology work for the poor, Demos: 
London, UK. 
 
Seward, Shirley B. (1974) The evolution of the International Development Research Centre 
(<http://hdl.handle.net/10625/6602>, accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
Shove, Elizabeth. (2003) Principals, agents and research programmes. Science and public policy 
30(5):371–381. 
 
Singer, Hans et al. (1970) The Sussex manifesto: science and technology to developing countries during 
the second development decade. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex: Brighton, UK. 
 
Sivadasan, Suja et al. (2003) Review of the DFID's role in the international research effort (< 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/Review_of_the_Department_for_International_Develo.pdf?
paperid=2155173 >, accessed 7 January 2015) 
 
Slaughter, Sheila and Gary Rhoades (1996) The emergence of a competitiveness research and 
development policy coalition and the commercialization of academic science and technology. Science, 
Technology and Human Values 21:303–339 
 
Slaymaker, Olva et al. (1998) The nature of research at IDRC, report of research ad hoc committee of the 
Board. BG 98(06)06 (http://hdl.handle.net/10625/29892 accessed 31 March 2013) 
 
Smillie, Ian, (2011) “Learning and development: three essential books”, Development in Practice 
21(3):441–43. 
 
Sparrow, Malcom K. (2011) Governing Science. New Perspectives in Policing. Harvard Kennedy School (< 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232179.pdf >, accessed 29 August 2013) 
 
Stephan, Paula (2012) How economics shapes science. Harvard University Press 
 
Stockdale, Peter (1995) Pearsonian internationalism in practice: the International Development Research 




Surr, Martin; Andrew Barnett, Alex Duncan, Melanie Speight, David Bradley, Alan Rew and John Toye 
(2002) Research for Poverty Reduction: DFID Research Policy Paper. 
(<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Articles/Surr_Report-
Research_for_Poverty_Reduction_Policy_Paper_Annexes.pdf >, accessed 7 January 2015)  
 
Talbot, Colin (2010) Theories of performance: organizational and service improvement in the public 
domain. Oxford University Press 
 
— — —. (2008) Performance regimes – the institutional context of performance policies. International 
Journal of Public Administration 31(14): 1569–91. 
 
Tribe, Derek E. (1991) Doing well by doing good: agricultural research feeding and greening the world. 
Crawford Fund and Pluto Press: Leichhardt, NSW 
 
Uhrig, John (2003) Review of the corporate governance of statutory authorities and office holders. 
Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, ACT 
 
UK (2011) Science & Engineering Assurance Review of the Department for International Development. 
Government Office for Science 
 
— — —. (2003) Getting the evidence: research in policy making. Report by comptroller and auditor 
general HC 586 session 2002–03 
 
— — —. (2002) DFID Performance Management - helping to reduce world poverty. National Audit Office, 
Report by comptroller and auditor general HC 739 
 
UN Millennium Project (2005) Innovation: applying knowledge in development. London, UK: Earthscan. 
 
UNESCO (2010) World social science report. UNESCO: Paris, France 
 
van der Meulen, Barend (2003). New roles and strategies of a research council: intermediation of the 
principal-agent relationship. Science and Public Policy 30(5): 323–336. 
 
— — —.  (1998). Science policies as principal-agents games - Institutionalization and path dependency in 
the relation between government and science. Research Policy 27(4): 397–414. 
 
Varmus, Harold et al. (2003) Grand challenges in global health. Science 302 (5644) 
 
Wagner, Caroline (2008) The new invisible college: science for development. Brookings Institute: 
Washington, DC  
 
Whitley, Richard. (2011) Changing Governance and Authority Relations in the Public Sciences. Minerva 
49:359–385 
 
Whitley, Richard and Jochen Gläser (2007) The changing governance of the sciences: the advent of 




Worboys, Michael (1996) “British Colonial Science Policy 1918–1939,” in Patrick Petitjean (ed.), Les 
Sciences Coloniales: Figures et Institutions. Paris: ORSTOM, 99–111. 
 
World Bank (1998) World Development Report 1998–99: Knowledge for Development. World Bank: 
Washington, DC. 
 
Ziman, John M. (2000) Real Science: What it is and what it means. Cambridge University Press 
